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The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) was created by the Open Society Initiative 
for West Africa (OSIWA) to reinforce the institutional and operational capacities of civil 
society in the region. WACSI also serves as a resource centre for training, research and 
documentation, experience sharing and political dialogue for CSOs in West Africa.
www.wacsi.org
Vision
:$&6, HQYLVLRQV D :HVW $IULFD RI HIîFLHQW HIIHFWLYH DQG LQïXHQWLDO FLYLO VRFLHW\
functioning as strategic partners for democracy, good governance and sustainable 
national development.
Mission
:$&6, LV DQRWIRUSURîWRUJDQLVDWLRQ WKDW VHHNV WR VWUHQJWKHQ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDODQG
operational capacities of civil society organisations through capacity strengthening 
programmes for increased and effective policy engagement, and the promotion of 
development, good governance and democratic values in West Africa.
OSIWA 
OSIWA plays a dual role in the region as both an advocate and grant-maker by enabling 
itself to be agenda-setters both within and alongside other organizations working on 
the ground. The Foundation works through a unique combination of grant making, 
advocacy, partnership building and technical assistance.
For example, we help support the production of publications and research studies; 
run advocacy campaigns using creative means; and provide institutional support to 
partners on the ground. While most funders either tend to focus exclusively on civil 
society or governmental institutions, OSIWA has carved its niche through a two-
pronged strategic focus: strengthening both democratic institutions and structures 
and civic participation in decision-making. There are several areas where, over the years, 
OSIWA has produced strong results.
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Civil Society and Development in West 
Africa: Issues, Problems and Doubts 




In the wake of the “Jasmine Revolution” which convulsed large parts of the Arab world 
in the spring of 2011, questions have been asked about the feasibility of transplanting 
the germ of discontent into the political soil of Sub-Saharan Africa. Not unexpectedly, 
a focal point of such excited discussions has been the assumed agency of civil society. 
For instance, early analyses of the role of social media in popular mobilizations in the 
affected countries appear to have settled on the consensus that they are important 
denominators of an ebullient civil society. While not expressly articulated, it is 
nonetheless implied that a strong civil society has been the driving social force behind 
WKHn$UDEVSULQJo
With the passage of time, others have disputed this line of thinking, pointing out the 
incongruity of speaking about civil society, never mind a healthy one, in a region of the 
world where, until recently, civil society was actually judged incapable of setting down 
roots. How, it is validly asked, can you have a strong civil society in societies where, if a 
VHFWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQWOLWHUDWXUHLVWREHEHOLHYHGLWVKRXOGQRWKDYHH[LVWHGLQWKHîUVW
instance? Thus, at the very moment of its apparent triumph, nagging questions about 
civil society - its pedigree, its usefulness in illuminating social processes outside the 
West, its character and forms- have powerfully resurfaced.
7KHUHDUHNH\OHVVRQVWREHGUDZQIURPWKHIRUHJRLQJDVRQHSRQGHUVWKHUDPLîFDWLRQV
of civil society in West Africa, particularly in relation to the subject of development- 
DPRYLQJ WDUJHW LQ LWVRZQULJKW7KHîUVW LV WKDW IRUDOO LWVXQGRXEWHGFXUUHQF\ FLYLO
VRFLHW\ UHPDLQV QRWRULRXVO\ GLIîFXOW WR SLQ GRZQ 6HFRQG HYHQ LI LWV SURSHUWLHV DQG
institutional forms could be established, assumptions about what civil society can or 
cannot accomplish are always fraught. Finally, pronouncements about civil society have 
to be located in historical time and place, for the social composition of civil society is 
invariably a function of local history, culture and socio-economic dynamics. To that 
extent, all civil society is, for want of a better word, local. 
Civil Society in West Africa: From the Colonial to the 
Contemporary Era
To properly anchor our analysis of the role of civil society in development in West Africa, a 
brief historical survey of the idea of civil society in the sub-region would seem imperative. 
Two distinct and not necessarily incongruent trajectories immediately come into view. 
On the one hand, it is possible to locate the antecedents of modern civil society in West 
$IULFD LQWKHWXPXOWRIWKHFRORQLDOHUDVSHFLîFDOO\WKH LPPHGLDWHSUHLQGHSHQGHQFH
period, when a network of associations arose to challenge the colonial regime and 
make a case for African political self-determination. Among other things, part of what 
was unique to this emergent civil society was its pan-regional focus. Names like the 
:HVW$IULFDQ6WXGHQWVo8QLRQ:HVW$IULFDQ<RXWK/HDJXHDQGWKHQHZVSDSHUWKHWest 
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African Pilot, are testimonies to the early stirrings of a sub-regional identity, and it is 
far from outlandish to suggest that the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), formed in 1975, must have drawn in part on this trans-national sensibility. 
That said, colonial civil society had an expressly political aim, to wit: expose the falsity 
RI FRORQLDOLVWVo FODLPV DQG DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW$IULFDQV DQG$IULFDQKLVWRU\ RUJDQL]H
Africans against the brutal assault on their culture by the colonial order; and prepare 
Africans for self-rule. Leading that charge was an emergent intelligentsia that mobilised 
indigenous histories and cultural repertoires to fashion a narrative in which Africans 
emerged as authentic and autonomous historical agents. With political independence 
in the bag, this elite, with few exceptions, moved to take over the reins of the newly 
LQGHSHQGHQWVWDWHVWKXVFRPSOHWLQJWKHîUVWHYHUSURFHVVRIPDVVGHIHFWLRQIURPFLYLO
VRFLHW\WRWKHVWDWHLQWKHVXEUHJLRQoVKLVWRU\
If the colonial era remains strangely elided in most writings on civil society in West 
Africa- and indeed the rest of the continent- it is because most writers on the subject 
tend to see civil society only in relation to the combination of individuals, events and 
LQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWVSDUNHGWKHHUDRInVHFRQGOLEHUDWLRQoLQWKHUHJLRQ7KLVLVWKHVHFRQG
GLVWLQFWQDUUDWLYHVWUDQGWKHFUXFLDOPLOHVWRQHLQZKLFKZDVWKHnFLYLOLDQFRXSoRI)HEUXDU\
1990 which saw the ouster of Mathieu Kerekou of Benin Republic. In a landscape then 
pockmarked with autocracies of various stripes, this was a remarkable achievement 
that owed in equal part to the inspiration of the Eastern European underground and 
WKHGRXJKWLQHVVRI ORFDORUJDQL]HUV7KH n0LUDFOHRI%HQLQoZDVPDGHSRVVLEOHE\ WKH
synergising of a network of civic associations from across the socio-political and cultural 
spectra, including student bodies, community organisations, church and associated 
UHOLJLRXVJURXSVWUDGHXQLRQVZRPHQoVDVVRFLDWLRQVDQGVXQGU\SROLWLFDOJURXSV
The events in Benin provided a marker for other civil society groups across the sub-
region. The political and economic situation in their respective countries was similar 
to what had obtained in under President Kerekou. Decades of political independence 
had failed to produce any concrete dividends. Material privation was pandemic, while 
civic autonomy remained a mirage due to persistent executive overreach. Furthermore, 
in many of them, years of martial rule had constricted the public sphere drastically. For 
the rest, any distinctions between military and civilian rule remained academic because 
RIWKHXQGHUO\LQJSHUVRQDOLVDWLRQRISRZHUDQGSXEOLFRIîFH7KLVZDVWKHVFHQDULRLQ
which a resurgent civil society emerged in early 1990s West Africa, and understandably, 
many had high hopes, not just for political liberation, but also for economic prosperity.  
The Socio-Cultural Milieu
In order to understand the contributions of civil society to political liberalisation and 
economic development in West Africa, one must begin with an appreciation of the 
broader ecology of the period under review. This is necessary in order to appreciate 
the global and domestic constraints that underpinned and shaped the agency of civil 
society, and the rationalities that informed or dictated the operations of different civil 
society organisations.
7RWKLVHQGLWLVZRUWKEHDULQJLQPLQGîUVWWKDWWKHHDUO\VFRLQFLGHGZLWKWKH
end of the East-West Cold War following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in October 
1989. Although the collapse was followed by mass exultation across Europe and North 
America, in Africa, it was also a period of intense angst and anxiety. The anxiety was 
GXHWRWKHXQFHUWDLQW\VXUURXQGLQJWKHHQGRI(DVW:HVWFRQWHQWLRQVSHFLîFDOO\IHDUV
about possible Western abandonment of its erstwhile strategic allies. In West Africa, 
these anxieties were compounded by the situation in Liberia (to be followed in short 
order by Sierra Leone) where a bloody civil war was exacting a massive human toll. This 
was the overall strategic environment in which civil society found itself at the beginning 
of the 1990s.
At the same time, the economic climate was overcast. The late 1980s found many 
African countries in the throes of a severe Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Initiated 
XQGHUSUHVVXUHIURPWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG,0)DQGWKH:RUOG%DQN6$3oV
advocacy of trade liberalization and state disinvestment in social services aimed at a 
leaner public bureaucracy. But the reality of SAP radically contradicted its theory. The 
new economic regime left in its austere wake a hobbled state and disaffected society. 
By the close of the 1990s, only a few scattered holdouts in universities, think tanks and 
corridors of state power remained wedded to the initial vision of SAP as an effective 
SDQDFHDIRU$IULFDoVHFRQRPLFSUREOHPV
Civil Society and Popular Expectation
2QHXSVKRWRIWKLVVFHQDULRZDVDPDVVLYHHURVLRQRISRSXODUFRQîGHQFHLQWKHVWDWH$W
the best of times, (West) Africans had been profoundly dubious about the capacity of the 
postcolonial state to midwife development. Among other things, many have doubted 
the capacity of the postcolonial elite for self-examination and political altruism. They 
have also questioned whether a state apparatus fashioned, presumably, to advance 
WKH LQWHUHVWV RI WKH FRORQLDO RUGHU FRXOG EH UHFRQîJXUHG DV D PRWRU IRU HFRQRPLF
transformation. SAP did little to dispel these doubts. On the contrary, its deleterious 
effect on state capacity meant that people doubted the state even more. 
In contrast, many, perhaps too hurriedly, saw an emergent civil society as the long 
sought for African economic Holy Grail. In part, this faith arose from a misreading 
RI WKH VRFLDO XWLOLW\ RI FLYLO VRFLHW\ RUPRUH VSHFLîFDOO\ WKH YDULDQW RI WKH LGHD WKDW
became ascendant in 1990s West Africa. Back then, many understood civil society as 
a counterweight to state power, roughly modeled on the dimension of society that 
had successfully outwitted authoritarian power in Soviet Eastern Europe. In time, civil 
society came to be seen as more than a counterweight to state arbitrariness; it became 
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the purveyor of a radical revolutionary gene, the platform upon which a new vision of 
economic prosperity and social justice could be built.
)RUWKRVHIDPLOLDUZLWKWKHOHVVWKDQOLQHDUDQFHVWU\RIWKHLGHDWKHREYLRXVLQïDWLRQLQ
popular expectation was something to be lamented. For such people however, while it 
was bad enough that a section of the African intelligentsia and development community 
XQFULWLFDOO\ DVVXPHG FLYLO VRFLHW\oV VDOYLîF GHVWLQ\ D JUHDWHU VRXUFH RI ZRUU\ OD\ LQ
WKHPDQQHU LQZKLFK WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW FRPSOH[ RIWHQ LQ nSDUWQHUVKLSo
RU nFRQVXOWDWLRQo ZLWK :HVW $IULFDQ FLYLO VRFLHW\ RUJDQLVDWLRQV VXFFXPEHG WR DQG
fostered the same misapprehension. In the end, though, the problem was not just the 
apparently simple question of whether or not civil society could facilitate development. 
Under certain conditions, it might, as examples from across the sub-region have 
shown. The real issues, it seems, were the failure to specify what was actually meant by 
GHYHORSPHQWWKHUHGXFWLRQRIGHYHORSPHQWWRVRPHWKLQJWKDWFDQEHnGRQHoZLWKRXW
UHIHUHQFH WR WKH VWDWH RU IRU WKDW PDWWHU SROLWLFV DQG îQDOO\ WKH LPSOLFDWLRQ WKDW
GHYHORSPHQW LV D nORFDOo SUREOHPZKLFK FDQ EH UHVROYHG RQFH WKH nULJKWo NLQG RI FLYLO
society- in practice, NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) which pass international 
GHYHORSPHQWDJHQFLHVoVPHOOWHVWLVLQVWDOOHG
Rethinking Civil Society and Development
That West Africa needs a development agenda is something that is taken for granted. 
What is not always clear, as indicated in the foregoing, is what is meant by development, 
whose duty it is to set the agenda (is it really about agenda setting?), what the agenda 
VKRXOGFRQWDLQZKRPGHYHORSPHQWLVPHDQWWREHQHîWDQGZKHWKHUFLYLOVRFLHW\DW
least as understood by majority in the region, is the proper agent to enact it. Clearly, 
then, things are not as settled as they might seem on the surface. 
First, it is futile to discuss development without engaging with what has been called 
the “development paradigm”, in particular the emergence of the idea of development 
within the framework of unequal relations between the global North and South. 
6HFRQG LQXQSDFNLQJ WKH LGHDRIGHYHORSPHQW VXIîFLHQW FDUHPXVWEH WDNHQQRW WR
give many of its underlying assumptions a free pass. For instance, part of what is 
UHJDUGHGD[LRPDWLFDOO\E\GHYHORSPHQW nSUDFWLWLRQHUVo LV WKHGHVLUDELOLW\RI HFRQRPLF
nJURZWKoDFKLHYHGWKURXJKWKHLQVWUXPHQWDOLW\RIDnIUHHoPDUNHW7KHSRLQWWREHVXUH
LVQRWDERXWZKHWKHUWKHIUHHPDUNHWLVRULVQoWDJRRGLGHDEXWWKHQHHGIRUDPRUH
incisive problematising of the fundamental principles of an idea- development- whose 
historical, discursive and ideological baggage is not always apparent.
The failure to grapple with this baggage is partly responsible, for instance, for the way 
the discourse of civil society and development in West Africa is typically framed. In this 
framing, development is prioritised as a set of goals which can be achieved once certain 
procedures are followed. Civil society, so goes the discourse, is best placed to actualise 
these procedures because it is shorn of the ills which have plagued the postcolonial 
VWDWH7KLVLVWKHEDFNGURSWRWRGD\oVVDQLWLVHGFLYLOVRFLHW\ZKLFKLVDUELWUDULO\FURZQHG
with only positive properties, and excludes actors and institutions ruled out either as 
QRWnFLYLOoHQRXJKRUSODLQnXQFLYLOo
Yet, for development to have any meaning at all, and for the discourse of civil society and 
development to gain any traction, these predetermined notions about both ideas must 
be unsettled. Bending the narrative arc will mean rethinking the idea of civil society, 
HVSHFLDOO\DJDLQVWWKHEDFNJURXQGRI:HVW$IULFDoVVSHFLîFKLVWRULHVDQGFKDOOHQJHV,W
will mean reviewing the travails of the postcolonial state and society in the region in 
light of the maelstrom of powerful global, economic, political and cultural forces. Last 
but not least, it will mean coming to terms with the notion of development itself as an 
integral part of these transnational forces, and not something that stands outside of it.
West Africa: A Sub-Region under Pressure
As a prolegomena to this, it is crucial to bear in mind the recent history of the sub-region, 
and the nature of challenges which it faces as a socio-economic and political unit. The 
tone for current developments in the sub-region was set by two landmark events which 
took place within three months of each other in December 1989 and February 1990 
UHVSHFWLYHO\7KHîUVWZDVWKHDWWDFNRQWKHUHJLPHRIODWH3UHVLGHQW6DPXHO'RHE\WKH
Charles Taylor-led National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The attack soon morphed 
into a full scale civil war which set the sub-region on a path of instability from which, 
two decades on, it is only just recovering. If the Liberian civil war- soon followed by 
WKHFLYLOZDULQ6LHUUD/HRQHLQVHWWKHVXEUHJLRQoVWHHWKRQHGJHWKHYLFWRU\RI
popular democratic forces over the Mathieu Kerekou dictatorship in February 1990 was 
a source of some consolation. 
The victory galvanised pro-democracy forces across the sub-region, partly inspiring the 
civic resurgence which resulted in reasonable democratic gains in Mali, Ghana, Senegal, 
1LJHULDDQG0DXULWDQLDDPRQJRWKHUV$ORQJWKHZD\VHYHUHFRQïLFWDQGWKHYLFWRU\
of democratic forces had yielded two interesting insights about state and society in the 
VXEUHJLRQWKHVWDWHLVQRWLQYLQFLEOHDIWHUDOODQGZLOOLIVXIîFLHQWO\SXVKHGPDNH
VLJQLîFDQWFRQFHVVLRQVDQGVRFLHW\GHVSLWHDFXWHPDWHULDOLPPLVHUDWLRQUHPDLQV
capable of mounting a robust challenge.
In the aftermath, West Africa has remained poised between despair and hope. Although 
political liberalisation raised hopes of a region-wide economic transformation, poverty 
remains endemic, with at least ten of the most stricken countries experiencing poverty 
OHYHOV GHîQHG DV WKH SHUFHQWDJH RI D JLYHQ SRSXODWLRQ VXEVLVWLQJ RQ OHVV WKDQ WZR
dollars a day) of between 65 and 90 percent.




international mediation of some sort almost inevitable, democratisation opened the 
GRRU IRU YDULRXV IRUPV RIZHVWHUQ îQDQFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO DVVLVWDQFH 7RJHWKHU WKHVH
LQWHUYHQWLRQVFRQVWLWXWHGDEDFNGURSWRWKHLQFUHDVHGLQïXHQFHRIJOREDOIRUFHVLQWKH
affairs of the sub-region. These forces have impacted state and society in unexpected 
ways. On the one hand, the irruption of neoliberal ideology has led to a fundamental 
reassessment of the state and its obligations, a reassessment that, in praxis, has 
translated into greater retrenchment from the public realm. On the other hand, at the 
level of society, rapid change has translated into disaffection among the majority who 
feel disoriented by both its pace and direction.
Fortunately, these existential clouds come with a silver lining. With global constraints 
has come a raft of opportunities that younger elements within the population are rapidly 
taking advantage of. For instance, in a totally unanticipated way, new communications 
technologies have facilitated the expansion of the public space and opened up new 
RXWOHWV IRU HQWUHSUHQHXULDO HQHUJ\ WR ïRXULVK $QGZKLOH WKLV SURYLGHV QR DVVXUDQFH
that the business of governance will not continue to plough its accustomed furrow 
DIHDUVHHPLQJO\EXWWUHVVHGE\:HVW$IULFDoVIULJKWIXOO\ ODUJHQXPEHURIFRPSHWLWLYH
autocracies), the change in the modality of interpersonal relationships inspires 
FRQîGHQFHWKDWVRFLHWDOUHVSRQVHZLOOEHPRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHG
The foregoing, I suggest, is the proper historical, economic and social milieu within 
which an examination of the role of civil society in development in West Africa should 
be anchored. To pass mustard, such analysis must transcend the current tendency to see 
civil society as an intra-associational competition to establish who can be most polite 
or civil, to a serious quest to locate the roots of what Celestin Monga once described 
as “the anthropology of anger” in West African communities. Further, such inquiry 
must eschew the dominant development paradigm in order to trace the footprints of 
authentic popular mobilisations for socio-economic change across the region.   
Civil Society and Development: Beyond the Usual Suspects
In line with this contrarian spirit, I would like to revisit one of the most inspiring 
examples of civic mobilisation in the sub-region- if not the continent- in recent years. 
This is the by and large successful campaign for reconciliation in war-torn Liberia, 
conducted under the aegis of the Liberian Mass Action for Peace. The details of what 
that movement accomplished, and the strategies it used under the inspired leadership 
of Leymah Gbowee, are now in the public domain, especially following the release of 
the documentary movie “Pray the Devil Back to Hell” and the recent award of the 2011 
Nobel Peace Prize to Ms. Gbowee. So, I will not recapitulate them here. Instead, I wish to 
underscore two lessons from that historical moment to deepen my critique of the way 
we imagine civil society, development, and the relationship between the two.
First, it goes without saying that the general understanding of civil society in West 
Africa today (and here, the sub-region toes the African party line) is of an associational 
realm that is autonomous of the family, the market, and the state. Even after setting 
aside the problem of how to properly demarcate boundaries among these spheres, 
other quandaries still arise. For example, what kinds of associations are in and which 
are out? How do we account for issues of class, resources, and ideological orientation 
among associations, given that not all associations are equal, and different associations 
have different kinds of access to the public space? How do we guard against equating 
associational visibility with associational success, given that visibility is often a function 
RIUHVRXUFHVDQGSDUWLFXODUDVVRFLDWLRQVoDFFHVVWRLQYLVLEOHVRFLDOFDSLWDO"
Finally, how do we ensure not to reduce the idea of civil society to the associational 
realm? These questions become especially pertinent when we consider that under 
nQRUPDO FLUFXPVWDQFHVo WKH /LEHULDQ0DVV$FWLRQ IRU3HDFHZLWK LWVPDVVRI VRFLDOO\
H[FOXGHG SRRU ZRPHQ ZRXOG QRW KDYH îWWHG LQWR WKH SRSXODU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
FLYLO VRFLHW\ 2QH OHVVRQ WKDW WKH VXFFHVV RIZRPHQoV DQWLZDUPRELOLVDWLRQ WHDFKHV
therefore, is that when it comes to how we think about civil society, it is important 
to look beyond the formal associational realm- beyond NGOs and similar agents- to 
WKRVHZLWKLQVRFLHW\ZKRPD\ODFN1*2VRUVLPLODUIRUPDORUJDQL]DWLRQVoFORXWEXWDUH
nonetheless resourceful in marking and achieving a social objective. 
The implication of this for the way we think about development is obvious. If our 
conception of what constitutes civil society needs to be broadened, it also means that 
ZHQHHGWRORRNEH\RQGnWKHXVXDOVXVSHFWVoIRUWKHNLQGRIDJHQF\DQGVWUDWHJ\WKDW
may bring about authentic development. In West Africa, and indeed in Africa as a 
whole, the need to look beyond NGOs, to take one instance, is underscored by increasing 
SRSXODU GLVJUXQWOHPHQW ZLWK ZKDW LV SHUFHLYHG DV PDQ\ 1*2Vo VHOIULJKWHRXVQHVV
and exaggerated sense of self-worth. A similar disaffection applies to aid agencies 
who many, not least local NGOs themselves, increasingly see as midwives of Western 
political design. While these grievances are not exactly new, the fact is that they have 
been more vehemently articulated in recent times. 
$W îUVW VLJKW D VHFRQG LQVLJKW IURP WKH VXFFHVVIXO DQWLZDU PRELOL]DWLRQ LQ /LEHULD
may seem counter-intuitive. The trigger for the formation of the Liberian Mass Action 
IRU3HDFHZDV WKH UHOXFWDQFHRIFRPEDWDQWVRQERWKVLGHVRI WKH/LEHULDQFRQïLFW WR




over the past decade, especially one involving an aspect of the general population that 
is often systematically discriminated against. Yet- and this is the rub- the success of the 
Liberian Mass Action for Peace tends to disguise the fact that, over time, in the sub-
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UHJLRQDQGSHUKDSVLQ$IULFDDVDZKROHDFHUWDLQORVVRIFRQîGHQFHLQWKHSRZHURI
collective action can be discerned. The reasons for this are multiple, including, ironically, 
D IHHOLQJ DPRQJ FLWL]HQV LQ WKH UHJLRQoV HOHFWRUDO GHPRFUDFLHV WKDW VXFK DFWLRQPD\
EHVXSHUïXRXV*HQHUDOO\KRZHYHU , WKLQN LWXOWLPDWHO\KDVWRGRZLWKWKHIHHOLQJRI
personal and political impotence created by powerful global economic and cultural 
forces.
The implications for civil society and development are intriguing, and profoundly 
so. For instance, what are the possibilities of civic agency in a context of generalized 
disillusionment? How do we conceive of resistance in a society whose members 
cynically assume the futility of mass action? Last but not least, how do you mobilise 
SHRSOHIRUGHYHORSPHQWDPLGVRPXFKGLIîGHQFHDERXWSROLWLFVDQGSROLWLFDORIîFH"
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the confusion associated with its usage, some of which have been 
pointed out in the foregoing, the idea of civil society remains hugely popular in West 
Africa. While the number of civil society organisations across the region has grown 
exponentially over the past decade, state governments have shown greater enthusiasm 
LQ nFROODERUDWLQJo ZLWK FLYLO VRFLHW\ DQG PDNLQJ LW SDUW RI WKH JRYHUQDQFH SURFHVV ,
take that as an indication of some success, though it has not been without its own 
problems. In a number of cases, apparent state attempt to court civil society has caused 
considerable tension, particularly where such courtship has borne a suspiciously 
close resemblance to incorporation. At the same time, civil society itself has become a 
KRQH\SRWIRUDVHFWLRQRIWKHHOLWHZKRVHHVWDUWLQJD&62DVDPHDQVWRîQDQFLDOVHOI
empowerment. For this and related reasons, civil society may seem dodgy.
But this must not be a pretext to abandon it. Rather, it ought to be seen as an invitation 
to retool. Such retooling must embrace the diverse lineage of the idea as a way of 
coming to terms with its possibilities and frailties. 
For its part, it is important to see development not as a set of slogans to be chanted, but 
a process that must be set within the framework of the historically complex intercourse 
EHWZHHQ :HVW $IULFD DQG WKH nGHYHORSHGo n1RUWKo DQ LQWHUFRXUVH WKDW KDV OHIW WKH
former with all sorts of vulnerabilities. Civil society can help with this. But it has to be a 
reimagined civil society, just as it will have to be a different sort of development.
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public arena. Voice of the voiceless, institution of checks and balances, it continues to be 
a relevant safeguard in a context where arbitrariness and all kinds of abuse take place. It 
is however, undermined by key questions relating to its existence, notably issues on the 
proliferation of its players, its ability to remain above reproach and achieve sustainable 
results. 
During the years of the Marxist revolution (1972 – 1989) marked by single party 
politics, civil society in Benin was controlled by a mix of scattered players: trade unions, 
parent-teacher associations, village or farmer groups and development or indigenous 
associations. In their respective domains, they represented a public opinion and 
constituted, so to speak, an alternative voice to that of governments. However, as with 
the labour movement of the time, these players lacked autonomy and could only serve 
primarily, as an appendage to the political power: «before 1990, the judicial framework 
for civil society was practically nonexistent: a civil society which was practically 
withdrawn, intimidated by the repressive control of revolutionary government»1
Thanks to democratic revival in the 90s, marked by the opening of the public space, 
the people of Benin fully experienced a multiparty system, liberalisation of the 
airwaves, economic liberalisation etc. Thus, political parties, private media, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) also experienced a boom.
$SDUWIURPLWV ODUJHPHPEHUVKLS%HQLQoVFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVPDWXUHGRYHUWKHSDVWIHZ
\HDUVEXWVWLOOKDVVLJQLîFDQWWUDFHVRIZHDNQHVVHV
A. Difficult conceptual clarification.
,Q%HQLQDVLQRWKHUSODFHVGHîQLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVEHHQDUHDOFKDOOHQJH)RUDORQJ




273 which approves the national Charter on environmental governance: « civil society 
brings together forms of structuring; interdependence and solidarity with are relatively 
autonomous in relation to the State, through which individuals satisfy their needs. 
Civil society comprises of households, development associations, diverse groupings, 
non-governmental organisations, religious organisations and other components of the 
social body ».
1 Arsène Joël ADELOUI, Legal aspect of the concept of civil society in Benin, In Proceeding of the national seminar on 
repositioning the concept of civil society in Benin, Palais des congrès of Cotonou on 18, 19 and  20 September 2007, 
p. 23.
2 Dominique COLAS, 1992, Le Glaive et le Fléau. Généalogie du fanatisme et de la société civile, Paris, Grasset.
3 Michael WALTER, Towards Global civil society, Berghahn Press, Oxford, 1998.
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7KLVDWWHPSWDWDGHîQLWLRQZKLFKUHïHFWVFLYLO VRFLHW\oV LQLWLDO IDOWHULQJVWHSVDW WKH
WLPH LV VLJQLîFDQWO\ LQDGHTXDWH LW FRQVLGHUV FLYLO VRFLHW\ WR EH  DOO HPEUDFLQJ 
including players who, contrary to the norm, are not generally considered as members. 
In fact the decree of 2004 cites « households »5 and « private companies »6 as players 
in civil society.
Benin corrected this imperfection during a national seminar organised in Cotonou 
from 18th to 20th September 2007, to reposition the concept of civil society. During 
this meeting, a consensus was reached on the seven components of civil society in 
Benin: religious bodies, non-governmental organisations, trade unions, the media, 
socio-professional organisations, traditional chiefs, associations. Beyond this list, the 
GHîQLWLRQZKLFKZDVUHWDLQHGHPSKDVL]HVVSHFLîFFULWHULDFLYLOVRFLHW\FRPSULVHVQRQ
SURîWPDNLQJDQGDSROLWLFDODVVRFLDWLRQVZKRVHREMHFWLYHVDUHIRUWKHJHQHUDOLQWHUHVW
Its aim is to defend and promote the interests of the people...»
B. Legal and institutional framework
Civil society organisations are operating in a context characterised by the absence of 
DQ\VSHFLîFUHJXODWLRQ)RUWKHPRVWSDUWWKHH[LVWLQJSURYLVLRQVDUHRIDJHQHUDOQDWXUH
scattered among the different components of civil society.
The highest of the existing norms is the Constitution of 11th December 1990 which, 
does not once mention the word “civil society” but features in articles 23, 25 and 31 
the principles of freedom of thought, of conscience, of religion, of cult, of opinion, of 
H[SUHVVLRQ RI DVVRFLDWLRQDQG IUHHGRP WRSURWHVWZLWKLQ WKH FRQîQHVRI UHVSHFW IRU
public order as established by the laws and regulations. The only law which governs 
non-state players in Benin is not a Beninese law but a French law.
Inherited from the period of colonisation, this law of 1st July 1901 relating to the 
FRQWUDFW RI DVVRFLDWLRQ UHFRJQLVHV WKH ULJKW RI DVVRFLDWLRQ DPRQJ FLWL]HQV VSHFLîHV
the modalities for making a declaration and requires that the State undertakes to 
acknowledge it.
Besides these two overarching laws, there are other regulations relating to some 
components of civil society: Ordinance N°59/PR/MDRC of 28th December 1966 regulates 
the establishment of cooperatives in Benin; Decree N° 99-436 of 13th September 
 GHîQHV WKH YDULRXV IRUPV RI WUDGH XQLRQV DQG FULWHULD IRU GHWHUPLQLQJ WKHLU
representativeness; Decree N° 2001-234 of 12th July 2001 lays down the conditions for 
the establishment of Non-Governmental Organisations  (NGOs) and their umbrella 
organisations as well as modalities for their operations.
4 MDGLAAT, Support to organise consultative forums between district authorities and civil society, Research report, 
Cotonou, April 2011, p. 22.
5 Civil society is generally considered as « a structure which is above the family ».
6 According to UNESCO, civil society comprises « all organisations or groups constituted in a more or less formal way 
and which belong neither in politics nor in business ».
7KHQHHGIRUVSHFLîFUHJXODWLRQZDVH[SUHVVHG LQGXULQJDQDWLRQDOVHPLQDUWR
reposition the concept of civil society. Two years later, the civil society Charter of Benin 
(11th February 2009) was created as «a point of reference for issues on ethics and conduct 
for associations in Benin». Without any binding provisions, the Charter undoubtedly 
SOD\VD UROH LQ WKH WUDQVLWLRQ WRZDUGVD VSHFLîF ODZRQFLYLO VRFLHW\1R LQLWLDWLYHKDV
however, been announced on this issue and the piecemeal regulation of civil society 
component by component will probably continue in view of the announcement of a law 
VSHFLîFDOO\IRUWUDGLWLRQDOUXOHUV
$WWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO OHYHO%HQLQoVFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVVLQFHWKHHQGRIWKHVVRXJKWWR
become well rooted. The State took the initiative in November 1999, with the creation 
of the Ministry in charge of Institutional Relations, Civil Society and citizens of Benin 
residing abroad (M.C.R.I.-S.C.B.E.). Is this a supervisory ministry? This combination of 
areas of oversight is often made however, the Constitution of Benin is clear: institutions 
of a religious, philosophical or associative nature «are not under the supervision of 
the State» (article 23). One of the actions of the Ministry to regulate associations is 
the establishment of a Centre for the Promotion of Civil Society (C.P.S.C.) which, since 
2006, has had the opportunity to organize a Civil Society Organisations Day « a time to 
showcase the products, services and know-how of CSOs ».
5HDOLVLQJ WKH QHHG IRU XQLîHG DFWLRQ WKH SOD\HUV LQFUHDVHG LQLWLDWLYHV WR XQLI\ WKH
organisations. In the past, FENONG, the Governing Council of NGOs or SCONGA wanted 
to regroup all NGOs at the national level but the sector or theme based umbrella bodies 
are the ones who have endured the times:  The National Anti Corruption Organisations 
Front has for the past 17 years brought together about twenty organisations committed 
to public transparency; since 2005, Social Watch Benin has joined together the efforts 
of about a hundred CSOs to ensure citizen control of public action; the Platform of Civil 
Society Players in Benin (P.A.S.CI.B.) was created on 27th February 2003 by the Research 
Action Group for the Promotion of Agriculture and Development(G.R.A.P.A.D.), etc
2QHRIWKHPRVWLQFOXVLYHRUJDQLVDWLRQVLQWKHQRQSURîWVHFWRUWRGD\LVWKH%HQLQ&HQWUH
for Civil Society established in 2009. It does not have the mandate to represent CSOs 
in Benin but to «strengthen them in terms of their ability to advocate, take decisions, 
LPSOHPHQWDQGHYDOXDWH%HQLQoVGHYHORSPHQWSURJUDPPHVDQGSROLFLHV DFFRUGLQJ
to a study undertaken in 2013, the centre tops the list (77.6%) of local partners who 
support CSOs.
The structures which are required to act on behalf of civil society are mainly the 
consultative forums. These forums emanated from the 2007 seminar and are part of 
the key tools to execute the CSO Charter. Having a pyramid structure, the national 
consultative forum is a unique body with members at different levels within the country 
(department, commune and rural district). These forums have various objectives: (self) 
regulation of CSO activities, representation of CSOs, examination of the synergy of their 
activities and opportunities...
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This structuring of civil society aims at preventing the players from being dispersed as 
well as avoiding the risk of duplication observed in their interventions. The consultative 
forums have however not met all expectations. The over involvement of government 
in their set up has, very quickly, cast doubts on their credibility. Undermined by internal 
FRQïLFWVWKH\KDYHRYHUWKH\HDUVEHFRPHDVKDGRZRIWKHPVHOYHVLQDQHQYLURQPHQW
where they are increasingly being overshadowed by other inclusive grassroots initiatives 
(eg. The case of Civic Participation Units – C.P.C)
C. Classification of Players/Stakeholders
During the period when the concept of CSO was gradually gaining ground, there was a 
SUROLIHUDWLRQRISOD\HUV$ERXWDVVRFLDWLRQVZHUHLGHQWLîHGGXULQJWKH\HDU,Q
1998, USAID listed 1,500 NGOs7. These increased to 2,700 in the year 2000, according 
to the register of the Ministry responsible for civil society. A decade later (2012 -2013) 
WKHVDPHPLQLVWU\LGHQWLîHG&62V7KHVHîJXUHVFRQVWLWXWHWKHYLVLEOHSRUWLRQ
of the iceberg and conceal a multitude of players operating informally or waiting to be 
accredited.
In fact the context lends itself to this explosion of organisations: «the desire of donor 
agencies to deal directly with local organisations and less with the State»; «the 
establishment of NGOs as a strategy for self employment and as a means of entering 
LQWR WKH LQIRUPDO HFRQRP\ îQDOO\ JRYHUQPHQWRIîFLDOV pZKRDUH DWSRVWEXW IHHO
insecure” and have capital owing to their contacts (abroad, within the administration, 
in former state agencies, or in local associations)»8... Majority of the studies conducted 
on these entities show not only that very few of them are active but also that they 
are inequitably distributed within the country: «although they operate throughout the 
country, they are located mainly in the south of the country, more generally, in Cotonou 
RYHU UG RI1*2V LGHQWLîHG 7KHLU ORFDWLRQ LQ &RWRQRX HQDEOHV WKHP WR LQWHUDFW
FORVHO\ZLWKDODUJHQXPEHURILQWHUQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWDJHQFLHVZKLFKKDYHRIîFHV
in Cotonou as well as many government Ministries»9.
D. Some achievements of players
According to public opinion, civil society, in spite of everything, has a good reputation 
DV D UHVXOW RI VRPH DFKLHYHPHQWV RI WKH UHFHQW SDVW ,Q  LWoV 7RXFK QRW P\
constitution » campaign contributed in discouraging some attempts at revisions by the 
WKHQUHJLPH7KLVFDPSDLJQVSHDUKHDGHGE\DFRQVRUWLXPRI1*2VDQGNH\îJXUHVLQ
FLYLOVRFLHW\FUHDWHGDSUHFHGHQFHZKLFKHQDEOHGWKH&LWL]HQoV&RXQWHU0RYHPHQWWR
 86$,' 5HVHDUFKÀUP8)6-) 6XUYH\DQG6WXG\RQ WKH OHJDODQG UHJXODWRU\ IUDPHZRUNRI1*2VDQGSURIHVVLRQDO
associations in Benin. Étude d’actualisation, vol. 1 : Rapport Général, Cotonou, 1998.
 *DXWLHU 3,5277( HW0DUF 321&(/(7 © &LYLO VRFLHW\ DQG QHZ JRYHUQDQFH LQ %HQLQ 6RPH UHÁHFWLRQV EDVHG RQ DQ
analysis of the new NGO sector in Cotonou », APAD Bulletin, 16 June 2008. Source : http://apad.revues.org/3573.
9 PIROTTE and PONCELET, op. cit.
take over in 2013 with its « Red Wednesday » campaign against the « opportunistic 
UHYLVLRQRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKHGHVLUHIRUDQXQGXHWKLUGWHUPRIRIîFHIRUWKH
president of the republic.
7KURXJK WKHVHSURWHVWV %HQLQoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ GHPRQVWUDWHV D JUHDW DELOLW\ WRPDUVKDO
public opinion as well as to be outraged and denounce human rights violations, acts of 
corruption and abuses of all kinds, sometimes at the peril of the lives of its leaders who 
demonstrate great courage in expressing their opinions. A case in point is the failed 
assassination attempt on Martin Assogba, a human rights activist, on the night of 10th 
December 2013, after making remarks that challenged the ruling government.
7KHPHGLDRQHRIWKHLPSRUWDQWSOD\HUVLQ%HQLQoVFLYLOVRFLHW\LVNQRZQIRULWVDELOLW\WR
be outspoken. Organisations such as F.O.N.A.C. have acquired a solid reputation in the 
îJKWDJDLQVWFRUUXSWLRQLQWKLVRUJDQLVDWLRQOHGLQYHVWLJDWLRQVLQWRWKHWKHIWRI
bags of glucose intended for the production of glucose serum in the laboratory of the 
0LQLVWU\RI+HDOWK7KLVGLVFRYHU\HQVXUHGWKDWWKHEUDLQEHKLQGWKHWKHIWZDVLGHQWLîHG
and convicted in court. It also led to the reimbursement of the value of 50 bags of stolen 
glucose (9.6 million CFA francs) to the Ministry of Health. Since then, F.O.N.A.C. has 
become noted for disclosing acts of corruption. Since 27th October of the previous year, 
F.O.N.A.C., like some other organisations (ALCRER, Social Watch Bénin, National Coalition 
RQ:DWHU KDV KDG LWV KHDG RIîFHZLWKLQ WKH&RQVXOWDWLYH IRUXP WRJHWKHUZLWK WKH
National Authority on the Fight against Corruption and the State monitoring apparatus 
WR îJKW DJDLQVW WKH LPSXQLW\ RI DFWV RI FRUUXSWLRQ DQG LQIUDFWLRQV FRQQHFWHGZLWK
Benin».
By demonstrating commitment to the defence of the general interest, civil society has, 
over the past few years, become recognised as a credible partner of the State. Through 
a consortium of three organisations (ALCRER, F.O.N.A.C. and Social Watch Bénin), civil 
VRFLHW\LVFXUUHQWO\OHDGLQJ%HQLQoVSURFHVVIRUPHPEHUVKLSWRWKH2SHQ*RYHUQPHQW
Partnership » (O.G.P.) and to the Washington DC Pact on transparency and accountability. 
Civil society receives budget documents and is invited to parliament, as is the case 
this Monday, 9th November 2015, to make input on budgetary policy guidelines of 
government as well as its public resource planning. 
With the advent of decentralisation in 2002, there has been the need to work towards 
good governance in the local districts. To this end, organisations which are noted for 
carrying out this campaign at the national level, (ALCRER and Social Watch Bénin), have 
created Citizen Participation Units (C.P.C.) in the communities. The C.P.C.s are a dynamic 
mechanism to group together grassroots civil society organisations in order to control 
SXEOLFDFWLRQDQGGHPDQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\IURPORFDOSXEOLFRIîFLDOV(VWDEOLVKHGLQ
out of 77 communities10 in Benin, this mechanism holds a lot of promise so long as they 
are consolidated over time.
10 With the exception of Cotonou for now.
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E. Some areas of weakness
,QVSLWHRILWVUHODWLYHPDWXULW\%HQLQoVFLYLOVRFLHW\H[SHULHQFHGDJURZWKFULVLVPDLQO\DV
a result of its practices and the effectiveness of its activities. There are many criticisms 
against civil society players: poor organisation, lack of professionalism, lack of cohesion 
and coherence in its interventions etc.
The internal governance of CSOs is often called into question: according to a study by 
the Benin Centre for Civil Society in 2013, 84% of players themselves indicated that « 
corruption exists among CSOs in Benin »11 The public is increasingly asking questions 
ZKLFK DUH FRQWURYHUVLDO DUH &62VPHUHO\ SURîW PDNLQJ WRROV LQ WKH KDQGV RI WKHLU
founders? Are they instruments for political advancement?
On the issue of connivance with the world of politics, there have been some rather 
unfortunate precedents. The key promoter of the «Touch not my constitution» 
campaign, Reckya Madougou, due to her obvious success within civil society, accepted 
WREHDSSRLQWHGDV0LQLVWHULQ7KH&LWL]HQoV&RXQWHU0RYHPHQWZKRVHOHDGHUV
are renowned players in civil society, eventually became a political party in January 2014 
and succeeded in ensuring that its honorary president, lawyer Joseph Djogbénou, was 
among the list of MPs for the April 2015 parliamentary elections. In fact the act of co-
opting members of civil society into government is an old practice in Benin. Everybody 
remembers the surprising entry into government of two leaders of civil society, 
Dorothée Sossa and Claire Houngan Ayémonna, in 2001 given that they had just led an 
election observation mission on behalf of civil society. Such precedents have destroyed 




against poverty and corruption, to defend widows and orphans and to promote civic 
participation in the development process. To the best of its ability, it reacts to the 
LQFRQVLVWHQFLHVRIWKHVWDWHDSSDUDWXVDQGîQGVVROXWLRQVWRSXEOLFSROLFLHVZKLFKKDYH
a negative impact on the disadvantaged.
To move forward, it needs to strengthen its cohesion, credibility and optimize its 
interventions in a more appropriate legal framework.
11 With the exception of Cotonou for now.
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In Burkina Faso, as in other West African countries, civil society has evolved throughout 
political history and today it plays a crucial role in governance and in the national 
development process. Though the contributions and roles of CSOs to the development 
process are important, they are however undervalued, especially by a lack of 
capitalization and dissemination of experiences. It is therefore important to conduct 
a periodic assessment of the status of the civil society as well as its position and its 
contributions to development, while highlighting the pitfalls that the civil society actor 
encounters in his work.
This article adopts a historical, descriptive and analytical approach which aims at 
retracing the development of civil society in Burkina Faso and analyzing its current state 
through the legal and conceptual framework in which it operates, as well as through its 
FRQWULEXWLRQWRJRYHUQDQFHDQGWKHFRXQWU\oVGHYHORSPHQW
Development of Civil Society
From 1960, the year Burkina Faso gained its independence, to 2015, the development of 
civil society can be divided into four broad periods.
From 1960 to the early 70s, civil society was dominated by the trade union movements 
and other similar political groups, which by reason of their recent independence struggle, 
had a strong link with political forces. The concerns of this civil society focused mainly 
on issues of building a national platform consistent with the ideals of independence. It 
was an active and committed civil society whose main achievement was the fall of the 
government of the First Republic of President Maurice Yameogo on 3 January 1966 after 
popular protests led by labour unions and military intervention.
In 1973, a severe drought hit the entire West African Sahel which includes the northern 
half of the territory of Burkina-Faso. This event constitutes a major natural disaster 
ZKLFKEURXJKW LQ LWVZDNH VLJQLîFDQWKXPDQDQGHQYLURQPHQWDO FRQVHTXHQFHV7KH
mobilization of the international community to try to stem the multiple shocks due to 
WKHGURXJKW UHVXOWHG LQDPDVVLYH LQïX[RIKXPDQLWDULDQDQGGHYHORSPHQWRULHQWHG
organizations. The establishment and operation of these NGOs, from 1974 to 1990 
marked the second half of the period of the civil society in Burkina-Faso which was thus 
dominated by humanitarian and development interventions that were less political.
The third period of Burkinabe civil society falls within the African neo-constitutionalism 
period which t began with the general political reforms from 1990 (Baule Summit). The 
democratization movement had in its forefront social forces headed by civil society 
organizations engaged in political advocacy at key stages of these processes of political 
reforms (National Sovereign Conference). In 1992, during the political and institutional 
reforms, new laws and regulations provided the civil society organizations with a new 
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framework for expression and operation, generally considered favourable (Report 
Civicus Index of civil society, 2008). 
It is within this context that civil society made its intervention in two fundamental 
areas, and at the same time, separating it into two main categories. On the one hand, 
there are development organizations working in the provision of goods and services to 
the poor, and  policy advocacy organizations working in the area of political governance 
and human rights, on the other. For two decades, these two intervention thrusts have 
been the focus of all Civil Society Organisations in the country.
The political transition begun from 30 October, 2014. During this period, a popular 
uprising led to the overthrow of the regime led by Blaise Compaoré and the 
implementation of special organs charged with the responsibility of guiding the country 
towards democratic elections. During this time, civil society was extremely polarised 
RQRQHKDQGEHWZHHQWKHVSRQWDQHRXVPRYHPHQWVFUHDWHGGXULQJWKHîJKWDJDLQVW
WKH UHYLVLRQRIDUWLFOHDLPHGDW UHPRYLQJ OLPLWDWLRQVRQ WKHSUHVLGHQWoVPDQGDWH
and on the other hand the traditional organisations which have been in existence for 
PXFKORQJHU:LWKRXWEHLQJRSHQO\DQWDJRQLVWLFWKHVHWZRFRPSRQHQWVRI%XUNLQDoV
civil society had various different approaches to action. The spontaneous movements 
adopted a more reactive, direct and political approach, indeed a partisan approach 
while the traditional organisations maintained their approach of political advocacy for 
change while trying to keep their distance from political actors.
Legal and conceptual framework
The work of Associations in Burkina Faso was initially governed by Act n°18/59/al of 
31 August 1959 which established the declaration regime, namely a relative freedom 
of association. The ZATU12n°AN VIII-24-FP/ PRES of 12 March 1991, just before the 
establishment of democratic institutions, called into question the declarative system 
by restoring the system of prior authorization. 
However, Act 10/92 ADP of 15 December 1992 restored the declaration system of 
associations and established the framework that has seen the emergence of a host 
of associations in Burkina Faso. Article 2 of this Act stipulates that « associations are 
freely formed without prior administrative authorization. They are governed by general 
principles of law applicable to contracts and obligations in terms of their validity ». 
Thus,  the total number of associations was around 80.000 but it is almost impossible 
to determine the number because of weak administrative structures in documenting 
registered associations. The review of Act 10/ADP/92 which started in 2010 has brought 
about issues between the government and CSOsA census of the number of associations 
12  In the legal order of the RDP (1983-1987) and the Popular Front (1987-1991) Zatu conforms to the decree
supported by the European Union (Project to Strengthen CSOs) obtained an unexpected 
number of eleven thousand re-registered associations. 
The recent developments in civil society have taken place against the backdrop of a 
reform of the law 10/92 of 15th December, 1992 which ensures freedom of association 
in Burkina Faso. As a matter of fact, since 2009, government embarked on a reform of 
the law on freedom of association which was considered by civil society experts to be 
OLPLWLQJ7KHNH\PRGLîFDWLRQVRIJRYHUQPHQWoVUHIRUPZKLFKFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVGLVSXWHG
are the political neutrality of associations and the cumbersome nature of procedures 




an association is any group of legal or natural persons, national or foreign permanent 
QRQSURîW RUJDQLVDWLRQZLWK WKH REMHFWLYH RI DFKLHYLQJ FRPPRQ REMHFWLYHV QRWDEO\
LQFXOWXUDOVSRUWVVRFLDOVSLULWXDOUHOLJLRXVVFLHQWLîFSURIHVVLRQDORUVRFLRHFRQRPLF
domains». This law provides for a broader freedom of association that allows citizens to 
give concrete expression to their different types of collective activities.
7KLVGHîQLWLRQDVOLEHUDODVLWLVLVQRWVXIîFLHQWWRGHîQHWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\LWVHOI6LQFH
 WKHUH KDYH EHHQ VHYHUDO DWWHPSWV WR GHîQH WKH FRQFHSW RI FLYLO VRFLHW\ 2QH
RI WKH SURSRVHG GHîQLWLRQV LV RQH WKDW GHîQHV FLYLO VRFLHW\ DV  D VHOIRUJDQL]DWLRQ
independent from the State whose components willingly engage in public action to 
SXUVXHLQGLYLGXDOJURXSRUQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVLQDOHJDOO\GHîQHGUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
6WDWHDQGWKH6RFLHW\7KLVGHîQLWLRQ LVGHULYHGIURPDSURFHVVVXSSRUWHGE\WKH
United Nations Development Programme consisting of the following stages:
r A study to identify the strengths and weaknesses of civil society organizations in 
2001.
r A national workshop to report back on the study and strengthening of  civil society 
in November 2002 in Bobo Dioulasso
r The establishment of thematic groups within civil society and regional co-
ordination units in the thirteen regions of the country in 2005 and 2007.
7KHPDLQ DVSHFW RI WKLV SURFHVV WKDW FRQWULEXWHV WR WKH GHîQLWLRQ RI FLYLO VRFLHW\ LV
WKH LGHQWLîFDWLRQRI WKHHOHYHQ FRPSRQHQWV WKDWDUH LQFOXGHG LQDOOGRFXPHQWV
LQFOXGLQJRIîFLDOVRQWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\
r :RPHQoVRUJDQL]DWLRQV
r Research institutes 
13 Framework  Document for Capacity Building of Civil Society Organisations in  Burkina Faso.
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r Trade union organizations
r Religious organizations
r $VVRFLDWLRQVDQG+XPDQULJKWVPRYHPHQWVZKLFKWDUJHWVSHFLîFGHPDQGV
r Professional Media Organizations (Private press)
r NGOs and development associations
r Movements and Youth associations 
r Organizations of persons who are marginalized
r Peasant organizations
r Sports and cultural associations.
,QWKHDEVHQFHRIDQH[KDXVWLYHUHïHFWLRQDQGUHVHDUFKRQWKHVWDWXVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\
WKLVSODQDOORZVIRUEHQFKPDUNVWRFDSWXUHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKLVDFWRULQWKHîHOG
of governance and development. The main consensus of civil society in Burkina Faso 
focuses on the exclusion of two categories of players from its ranks. Political parties 
and traditional chieftaincy were, on several occasions, deemed not to be part of civil 
society by actors in this sector. The trade unions, though covered by the same law as 
the associations (Law 10/92), have always maintained a distinction in their activities as 
against that of CSOs.
Social and Political commitment
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH GHîQLWLRQ FLYLO VRFLHW\ DLPV DW GHYHORSLQJ VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF
GHYHORSPHQW LQDFRQGXFLYH LQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[W7KLV LGHQWLîHVWKHYDULRXVDUHDVRI
activity assessment of the civil society in the country.
All the CSOs, at least by the objectives stated in their constitutional texts, and in line 
with the law, tend towards goals aimed at improving the living conditions of the 
majority of the population. These goals eventually reveal a non-hermetic categorization 
between a civil society that seeks to increase the availability of goods and services and 
one which also seeks equity in access to these resources. Both major categories, which 
include organizations with overlapping objectives and activities, are on many occasions 
successful in their interventions.
The development associations, most of which are made up of organizations commonly 
NQRZQ DV 1*2V RQ WKH EDVLV RI D VSHFLîF DJUHHPHQW VLJQHG ZLWK WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI
Finance and Economy, provide multifaceted support to the people, sometimes in areas 
where there is no public intervention.
According to the General Directorate of Cooperation at the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, the contribution of NGOs increased from 25.9 million US dollars in 2006 to 31 
million US dollars in 2009, an increase of 13.57%. This contribution represented 0.02% 
RI2IîFLDO'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFHE\WKHFRXQWU\GXULQJWKDWSHULRG14.
A capitalization requested by the member organizations of the Permanent Secretariat of 
NGOs (SPNGO), in April 201, estimated the partial contribution of 14 of these member 
organizations to be 11 billion FCFA.
The new Oxfam global campaign was launched on 1 June 2011 in Ouagadougou. In his 
RSHQLQJVSHHFKWKH&KLHI([HFXWLYH2IîFHURI2[IDP%XUNLQD2PHU.DERUHVWDWHGWKDW
fDJULFXOWXUDOGHîFLWVLQ:HVW$IULFDLQDQGDIIHFWHGPLOOLRQ6DKHOLDQV
and put thousands of them in danger. In Burkina Faso, despite good harvests in recent 
years, some parts of the country suffer from chronic or structural food insecurity. 
Therefore, 32.8% of Burkinabes are undernourished, and acute malnutrition affects 
10.5% of children under 5 years». Every day, about one billion persons are said to suffer 
from hunger, while according to him, « our world produces enough food for everyone ».
2IîFLDOV DQG UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI SDUWQHU RUJDQL]DWLRQVZHUHSUHVHQW DW WKH ODXQFKRI
the campaign. These were Mr. Euloge Ouédraogo, representative of the Directorate for 
Monitoring Non-Governmental Organizations (DSONG) and the General Directorate of 
Cooperation; Pierre Nacoulma the Consumers League of Burkina (LCB); Bassiaka Dao, 
3UHVLGHQW RI WKH &RQIHGHUDWLRQ 3D\VDQQH GX %XUNLQD)DVR )DUPHUVo &RQIHGHUDWLRQ
(CPF) ; Alfred Sawadogo, Chairman of the Board of Directors of SOS Sahel ; Dr Moïse 
Napon of the Permanent Secretariat of Non-governmental Organizations (SPONG).
On behalf of these personalities, Alfred Sawadogo expressed the commitment of partner 
organizations to play their part to implement the initiative scheduled to last four years. 
« this campaign will grant us the opportunity to develop a popular movement for food 
justice, to sustain and support the needs of modernization and adaptation of family 
farms through the national rural sector programme (PNSR), to respond quickly and fairly 
to global crises related to food costs and curb the phenomenon of  land acquisition or 
speculation by new players to the detriment of family farms » .
The relationships between the State and Civil society have evolved in the historical 
stages that it went through. Until the advent of participatory policy development, 
DQG HVSHFLDOO\ RI WKH 6WUDWHJLF )UDPHZRUN WRîJKW DJDLQVW SRYHUW\  WKH 6WDWH
had generally a distrustful attitude of civil society. Under the fourth republic (1991), 
the consolidation of democracy and the principles of good governance (participation, 
transparency, subsidiary) have created a more favourable environment, in formal 
terms, the relationships between the State and the civil society. From 2003 to 2011, on 
14 0LQLVWU\RI(FRQRP\DQG)LQDQFH&RRUGLQDWLRQDQG(IIHFWLYHQHVVRI2IÀFLDO'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFHLQ%XUNLQD)DVR
Issues, realities and prospects. Report 2009, Ouagadougou June, 2010, www.dgcoop.gov.bf
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several occasions, the groups of civil society participated in frameworks with the State 
ZLWKUHJDUGWRSXEOLFSROLFLHV ,QWKLVZD\WKHFLYLOVRFLHW\ LVDEOHWRPDNHVLJQLîFDQW
FRQWULEXWLRQVLQYDULRXVîHOGV
Freedom of association in Burkina, the Civil Society speaks out
Ouagadougou hosted a national civil society workshop on the review of Act n° 10/92/
ADP of 15 December 1992 on freedom of association in Burkina. Organized on Friday 
July 8, 2011 by the Permanent Secretariat of Non-Governmental Organizations 
6321*WKHZRUNVKRSIRFXVHGRQWKUHHVSHFLîFREMHFWLYHV$QDO\]HWKHSURSRVDOV
of the inter-ministerial review Committee of Act 10, (2) make new proposals to improve 
IUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQLQ%XUNLQDDQGîQDOO\H[SORLWWKH\HDUVRIH[SHULHQFHRI
civil society practitioners  on freedom of association.
Freedom of association is enshrined in the fundamental laws of Burkina Faso stipulated 
in the Constitution and registered by Act n° 10/92/ADP of 15 December, 1992. Indeed, 
after almost two decades of implementation, it became necessary to review Law 10 
for adaptation. It was against this backdrop that the Permanent Secretariat of Non-
Governmental organizations (SPONG) held a workshop on July 8, to review the law in 
question, as a result of proposals made by the Inter-Governmental Committee. For Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs)/ Development Associations, it was an opportunity 
to share their experiences of freedom of association and to examine the draft bill 
formulated by the Inter-Ministerial Committee. The different amendments, which are 
eight (8) in number, were read by Siaka Coulibaly- legal consultant. 
6SHFLîFDOO\ SURSRVDOV IURP FLYLO VRFLHW\ SOD\HUV IRFXVHG RQ WKH VWUXFWXUH RI WKH ODZ
GHîQLWLRQV DQG SURFHGXUHV IRUHLJQ DVVRFLDWLRQ LVVXHV SXEOLF IXQGLQJ YROXQWHHU
PHPEHUVRIWKHDVVRFLDWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\SHQDOWLHVDQGWKHUHVROXWLRQRIFRQïLFWVDV
well as monitoring of the associations. It emerged from the discussions that the social 
DVSHFWRIWKHDVVRFLDWLRQVZRXOGQHHGDQH[HPSWLRQIRUWKHLUEHQHîWDQGDVXEPLVVLRQ
to the rules of public accountability. This last point is explained by the fact that the 
rules of accountability are very restrictive, and at the same time, they promote sound 
management of the funds of the associations. 
The apolitical nature of civil society structures was not been left behind. For the legal-
consultant of the workshop, it is preferable to speak of “non partisan association 
rather than “apolitical association” because most of the activities conducted by these 
civil society actors are political in nature although they maintain their distance from 
institutions established to take over political power. However, volunteering was treated 
in a special manner because according to statistics, 84.9% out of 300 people surveyed 
in 2004-2006 reported having done voluntary work in civil society organisations, which 
LQWKHH\HVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVLVTXLWHVLJQLîFDQW+HQFHWKHSURSRVDOIRUDYROXQWHHU
status with the aim of improving working conditions and employability of those 
concerned. Daniel Da Hien, the moderator of the workshop and pastor Moïse Napon 
(Head of SPONG) gave their view on the penalties which are incompatible with a liberal 
system of associations.
So far, these two concomitant sectors have maintained very close relations. This 
collaboration was made possible because of the socio-political context on one hand, 
and by the relative lack of clarity of the law governing the two sectors, on the other 
hand.
,QWKHFRQWH[WRIDFULWLFDOVKRUWDJHRIîQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVWKH6WDWHPDFKLQHU\KDVEHHQ
the main source of power and material resources of the country since independence. 
It is held by the political forces, social entrepreneurs even though their actions are 
QRQSURîWPDNLQJ  OLNHWKRVHRIWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU DUHRIWHQFRPSHOOHGWRHVWDEOLVK
a  non visible  relationship  of « agreement » with political actors. These very informal 
connections exist between some political forces and some associations.
Laws governing the freedom of association and political parties do not establish a clear 
prohibition of interference between the two groups of actors. Only the ethics of the 
CSOs in Burkina Faso, in accordance with the French model on which it is based, make a 
distinction between the associations and political parties. In fact, until 2014, there were 
very few cases where a leader of an association is an active head of a political party at 
the same time.
In the context of this article, some association leaders were interrogated to make a 
FXUUHQWDQGOLYHO\LQSXWLQWRWKLVUHïHFWLRQ6HOIDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\VHHPV
D ELW ïDWWHULQJ ,WV LPDJH VHHQ E\ VRPH RI LWV PHPEHUV LV UDWKHU QHJDWLYH:KHQ
asked « what grade from 0 to 10 he would give to the civil society in Burkina Faso in the 
consolidation of democracy? », the most common mark has been 3 over 10.
Conclusion
Though civil society is considered as a full stakeholder in governance and development, 
the fact still remains that its intervention is constrained by a lot of inadequacies of all 
NLQGV7KHOHJDODQGSROLWLFDOV\VWHPRIWKHFRXQWU\LVWKHPDLQSDUDPHWHULQïXHQFLQJ
the performance of civil society. In Burkina Faso, civil society has evolved through the 
early history of the country, playing a variety of roles at different times. In recent years, 
WKRXJKLWVSRVLWLRQLQWKHîJKWIRUGHPRFUDF\DQGGHYHORSPHQWKDVEHHQUHFRJQL]HG
many existing obstacles still undermine its work. But, ultimately the main obstacle is 




Two policy recommendations can be put forward with regard to the fact that there is no 
systematic and comprehensive study of civil society in Burkina Faso.
r It is vital that a unitary integrating and operational-oriented framework civil society 
be established. The deepening of a national dialogue on public policies requires 
such an organization
r The institutional and legal framework governing freedom of association in Burkina 
Faso needs to be improved. This requires the review of the law on freedom of 
association and the adoption of the decree to implement the law inspired from the 
experiences of civil society actors
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Civil Society and Democratic 
Development in Cape Verde
Iolanda Évora & Suzano Costa
CAPE VERDE
Introduction
This article aims to analyse the concept of civil society, its institutional and operational 
capacity, and to investigate its actual contribution to economic and democratic 
development in Cape Verde.   
In revisiting the political history of Cape Verde and the contribution of civil society 
to its economic and democratic development, it is necessary to adopt a theoretical 
framework that focuses on three (3) fundamental historic moments: (i) the structuring 
of the post-colonial state and the period of establishment of a single-party regime 
(Cardoso, 1993); (ii) the political opening and transition to a multi-party democracy 
(Meyns, 2002); (iii) the current national policy and the political structures (Tarrow, 1994, 
1996) that may stimulate and/or constrain civil action and non-conventional forms of 
political participation.
Taking into account the beginnings of civil participation and the determinants of 
community life in Cape Verde, from national independence until the opening to 
democracy, we notice a structural dependence of civil organisations on the “top-down” 
mechanisms of activation as opposed to the logic of “bottom-up” mobilisation that is 
subsumed, in the case of Cape Verde, in the context of weak civil participation. 
The poor capacity for mobilisation and civil participation in “bottom-up” initiatives 
is associated with the lack of opportunities to promote non-conventional forms of 
political participation on one hand and, on the other, a “low intensity of democratic 
H[SHULHQFHq&RVWDDDVZHOODVDpVXEVWDQWLDOGHîFLWRIGHPRFUDF\q£YRUD
Moreover, the poor capacity of civil society organisations to accumulate social capital 
is a trend (as almost everywhere) towards misappropriation in one hand, and political 
exploitation of civic initiatives by political parties and their leaders on the other hand. 
This is usually a strategy to broaden their electoral opportunities. The factors that 
contribute to this trend of misappropriation and exploitation are: a) the strong 
subordination to political parties; the political bipolarisation of Cape Verdean society 
(Costa, 2010b); as well as the dependence on the logic of State funding that transforms 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVLQWRLPSOHPHQWHUVRIRIîFLDOSURJUDPPHVZKLFKDUHH[HFXWHGZLWKRXW
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHUUHJDUGLQJWKHFRXQWU\oVGHYHORSPHQWDQGGLUHFWLRQ
Context, Origins and Progress of Cape Verdean Civil Society
The social experience of the islanders has always been marked by a severe lack of 
SURGXFWLYHVWUXFWXUHDQGDVWUXFWXUDOGHSHQGHQF\RQUHVRXUFHVIURPDEURDGîUVWIURP
the metropolis, after the independence, relying on foreign development aid but, as 
always, relying on the remittances from emigrants. It was against this background of a 
lack of local resources that Cape Verdean society experienced oppression and attempts 
to formally suppress its independent initiatives. 
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Despite these challenges faced by Cape Verde, during the colonial era, its leading cultural 
and social movements were vigorously restored. Cardoso (1993) suggests that this 
period was notable for the production of literacy and music, publications, magazines 
and journals, and the proliferation of sports, commercial and agricultural organisations. 
+HDOVRLGHQWLîHGRWKHULPSRUWDQWVRFLDODQGFLYLODFWLYLWLHVWKDWOHGIRUH[DPSOHWRWKH
creation and defence of the Cape Verde High School.
Similarly, Silva (1995) was against the idea that the dynamism of civil society is assigned 
to the Party-State activity and mentioned that the civil experience of Cape Verdean 
emigrants in the USA and Western European countries contributed to the construction 
RIWKH&DSH9HUGHDQQDWLRQLQDZD\HYHQEHIRUHLQGHSHQGHQFHLQ+HUHïHFWHG
WKDWLWLQïXHQFHGWKHQRWLRQRIVRFLDOMXVWLFHHPSRZHUPHQWRIFLWL]HQVWKHGHIHQFHRI
civil rights and civil participation in Cape Verde (Silva, 1995).
In terms of organisations that bring together individuals, the post-independence 
period of the Single-Party system in Cape Verde was characterised by the existence 
of mass organisations “distributed by age group (Pioneer Organisation-OPAD, Amílcar 
&DEUDOoV $IULFDQ <RXWK-$$& DQG E\ sex (Organisation of Cape Verde Women-OM) 
or by professional interest (Unions-UNTC-CS).” (Cardoso, 1993: 184). The attempt to 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]H WKH JRYHUQPHQWoV WHUULWRULDO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ SODQ DQG PD[LPL]H
strategies of political regimentation on a national level led to the promotion of 
WHUULWRULDOEDVHG RUJDQLVDWLRQV OLNH 3HRSOHoV &RXUWV 1HLJKERXUKRRG &RPPLWWHHV DQG
Popular Militias. 
Associative self-governing practices in the post-independence 
period
Created on 1974, cooperatives are still thought as the most illustrative experience of 
WKHRIîFLDOVWUDWHJ\RIVRFLDOPRELOLVDWLRQLQWKHSRVWLQGHSHQGHQFHSHULRG7KHLUULVH
was intended to promote popular participation in the development process and to 
ensure access to consumption goods and services to the most vulnerable social groups. 
7KHDLPZDVWRRXWïRZIRRGVXSSO\DQGDGGWKHHIIHFWVRIDJUDULDQUHIRUPWKURXJKWKH
introduction of fair distribution mechanisms and the participation of citizens in the 
PDQDJHPHQWRIFRPPXQLW\OLIH£YRUD
&RRSHUDWLYHVZHUHWKHîUVWSRVWFRORQLDOSUDFWLFHRIVHOIPDQDJHPHQW15 in opposition 
to the traditional practices of mutual support and association, which were believed 
to16VROYHVSHFLîFSUREOHPVZKLOHWKHFRRSHUDWLYHPRYHPHQWZDVLQFOXGHGLQDEURDG
15 7KHH[LVWHQFHRIRQO\ÀYHFRRSHUDWLYHVLQWKHDUFKLSHODJRFUHDWHGE\WKHFRORQLDOJRYHUQPHQWDQGUXOHGE\WKH
Portuguese Commercial Code, demonstrated, at the time of independence, the lack of interest by the colonial power 
LQSURPRWLQJZD\VRIVHOIPDQDJHPHQWDQGSRSXODUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ)URPRIÀFLDOGRFXPHQWVRIWKHFRORQLDOHUDWKH
spirit of association should ensure the common use of capital goods, improvement of techniques and the conquest of 
favourable markets by the economically weak population. See, Código Comercial Português, chapter V, title II, book II.
16 For example, the djunta-mon and djuda systems practised on the island of Santiago (Évora, 1996).
process of promotion of participation, national development and transformation 
RI PLQGVHWV £YRUD  +RZHYHU D IHZ \HDUV DIWHU WKH LQGHSHQGHQFH WKLV VHOI
PDQDJHPHQWSURFHVVSURYHGWRKDYHOLWWOHVXSSRUWIURPFRRSHUDWLYHPHPEHUV£YRUD
1996; 2001).17 The failure of the movement is, on one hand, associated with the lack of 
DQHDUOLHUFRRSHUDWLYHWUDGLWLRQWKHREMHFWLYLW\RIWKHPHDQLQJRIFRRSHUDWLYHLQîJXUHV
VXFKDV VKRSV FRQVXPHUVo FRRSHUDWLYH ERDWV îVKLQJ FRRSHUDWLYH RU ODQG IDUPHUVo
FRRSHUDWLYH£YRUDDQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGZLWKWKHGLUHFWpLGHQWLîFDWLRQPDGH
E\UXUDOZRUNHUVEHWZHHQWKHFRRSHUDWLYHPRYHPHQWDQGWKHnQHHGIRUSROLWLFDODFWLYLVPo
in the party structures” (Furtado, 1993: 109). 
Dynamics of Civil Society in Democratic Cape Verde
,QDQDO\VLQJWKHSURîOHVRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGWKHDFWLYLW\DUHDVIURPDORQJLWXGLQDO
SHUVSHFWLYHVLJQLîFDQWYDULDWLRQVDUHQRWIRXQGLQWKHWUDGLWLRQDODUHDVRI
intervention, despite the emergence of new issues – good governance, environment 
and energy, economic growth and opportunities, human capital and social protection 
– largely attributed to the agenda of international institutions and specialised agencies 
of the United Nations. There is a tendency to maintain the intervention in the following 
areas (community development, training and communication, solidarity activities, 
water supply, cultural and sports activities etc.) rather than in those issues which are 
structural to the current developmental agenda for the nation (youth and education, 
protection of the environment, support for microenterprises/microcredit, human rights, 
empowerment of women, social housing etc.).
The decade of 1990 was marked by the emergence of the majority of Cape Verdean 
NGOs working at a national or local level. In 1996, the Cape Verde NGO Platform was 
formed; the 11 NGOs that existed at the beginning of the decade had quickly been 
overtaken by the 81 registered NGOs with activities at a national level or in more than 
one city council and about 600 associations with a national scope. Historically, the 
QDWLRQoVFDSLWDOFLW\KDVKDGWKHJUHDWHVWQXPEHURI1*2KHDGTXDUWHUVDQGFXUUHQWO\
not a single association is registered on the island of Brava18. 
17 Critics argue that the cooperative experience in Cape Verde contrasted with the ideals of participatory democracy 
and the self-management practice of a cooperative organisation, with practices far from the principles originally 
SURFODLPHGVWDJQDWLRQWKHH[HUFLVHRIIXQFWLRQDOKLHUDUFK\DQGSRZHUFRQFHQWUDWHGLQWKHRIÀFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVOLNH
what happened in the period that preceded independence.
18 In fact, in the case of Cape Verde, the emigrants maintain close and regular contact with their places of origin, and this 
is indicative of the low degree to which, over time, the policies geared towards emigration permitted the emigrants 
intervention within their close family group to also reach the broader level of the locality and the country. 
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The intervention areas are divided into:
Areas of activity % of NGOs
Training 41%
Information & communication 37%
Youth & education 36%
Solidarity actions 25%
Community development 18%
Protection of the environment 17%
Support for micro-enterprises/micro-credit 17%
Cultural & sports activities 16%
Water supply 15%
Human rights 10%
Advancement of women 10%
Social Residency 10%
7KHEHQHîFLDULHVFRPSULVH






Some studies indicate that, with few exceptions, “the Cape Verdean associations do not 
VSHFLDOLVHHLWKHULQWHUPVRIWKHWDUJHWEHQHîFLDU\JURXSRUWKHDUHDRI LQWHUYHQWLRQq
(Platong, 2011), have a culture of dependence on subsidies,19 and a welfare-based 
attitude, typical of a poor country that depends on foreign aid.20 
19 The dependence of the State enunciated as the principal inhibitor of the vocation of civil society associations, to the 
extent that, “receiving State resources obliges them also to take orders from the State (…)” (Bonifácio, 2011: 23), which 
hampers a performance based on criteria, regulations, control and transparency.
20 This is the island with the oldest tradition of emigration to the United States and it remains particularly dependent 
on remittances from emigrants living there.
Perceptions and Representations of Civil Society in Cape Verde
In Cape Verde, the perception, image and representations about civil society lead, 
almost invariably, to vague formulations of an entity that brings together – with the 
exception of political parties – civil, community21 and social solidarity associations, 
NGO22, professional organisations, voluntary institutions, civil movements, sports clubs, 
charitable institutions, social activists, bloggers and opinion-makers, cooperatives, 
religious institutions, university groups, among others.
The current representations about civil society in Cape Verde lead us to the many 
IRUPDORUJDQLVDWLRQVWKDWEHQHîWIURPWKHSURWHFWLRQRIDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGOHJDORUGHU
(Diamond, 1994) such as the social, civil movements and spontaneous lobbies formed 
by citizens claiming issues relating to urban violence, gender equality, basic health, 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHKXPDQDQGZRUNHUVoULJKWVUHJLRQDOLVDWLRQDQGDGHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQSROLF\
The public perception of the action of these civil society organisations in the archipelago 
is generally positive and their members enjoy a certain social acceptance and public 
popularity, because they are socially perceived as acting in the public interest.
In the eyes of ordinary citizens, civil associations have a social responsibility in the 
GHYHORSPHQWSURFHVVDQGLQWXUQRIîFLDOGLVFRXUVHVHHNVWRHOHFWFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGLWV
DVVRFLDWLYHVWUXFWXUHVDVSDUWQHUVLQG\QDPL]LQJWKHFRXQWU\oVSRWHQWLDOIRUHFRQRPLF
and social development, and in accelerating its agenda of transformation (PG, 2001-
2006-2011).23
However, there are still indicators of political and intellectual promiscuity, and 
mutual exploitation amongst leaders of the organizations and political parties. There 
is interference in the process of electing the leaders of the associations, in decisions 
related to the functioning of associative structures and in the allocation and use of 
resources. In certain instances civil society leaders are frequently mentioned as being 
submitted to logics of clientelism and using their associative status as a support for 
emphasising particularistic agendas of upward social (professional) mobility. 
21 From the development analysis perspective, Bonifácio (2011) says that the emergence of community associations 
IURPZDVRIÀFLDOO\SURPRWHG LQRUGHU WR VWDUW WKHFRQYHUVLRQRI WKH/DERXU ,QWHQVLYH3XEOLF:RUNV3URMHFWV
(FAIMO), increase productivity and carry out activities with an impact on the community. With encouragement 
from State institutions, the top-down perspective was carried over from the earlier period and the associations were 
transformed into temporary employment agencies.   
22 With regard to the image and representations conveyed about civil society in Third World countries, authors in the 
wake of Jose Harris (2006) argue that in these contexts, the notion of “civil society” is frequently associated with the 
work done by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) founded by expatriate Europeans and North Americans for 
the purpose of building new structures and services that complement or bypass the activities of national governments 
that are corrupt or have limited resources (Harris, 2006). 
23 In addition to the policy direction established by successive Government programmes, this structuring argument of 
public consultation on civil society is also strengthened, particularly acutely in the Major Planning Options. Council of 
Ministers (2001), As Grandes Opções do Plano. Uma Agenda Estratégica, Praia: Council of Ministers, Republic of Cape 
Verde.
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In opposition, the claims of Cape Verdean civil society, despite the low intensity of social 
mobilisation registered, have been embodied around unconventional (heterodox) forms 
of civil and political participation, and new platforms of intermediation and aggregation 
of interests such as the use of public manifestations, on-line petitions, social networks 
and new information and communication technologies. The general perception is that 
there is a low attendance in public demonstrations as various initiatives show along 
the lines of those taken by people who feel abandoned by the Government and the 
Local Council (as in the case of the island of S. Vicente),24 or the demonstration against 
the permanent electricity cuts and problems with the potable water in the city of Praia. 
Likewise, regarding the demonstration against Violence, it was reported that about 
12,000 people registered on facebook their intention to participate. However, due to 
WKHODFNRIFODULW\LQWKHîHOGERXQGDULHVEHWZHHQWKHSROLWLFDOSDUW\DQGFLYLODQ\FDOO
for protest or demonstration immediately carries a suspicion of party political aims on 
its organisers. Thus, by way of example, the citizen who took the initiative to issue a call 
to all Cape Verdeans to join a movement against the “kasu body” phenomenon,25 which 
he called the “Cape Verde Korda Movement,” stressed its non-partisan nature and said 
that his motives simply had to do with his “love for the land”. In the public event that 
civil society groups organised in protest against police action directed at the S. Vicente 
City Council, the party in local power distanced itself from this demonstration. 
Currently, the social networks are experiencing growing participation and have become 
the preferred channel for information, opinion, debate, protest, contrary views, and calls 
for manifestation. They are also the principal means through which both the diaspora 
and the archipelago participate in events that involve Cape Verdeans in different spaces. 
Civil society and Development in Cape Verde
United Nations agencies have developed programmes in areas in which the participation 
of the civil society is seen as essential, such as “Consolidation of Democracy” and 
“Promotion of Growth and Economic Opportunities” sub-programmes reveal. The 
81'3LGHQWLîHVDVDUHVXOW UHLQIRUFHPHQWWKDW LQYROYHVDSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKH ORFDO
populations and the administrative capacity of local authorities; b) response of the 
3XEOLF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQWRWKHSHRSOHoVQHHGVFHJRYHUQDQFHGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH
National Gender Equality Plan; e) implementation of a Gender-Sensitive Budget. 
It is also believed that it was possible to support the growth of a corporate and business 
environment with training systems, professional training and competitiveness that 




25 Popular name for assaults carried out, generally, by young people in city centres.
national partners of the UNDP (Government bodies, State-sponsored institutions), even 
in actions that directly propose capacity building for the State and civil society.26 The 
role of the State is excessive in the appropriation of the social agenda and it occupies an 
area that should be attributed to civil societies, to such an extent that, as a result, their 
contribution to the social, economic and democratic development of the archipelago 
is decapitalised. This was the case for the “Special programmes for the integration of 
women, young people and vulnerable groups into the labour force” that have important 
issues about social intervention.
Failure to completely free Cape Verdean civic organisations from the State leads to the 
restraining, manipulating and exploiting of these organisations. Symptomatic to this, 
are the various monetary transfers made to community associations in pre-election 
times or the appearance of association leaders, trade unionists and other civil activists 
in the parliamentary and local government electoral lists. 
In the current political context, the promotion of a relationship with the private sector 
would, therefore, represent a comparative advantage and an alternative to the logic 
of dependence on State funding, enabling civil society players to escape the top-down 
system that constrains their public intervention agenda. Also, association leaders in the 
diaspora claim that it is up to Cape Verde to promote a national project, from the inside, 
capable of bringing together its organisations abroad (Silva, 2004) and the civil society 
within Cape Verde. The author is critical of the way the emigrants are systematically 
ignored as an integral part of civil society and says that it is necessary to construct a 
national thinking that hinges on their involvement.27
Conclusion and Recommendations
It is recommended that Cape Verdean civil society organisations, in their quest for 
independence from political society, should achieve emancipation from the intricate 
web of relationships that surrounds the State, the political parties and elections: (i) 
become free from their dependence on State funding sources and the strategies by 
which the State constrains their agenda of intervention; (ii) prevent the appropriation of 
civil initiatives by political parties and their (iii) political exploitation aimed at expanding 
the electoral opportunity structure for the parties. In turn, the State must forge the 
institutional mechanisms, safeguarding, on one hand, its engagement in the process of 
design as well as evaluation and implementation of public policies and promoting the 
decentralisation of decision-making at a community level with the institutionalisation 
of participatory budget on the other hand.
26 As with the sub-theme “Capacity development of State and civil society for the prevention of drug abuse and 
antisocial behaviour”.
27 While emigrants remain a lobby because of the importance of their remittances and their participation in elections 
(parliamentary and presidential), their modes of participation in the development of the country are indicative of 
the low capacity of national civil society to propose or participate in creating ways of bringing emigrants together 
around the development of Cape Verde and, thus, make them decisive agents of the process (Silva, 2004).
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The existence of a large number of civil associations contrasts with the quality 
DQG PDJQLWXGH RI WKHLU LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ WKH UHVROXWLRQ RI VSHFLîF SUREOHPV VR ZH
recommend that the associations develop (i) a greater specialisation in relation to the 
EHQHîFLDU\WDUJHWJURXSDQGWKHDUHDVRILQWHUYHQWLRQDQGLLDSHUVSHFWLYHRIFODLP
focused action, not limited to the welfare dimension. 
Given the power of the media and the media coverage in building social perceptions 
and shaping public opinion, we recommend that the civil associations develop a 
methodology for placing their claims in the public agenda in order to give them greater 
public visibility and social acceptance.
The contribution of civil society to the economic and democratic development in Cape 
Verde places on its organisations the challenge of increasing the quality, independence 
DQGVFRSHRIWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVLQRUGHUWRPHHWVRFLDOQHHGVDQGWRSURPRWHDQGLQïXHQFH
WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI FRPPXQLWLHV7KH FXUUHQW GLIîFXOWLHV DUH GXH WR WKHLU H[FHVVLYH
dependence on the State and to their vulnerability to attempts at political exploitation 
E\WKHSDUWLHV7KHVHIDFWVXQGHUPLQHWKHîHOGDQGWKHIRUPVRI LQWHUYHQWLRQE\FLYLO
society organisations, as well as their social legitimacy as a platform of mediation, 
articulation and aggregation of public interest.
1RZDGD\V WKH SRVVLELOLW\ IRU FLYLO VRFLHW\ WR LQïXHQFH WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH
legitimising discourse and the formulation of the public agenda are compromised due 
to its reduced involvement in the conception and evaluation of public policies. 
The general perceptions and expectations of civil society and its organisations are 
positive and it is acknowledged that, when they are well-adapted to reality, they promote 
the mobilisation of active players and properly interpret their needs and aspirations. 
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Reflection on civil society in the Ivory Coast: 
Issues, institutional challenges and post-
crisis sensitivities
Mr Traore Wodjo Fini
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Introduction
Civil society is of one of the areas that have experienced a relative boom due to the 
political instability Ivory Coast has experienced since 1999. Limited to a handful of 
active organizations before the crisis, today, civil society has grown. It demonstrates a 
conscious effort to ensure public participation in the management of power. Thus, its 
contribution, notably to the building of the Rule of law and the democratic process  has 
an obvious advocacy dimension.  
However, though  one of the answers to the serious violations of human rights and social 
GLYLGHLVDFWLRQE\FLYLOVRFLHW\WKHUH LVQRGRXEWWKDW LVVXHVUHODWLQJWRWKHGHîQWLRQ
of civil society, its legal framework and its effectiveness remain (GUEDE, 1990). The 
objective of this analysis is to possible options on these concerns. This perspective leads 
to the study of the history of civil society, describes its role in the development of the 
Ivory Coast and proposes topics for discussion on the effectiveness of civil society. 
Definition and history of the Ivorian ”civil society” 
 Definitional aspect of the concept ”civil society” 
&LYLOVRFLHW\LVDVHWRIQRQSURîWYROXQWDU\1*2VFUHDWHGE\LQGLYLGXDOVZLWKDFRPPRQ
objective to maintain a common focus. Often, acting in anticipation or in response to 
situations of distress, civil society organizations play a role in sensitizing, educating, 
training and raising the awareness of the people.
However, the scope of intervention of civil society remains unclear due to lack of 
SUHFLVLRQRIWKH ODZ6R LW LVGLIîFXOWWRDFFXUDWHO\GHîQHWKHRSHUDWLRQDOFRQWRXUVRI
the non-governmental organizations as their borders change based on practice. When 
asked, for example, what is an NGO, the Ivorian positive law is vague on this subject 
PDWWHU$FWQRI6HSWHPEHURQDVVRFLDWLRQVGRHVQRWFRQWDLQDVSHFLîF
VHFWLRQIRU1*2VWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKLVWHUPGRHVQRWUHIHUWRDQ\VSHFLîFOHJDOFDWHJRU\
Worse still, the same text governed the creation of political parties and groups as well 
as religious organisations. So in Ivory Coast, an NGO is not born, but it is made. 
The ambiguity of the legal status of civil society loosens it.  Indeed, the limit of the law 
FDXVHVWKH1*2VWREHLGHQWLîHGZLWKFUHGLWXQLRQVIRRWEDOOFOXEVWUDGHXQLRQV\RXWK
and women associations, political parties and groups.  Given the limited scope of work, 
only human rights, social cohesion, peace building, democracy and good governance 
NGOs will be considered. 
  Background of the civil society in Ivory Coast 
The phenomenon of associations is enshrined in act n° 60-315 of 21 September 1960 on 
associations.  However, three periods seem to mark the emergence of the phenomenon 
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LQWKH,YRU\&RDVW7KHîUVWSHULRGLVLGHQWLîHGZLWK,YRULDQVRFLRSROLWLFDOOLIHDQGEHJLQV
from 1944 with the creation by the late President Houphouët Boigny of the African 
Agricultural Union (SAA). In collaboration with the various political factions created in 
WKHFRORQLHVRI)UHQFK:HVW$IULFD$2)6$$OHGWKHîJKWQRWRQO\IRULQGHSHQGHQFH
but also to improve the trade unionism. 
7KHîJKWUHVXOWHGLQWKHSURYLVLRQRIVRPHIUHHSURGXFWVVXFKDVSDOPRLODQGUXEEHUWR
the population. (DERIVE, 1986). 
The second period started from the late 1980s during which civil society rhetoric 
HPHUJHGLQSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFGHEDWHV7KHVHULRXVHFRQRPLFGLIîFXOWLHVWKDWOHG
the Ivorian government to the structural adjustment programmes of the BrettonWoods 
institutions eventually caused an upsurge in unemployment and the emergence of 
land disputes. Thus, human rights and democracy related-issues emerged with force. In 
UHVSRQVHWKHîUVWQRQJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQV1*2VHPHUJHGZLWKWKHFUHDWLRQ
of the Association of Women Lawyers of Ivory Coast (AFJCI) in 1986 and the Ivorian 
Human Rights League (LIDHO), in 1987. 
7KHSURFHVVRIGHPRFUDWLFWUDQVLWLRQLQWKHVPDUNHGWKHWKLUGSHULRG,QWKHîUVW
place, it generated a proliferation of  NGOs and secondly, the latter were restructured 
ZLWK WKH FUHDWLRQ RI WZR VSRQWDQHRXV JURXSV WKH îUVW FUHDWHG LQ  ZDV WKH
National Elections Observatory (ONE) consisting of several NGOs including the Ivorian 
+XPDQ 5LJKWV /HDJXH /,'+2 DQ DIîOLDWH RI WKH 6WXG\ DQG 5HVHDUFK *URXS IRU
'HPRFUDF\ DQG'HYHORSPHQW LQ$IULFD *(5'(6&ÎWHGo,YRLUH DQG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Movement for Women Democrats (MIFED-CI), with a mission to raise awareness about 
the transparency of the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections. The mandate 
of ONE was renewed for the 2000 elections. 
Following the 2002 crisis, the second group of NGOs, the Civil Society Association was 
created to bring a message of peace to all parts of the country to avoid an imminent 
civil war.
7KH1*2VQHWZRUNLQJZDVIRUPDOL]HGZLWKWKHRIîFLDOFUHDWLRQLQRIJURXSLQJV
such as WANEP (West African Network for Peace building), the Civil Society Coalition for 
Peace and Democratic Development (COSOPCI) and the Ivorian Civil Society Convention 
(CSCI). 
However, one of the most vibrant manifestations of the collaboration between civil 
society and the State was the appointment of Professor BLEOU Martin, former chairman 
of LIDHO, in 2003, in the Seydou Diarra government as Minister of the Interior as a 
result of the Linas Marcoussis Political Agreements.
Today, the national human rights NGOs working in the area of democracy and social 
cohesion, are grouped into several networks including COSOPCI, Forum for West African 
Civil Society (FOSCAO), the Ivorian Actors Network for Human Rights (RAIDH), the 
Women Network for Ivory Coast (COFEMCI), WANEP, CSCI, ECOWAS Women Network 
for Peace and Security (RESPECO), the Ivorian Coalition for the International Criminal 
&RXUW&,&3,WKH,YRULDQ+XPDQ5LJKWV'HIHQGHUVo&RDOLWLRQIRU&,''+DQGWKH:HVW
$IULFDQ$FWLRQ1HWZRUNRQ6PDOO$UPVRI&RWHGo,YRLUH:$$16$&,
As a result of the coordination in their action after the 2010 elections, government 
authorities were convinced that their presence in some institutions could change 
things. Thus many of their leaders became members of independent State institutions 
in charge of issues on Human Rights, democracy, information and communication. 
These are: the National Commission on Human Rights of Ivory Coast (CNDHCI), of which 
6 persons from civil society are members, the National Media Council (CNP), 1 person, 
the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA), 1 person, the Commission 
for Access to Public Information and Documents (CAIDP), 1 person. This is recognition of 
the extensive work undertaken by these people through their respective organisations.
Contribution of civil society to Development 
The 2002 military and political crisis crystallized the NGOs spheres of action on several 
thematic areas: mobilize the people for presidential election to  come out of the crisis, 
sensitize the political actors to respect the code of conduct of the Ouagadougou 
Political Agreement  and the Electoral Law in force, sensitize the citizens on  peace and 
social cohesion
In some cases, the civil society action was supported by the administrative authorities. 
In others, the complementarity between STATE and NGO failed and the NGOs were 
perceived as political opponents.
 STATE/ NGO complementary roles:  a guarantee for NGOs  effectiveness 
Both electoral and post electoral issues mentioned above have brought about the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRISURMHFWVZKLFKUHFHLYHGDQGVWLOO UHFHLYHVWKHîQDQFLDOVXSSRUWRI
several partners including the American and Canadian Embassy, organizations such as 
OSIWA, NED and the UNDP. The implementation of these projects was endorsed by the 
government. The following examples demonstrate the richness of the collaboration 
between the NGOs and the State.
 In terms of social cohesion and  return to peace
5HFXUUHQFH RI YLROHQW FRQïLFWV LQ WKH:HVW DQG &HQWUDO:HVW UHJLRQ RI &ÎWH Go,YRLUH
which undermines harmonious co-existence can be explained in part by the differences 
in interpretation of Act n° 98-750 of 23 December, 1998 in the area of rural land tenure 
system. This law stipulates in Article 26 that: « rural land ownership acquired prior to 
this Act by persons or entities not meeting the conditions of ownership set out in Article 




of three years to sell the lands in accordance with conditions laid down in Article 16 
or inform the administrative authorities about the return of these lands to the State, 
subject to obtaining the lease as long lease transferrable. Failure to do so is tantamount 
to the heirs being deprived of their title.   
Thus, the Ivorian Human Rights Movement (MIDH), for example, referred the matter to 
WKH$IULFDQ&RPPLVVLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG3HRSOHVo5LJKWV$&+35&200
2002). Following several sensitization programmes, lobbying and advocacy, the text 
was amended by Act n° 2004-412 of 14 August 2004. 
It should be noted that the reconciliation of customary ownership practices with an 
administrative license does not totally guarantee the implementation of the 1998 Act. 
7KHLQHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKLV$FWLVWKH$FKLOOHVoKHHORIWKH,YRULDQJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHDUHD
of land policy.
Thus, in 2009, the African Union Club initiated several projects for sensitization 
and capacity building for village-rural management committee members in the 
'HSDUWPHQWVRI6DQ3HGUR'DORD6RXEUÃDQG%RXDïÃ7KURXJKWKHVHSURMHFWVPRUH
than 10.000 people in villages and settlements were sensitized to accept the law; this 
enabled the Ministry of Agriculture to begin the demarcation of village and rural lands 
in the Department of Soubré, in 2006 and Daloa, in 2008.
$V SDUW RI WKH SURFHVV RI FRQïLFW SUHYHQWLRQ SHDFH SURPRWLRQ DQG VRFLDO FRKHVLRQ
programmes, the COSOPCI set up alert and peace committees as well as operational 
RIîFHV LQ WKH:HVW 1RUWK DQG &HQWUH:HVW (DVW &HQWUH DQG 6RXWK RI WKH FRXQWU\
The sensitization and educational programmes of these structures have promoted 
reconciliation between traditional and religious communities in all these cities. 
 Democracy and citizenship: 
Following the sudden interruption of the electoral process caused by both the 
dissolution of the government and the Independent Electoral commission (IEC) by 
the President in February 2010, civil society including the networks and coalitions, 
COSOPCI, WANEP, COFEMCI, WACSOF and the RAIDH,  embarked on a series of 
consultations with political actors and some partners in March 2010: they included  the 
Houphouétistes for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), the representative of the Facilitator 
of the Ouagadougou  Political Agreement on Ivory Coast, African Union and the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQoVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV7KHVHPHHWLQJVZHUHDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUFLYLOVRFLHW\
to question the actors of the electoral process and make recommendations to bring the 
peace process back on track. 
$OVRWKHîYHQHWZRUNVDQGFRDOLWLRQVLQYROYHGLQWKHSHRSOHoVVHQVLWL]DWLRQIRUWKH
organization of transparent elections, proceeded with their activities across the entire 
country. The methodology approved by the IEC led to a sensitization campaign with 
a standardized approach. This campaign was to sensitize the people on the three (3) 
periods of the electoral process (before, during and after the elections). Also, these 
networks were created in collaboration with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), 
the Observatory for the National Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Groupings and 
Political forces and candidates. This observatory denounced violations of the electoral 
code observed during the campaign for the presidential elections. 
:RPHQoV 1*2V DOVR FRQGXFWHG VHYHUDO RXWUHDFK SURJUDPPHV WR LQFUHDVH WKH
participation of their members in the electoral process. The project- European Initiative 
IRU 'HPRFUDF\ DQG +XPDQ 5LJKWV ,(''+ îQDQFHG E\ WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ
'HOHJDWLRQ DQG LPSOHPHQWHG E\ WKH2UJDQL]DWLRQ RI $FWLYH:RPHQ LQ &ÎWH Go,YRLUH
(OFACI), was part of the process. This information programme to raise awareness and 
support women and young voters was implemented in twelve (12) localities28. The 
record breaking participation rate of more than 80 % in both rounds of the elections 
attests to the effectiveness of all the sensitization campaigns.
An investigation carried out by the African Union Club revealed that about 30 % of 
children from the rural areas had not been declared at birth. As a result, programmes 
were initiated in collaboration with the local government authorities to recognize the 
OHJDOH[LVWHQFHRIWKHVHFKLOGUHQ7KHLPSDFWRIWKH1*2oVSURJUDPPHFDQEHDSSUHFLDWHG
LQWKHVHQVHWKDWELUWKFHUWLîFDWHVZHUHLVVXHGWRFKLOGUHQLQWKHVXESUHIHFWXUHRI
Aboisso, in 2009 and also to 600 children in the sub-prefecture of Daoukro, in 2011. 
Committees to sensitize parents to the culture of birth registration were established 
and henceforth the “Civil Status Day” will be celebrated.
6RPH\HDUVODWHUWKH,YRULDQJRYHUQPHQWXQGHUWKHLQïXHQFHRI+XPDQ5LJKWV
1*2VîJKWDJDLQVWVWDWHOHVVQHVVGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGSURPRWLRQRILGHQWLW\VXFFHHGHG
in convincing the incoming government to make primary education compulsory 
for all children from age 6 to 16, violation of which is punishable. This commitment 
was accompanied by the release of more than 700 million to recruit 4,500 additional 
teachers and construct 4,500 classrooms. 
 Promotion of the « Gender » concept 
On the average, women occupy 19.3% of parliamentary seats in countries which have 
implemented electoral quotas in one way or another, against 14.7 % in countries 
without quotas.  To address this imbalance, women NGOs have engaged in a battle 
to implement the United Nations Resolution n° 13-25 of 31 October 2000 on the 30 % 
quota.
28 Abidjan, Bondoukou, Issia, Gagnoa, Guiglo, Danané, Séguéla, Tingrela, Duékoué, Béoumi, Sakassou, et Tabou
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7KH &)H/&, &RDOLWLRQ IRU :RPHQ /HDGHUV &ÎWH Go,YRLUH FUHDWHG LQ $SULO  E\
100 Ivorian women leaders from different backgrounds and skills, organized women 
sensitization campaign on the theme « why not a woman? » from 2005 to 2006, with 
the aim of giving women their pride of place in the reconstruction of the nation as 
well as in the economic, political, cultural and social development of Ivory Coast. This 




3DUWLHV LQ&ÎWHGo,YRLUH 5()(3&, HPEDUNHGRQDFDPSDLJQ WRDGYRFDWHDQGDGRSWD
law of the 30 % quota in parliamentary, municipal, and general elections scheduled for 
2011 and 2012. To get the institutions to side with their cause, the women have, since 
2010, embarked on lobbying and advocacy campaign in consultation with the Ivorian 
authorities.
But apart from these examples of successful collaboration with the administration, 
WHQVHDQGRUFRQïLFWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVKDYHRIWHQPDUUHGWKHFROODERUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
NGOs and the State on the issue of institutional reform for the protection of human 
ULJKWVLQ&RWHGo,YRLUH
Human Rights Defenders
'XULQJ WKHSHULRG &ÎWHGo,YRLUH H[SHULHQFHGDSRVWHOHFWLRQ FULVLV GXULQJ
which leaders of human rights organisations were threatened, abducted, intimidated 
and the lives of others were saved only after they were taken out of the country.29  
Mr. Nahouala Soro, then deputy Secretary General of the Ivorian Movement for Human 
Rights (MIDH) and Head of the investigation unit within the same organisation, Judge 
Traore Drissa, President of MIDH, Mr Traoré Wodjo Fini, President of the African Union 
&OXERI&RWHGo,YRLUH&OXE8$&,DQG*HQHUDO&RRUGLQDWRURIWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\&RDOLWLRQ
IRU 3HDFH DQG'HPRFUDWLF'HYHORSPHQW LQ &RWH Go,YRLUH &2623&,ZHUH WKRVHZKR
received death threats via telephone from 14th February 2011. The threats were made 
after a speech by Mr Traoré Wodjo Fini at the World Social Forum which took place from 
WKWRWK)HEUXDU\LQ'DNDUZKHUHKHVSRNHDERXWWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ&RWHGo,YRLUH
Some elements in the media also contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of 
intimidation against human rights defenders. The Notre Voie newspaper published an 
article stigmatising human rights defenders, portraying them as opposition members 
DQG DFFXVLQJ WKHP RI LQVWLJDWLQJ PLOLWDU\ LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ &RWH Go,YRLUH 7KH DUWLFOH
29 Front Line 2011/02/ 25 www.frontlinedefenders.org no 17
published on 27th January, mentioned Madam Geneviève Diallo, National Coordinator 
of the Network for Peace and Security of Women in the ECOWAS region (REPSFECO), 
Madam Salimata Porquet, Regional Coordinator of the same network, as well as Madam 
Edwige Sanogo, also member of the network.
0DQ\ MRXUQDOLVWV ZHUH DOVR WKUHDWHQHG LQWLPLGDWHG DQG DUUHVWHG 'XULQJ WKH îQDO
months, at least three journalists were arrested and placed in detention and at least 






human rights organisations initiated a draft legislation on human rights defenders, 
which was adopted at the National Assembly in May 2015 and promulgated in June 
2014 by the President of the Republic. It is Act N° 2014 -388 of 20th June 2014 ensuring 
the promotion and protection of human rights Defenders. 
Organisations for the promotion and defence of human rights played an important role 
LQWKHSURFHVVRIDGRSWLRQRIWKLVODZ7KHSURFHVVLQYROYHGWKHîQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHGUDIW
legislation, advocacy among parliamentarians before the adoption and dissemination 
of the law. 
FINALISATION OF THE DRAFT LEGISLATION 
In 2012, the Ministry of Human Rights and Public Freedom, under the leadership of Mr 
*QÃQÃPD&RXOLEDO\0DPDGRXDVKDUHGWKHîUVWYHUVLRQRIWKHGUDIWELOOE\PDLOZLWK
Human Rights promotion and defence NGOs, who made their observations known. 
A working session was organised in 2013 by the same Ministry in collaboration with 
Human Rights promotion and defence NGOs with a view to validating the draft bill.
Under the initiative of the Civil Society Coalition for Peace and Democratic Development 
LQ&RWHGo,YRLUH&2623&,+XPDQ5LJKWVSURPRWLRQDQGGHIHQFHRUJDQLVDWLRQVZHUH
invited to an internal workshop, a few days after the validation session by the Ministry 
of Human Rights, to review their proposals
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ADVOCACY PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE LAW
In May 2014, the Ivorian Coalition for Human Rights Defenders (CIDDH) contacted the 
OHJLVODWLYHRIîFHRIWKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\WRREWDLQDFRS\RIWKHGUDIWELOOWUDQVPLWWHG
to the Assembly for adoption. A member of parliament, who had participated in a 
&,''+ DFWLYLW\ IDFLOLWDWHG WKH FRQWDFWZLWK WKH KHDG RI WKH OHJLVODWLYH RIîFH RI WKH
National Assembly. 
A working session was organised with members of the coordination unit of the CIDDH 
WRFRPSDUHWKHFRS\UHFHLYHGIURPWKHOHJLVODWLRQRIîFHRIWKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\ZLWK
the draft bill. The objective of this working session was to: 
r Verify the similarity in the contents of the draft bill which the NGOs worked on, and 
the one adopted by the Ministerial Council 
r Make proposals with the aim that they will be considered before the adoption of 
the law by the National Assembly. 
After the internal working session, the CIDDH undertook an advocacy initiative among 
parliamentarians who are members of the Commission on General and Institutional 
Affairs (CAGI), other parliamentarians and the Director of Human Rights promotion, 
Ministry of Human Rights. The message essentially focused on the proposals by CIDDH 
DQGWKHQHHGWRWDNHWKHPLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHîQDOOHJLVODWLRQ
In addition, as part of the advocacy, emphasis was placed on the status of female human 
rights defenders by the inclusion of the word « threat » in the article.
SESSION TO ADOPT THE LAW
In May 2014, members of the coordination unit of the CIDDH participated as observers 
in the session to adopt the law. During this session, the Minister of Justice, Minister of 
Justice, Human Rights and Public Freedom presented the draft bill which was adopted 
by the parliamentarians article by article.
The CIDDH noted at the time of the meeting the proposals which were considered and 
those which were not. The CIDDH was elated that a good number of its proposals were 
considered by the parliamentarians who took ownership of these proposals. 
DISSEMINATION OF THE LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
LEVEL
In December 2014, the Ivorian Coalition for Human Rights Defenders (CIDDH) organised 
a presentation session on the ivorian Act N°2014-388 of 20th June 2014 ensuring the 
promotion and protection of human rights defenders. This presentation session was 
organised in partnership with the Human Rights Division of ONUCI. The National 
&RPPLVVLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVLQ&RWHGo,YRLUH&1'+&,ZDVLQYROYHGDQGPRGHUDWHG
the session.
About eighty (80) people (representatives of human rights organisations, journalists and 
representatives of national and international institutions) participated in the session.
A dissemination campaign was scheduled for the month of September 2015, in 
SDUWQHUVKLSZLWKWKH&1'+&,DQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO&HQWHU)RU1RW3URîW/DZ,&1/
It is the ultimate opportunity to congratulate the Ivorian authorities who initiated this 
ODZWKHîUVWRILWVNLQGLQWKH$IULFDQFRQWLQHQW
It must be replicated to protect human rights activities who are often vulnerable 
because of their ideas and the work they do during the election period. In addition, 
lobbying and advocacy at the government level must continue to ensure that the 
implementing regulations are signed.
Institutional Reform on Forest Governance in Cote d’Ivoire
Within the framework of the APV-FLEGT process, Ivorian civil society started an informal 
platform called Ivorian Observatory for Natural Resources, abbreviated (OI-REN). This 
SODWIRUP EULQJV WRJHWKHUPRUH WKDQ îIW\  1*2VZRUNLQJ LQ WKH DUHD RI KXPDQ
rights, land security, sustainable development, environment and forestry. 
This platform was established for ongoing processes particularly the APV-FLEGT and 
the REDD, as well as future processes. With the establishment of this platform, civil 
society, with one voice and through its actions, is contributing to the improvement of 
IRUHVWJRYHUQDQFHLQ&RWHGo,YRLUH7KXVZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRI)/(*7FLYLOVRFLHW\KDV
LGHQWLîHGLWVWKUHHSULRULWLHVLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIIRUHVWGHSHQGHQWSHRSOHZLWKDYLHZWR




For civil society, it is an issue of ensuring that within the context of this process, the 
ownership of trees goes back to forest dependent people and that the State creates 
OLJKWHUDQGOHVVFXPEHUVRPHFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHDFTXLVLWLRQRIODQGFHUWLîFDWHVLQRUGHU
WKDWWKHRQHZKRKDVFXVWRPDU\ULJKWVRYHUWKHODQGKHIDUPVFDQEHQHîWIURPLQFRPHV
from the use of fruit bearing trees on his land. This has been taken into account in the 
new code. Nevertheless, the implementing regulations of the said code are yet to be 
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written. Civil society has already drafted its position paper to ensure that its concerns 
are taken into consideration and incorporated in the said regulations in the interest of 
rural forest dependent people.
:LWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVKDULQJRIEHQHîWVFLYLOVRFLHW\oVSRVLWLRQLVWKDWIRUHVWGHSHQGHQW
SHRSOH PXVW LQ H[FKDQJH IRU WKH XVH RI WKHLU IRUHVWV EHQHîW IURP WKH îQDQFLDO
proceeds as compensation for the said use, in line with existing regulatory provisions. 
7KHîUVWSUHUHTXLVLWHWRHQVXULQJWKDWWKLVLVPDGHSRVVLEOHLVWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQUHODWLQJ
WRWKHVKDULQJRIEHQHîWVSDUWLFXODUO\WKH3XEOLF,QWHUHVW7D[7,*PXVWEHSODFHGDW
the disposal of the people. To this end, civil society expects that information will be 
readily available and it proposes that people have easy access to these documents and 
LQIRUPDWLRQUHODWLQJWRWKHXVHRIWKHIRUHVWDQGWKHVKDULQJRIVXEVHTXHQWEHQHîWV
&LYLO VRFLHW\EHQHîWV IURPWZRFXUUHQWO\RQJRLQJSURMHFWV7KHîUVWSURMHFWîQDQFHG
by the European Union (managed by FERN, CLUB UA, and UFEMCI) aims at making 
effective the platform for the APV-FLEGT process. In the context of this project, civil 
society has put in place three thematic groups which undertake preparatory work for 
its representatives to the Technical Negotiation Committee (CNT) such that they defend 
FLYLO VRFLHW\o V SRVLWLRQ LQ WHUPV RI OHJDOLW\ 7KHVH WKHPDWLF JURXSV DUH 7KH /HJDOLW\
Assurance System Group (SVL); Domestic Market Group; Information and Public 
Documents Group. This project has strengthened the capacities of 12 focal points in 
WKHIRUHVWDUHDVRI&RWHGo,YRLUH. 
7KHVHFRQGSURMHFWîQDQFHGE\WKH)$2DLPVDWKLJKOLJKWLQJDFWLRQVWDNHQZLWKLQWKH
framework of APV-FLEGT (managed by the NGO, AMISTAD)
With respect to the REDD process, the platform participated in the drafting as well as 
the validation of the national strategic plan for the preparation of REDD, abbreviated, 
RPP and its contributions were almost all taken into consideration and incorporated.
The platform participated in preparatory works towards the implementation of REDD 
and its validation. The platform contributed to the elaboration and validation of the 
decree which created the Permanent Executive Secretariat – REDD.
Civil society participated in the activities relating to Deliberately Determined 
Contributions at the National level (INDC). In the framework of climate change it relates 
to the development of an action plan by each country to show how it contributes to 
WKH îJKW DJDLQVW FOLPDWH FKDQJH IRU WKH  *OREDO 3RVW $JUHHPHQW RQ FOLPDWH
change which will be negotiated in December 2015 in Paris, France during the twenty 
îUVW&RQIHUHQFH RI 3DUWLHV &237R WKLV HQG WKH0LQLVWU\ RI (QYLURQPHQW8UEDQ
Sanitation and Sustainable Development (MINESUDD), in collaboration with the Global 
Environment Fund (FEM) and the United Nations Programme for Development (UNDP) 
organised an information and sensitization workshop for NGOs and Civil Society on the 
GUDIWLQJRI&RWHGo,YRLUHoVGHOLEHUDWHFRQWULEXWLRQVRQFOLPDWH
Conflicting relationships between STATE and NGOs or the 
marginalisation of NGOs 
The NGOs exist but have no real institutional support. Distrust of the administration 
towards the NGOs still persists. Their differential treatment brings about discrimination. 
The post electoral crisis in Ivory Coast was a clear illustration.
$IWHUWKHîUVWURXQGRIHOHFWLRQV6WDWHPHGLDQDPHO\57,,YRULDQ5DGLRDQG7HOHYLVLRQ
and Fraternité Matin were accessible to all NGOs and Networks that observed the 
HOHFWLRQV 6WDWHPHQWV WKDWïRRGHG WKH6WDWHPHGLDZHUH OLNHO\ WR FRQYLQFHHYHU\RQH
about the effectiveness of freedom of speech and equal access to public service.  But 
after the second round, almost all the NGOs were censored and free rein given to those 
who supported the decision of the Ivorian Constitutional Council declaring Laurent 
GBAGBO, winner. To cope with these challenges, some obstacles must be overcome. 
Limitations of the NGOs
r The issue of the sustainability of the CSOs. Many civil society organizations are 
based on the « one-man NGO », organization operating only on the charisma and 
enthusiasm of the founder; this situation raises the question about the future of 
the organization; 
r Issues of legitimacy of the organization and governance.  Many NGOs are almost 
run by families or with an almost « invisible » steering committee;
r Lack of transparency. The NGOs have often criticized the lack of transparency of 
activities and processes of decision-making of governmental cooperation agencies; 
yet, these aspects are also still not clear within some NGOs.
r The closeness of some CSOs to government. The 2010 presidential elections was 
a test of democracy for all political actors. Some, having received accreditation 
from the IEC to observe the elections did not hesitate to side with the positions of 
political parties. After the second round, these CSOs refused to declare the results 
JDWKHUHGRQWKHîHOGWKXVSHUSHWXDWLQJGRXEWLQWKHPLQGRIWKHSHRSOHDERXWWKH
outcomes of the elections. 
r $QDQQXDOîQDQFLDOHQGRZPHQWIRUWKHPRVWGHVHUYLQJ1*2V
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Discussions and Recommendations 
The weakness of the legal framework creates a drift which leads to the manipulation 
of the CSOs. Often in line with the political situation, NGOs are formed claiming to be 
pro-government. In Ivory Coast as elsewhere in Africa, the line between the political and 
QRQSROLWLFDOLVRIWHQQRWSURSHUO\FODULîHG%$
Indeed, there is the tendency for many leaders of civil society organizations to use their 
organizations as a platform to launch political campaigns. We can therefore admit that 
the emergence of the civil society in Ivory Coast as elsewhere is accompanied by the 
appearance of “GONGO”, which is Governmental non-Governmental Organizations, 
created covertly to manipulate public opinion (FELLOUS, 2010).This situation can be 
perceived as an expression of the reluctance of the Ivorian government to promote 
development and autonomy with a view to making them credible collaborators 
(FELLOUS, 2010).  This could explain why in Ivory Coast less than ten (10) NGOs have the 
VWDWXVRISXEOLFEHQHîWRUJDQL]DWLRQV
On the other hand, the lack of open collaboration and transparency between the various 
components that constitute civil society and the improvisation that characterizes much 
RIWKHLULQWHUYHQWLRQVUHGXFHWKHLPSDFWRIWKHLUSURJUDPPHVRQWKHîHOG/(,0'25)(5
2003).  In the same vein, the following have been noted about NGOs; lack of clarity, fraud 
and amateurism in the management of civil society organizations to the detriment of 
scheduled programmes (LE NAELOU, 2004). For instance, in March 2008, the president 
of an NGO in Ivory Coast was referred to the public prosecutor in Abidjan for fraud and 
blackmail in respect of one of the award winners for  best enterprises organized in Benin.
What is more anecdotic again is the inability of the NGO to engage in research activities. 
Almost all Ivorian NGOs engage only in activities related to events (raising awareness). 
5HVHDUFKDFWLYLWLHVWKDWFRXOGKHOSWRUHîQHWKHQHHGVRIWKHSHRSOHDQGDWWKHVDPH
time provide a database for civil society are very rare. Quick and expeditious surveys 
FDUULHG RXW MXVW EHIRUH WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI SURMHFWV DUH LQVXIîFLHQW WR WHVW WKH
realities on the ground. 
7KHîQDQFLDO GHSHQGHQFHRI WKH1*2V LV DQRWKHU OLQHRI WKRXJKW WR VWUHQJWKHQ WKH
SURJUDPPHVRI1*2V7KHîQDQFLDOSDUWQHUVRI1*2VLQFKDUJHRISURPRWLQJKXPDQ
rights, democracy and citizenship are a well-restricted group. As a result, competition in 
organizations to access resources limits in part the « networking ».
In the face of all these challenges, the following recommendations can be 
made:
r Professionalization of NGOs through capacity building of members in management 
and organization;
r Strengthening the « thematic networking »  at the national and international level;
r Consolidation of the legal framework in order to establish a code of ethics of the 
profession and improve the institutional framework for the NGOs;
r Effective inclusion of the NGOs in any reconciliation and sensitization programme;
r ,QFUHDVH LQ WKH QXPEHU RI1*2VZLWK WKH VWDWXV RI QRQSURîW RUJDQL]DWLRQV WR
UHGXFHWKHH[FHVVLYHîQDQFLDOGHSHQGHQFHRIWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\RQIRUHLJQDVVLVWDQFH
Conclusion





WANEP CI). Today, NGOs are emerging as one of the development partners and appear 
as a vital link in the national reconciliation and democratic reinforcement process.
However, many challenges are yet to be overcome. In legal terms, the Ivorian legislative 
efforts are still below expectation from observations made on the ground. The 1960 
law on associations suffers from a serious malaise of adaptability. At the organisational 
DQGVWUXFWXUDOOHYHODPDQDJHPHQWUHIRUPRI1*2VLVHVVHQWLDO'HGLFDWLRQDQGVHOïHVV
DFWLYLVPDUH IDU IURPVXIîFLHQW WRDGGUHVV WKHPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQRIFLYLO VRFLHW\DFWRUV
The cloudiness observed in the strategic and policy agendas of civil society actors 
should help anticipate an approach geared at consolidating achievements and capacity 
EXLOGLQJRI1*2VWRHQDEOHWKHPWRSOD\DVLJQLîFDQWSDUWLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWSURFHVV
The State should ensure that CSOs effectively play their role as watchdogs in ensuring 
GHPRFUDF\DQGDOVRDVDJHQWVRIGHYHORSPHQWHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHVSHFLîFFRQWH[WRI,YRU\
Coast in the post crisis era.
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The late Dr. Samuel J. Palmer is the founding father of The Gambia Family Planning 
Association (GFPA). The idea of setting up an association struck him in the early 1960s 
while working as a young doctor at Bansang Hospital,the only health facility in the 
whole of the Protectorate (all regions outside the greater Banjul area) during the 
Colonial days. The appalling conditions of mothers and children were so disturbing that 
he was challenged to establish the GFPA to cater for their needs in 1968. 
Today, the GFPA is not only a major service provider in The Gambia with clinics in every 
region of the country; but the organisation has also become one of the major social 
movements that are advocating for the sexual and reproductive health and rights of 
FLWL]HQVVXFKDVWKHîJKWDJDLQVW+,9$,'6SURYLVLRQRIVDIHDQGOHJDOLVHGDERUWLRQ30, 
and family planning services and goods, as well as tackling teenage pregnancy and 
sexually transmissible infections among others. Furthermore, the association has been 
playing a major role in policy processes at the national level.
The emergence of civil society organisations in The Gambia and around the world is 
similar to the story of Dr. Palmer and the GFPA as individuals and groups with shared 
beliefs, concerns and interests come together to create a platform upon which to 
promote their objectives. The emergence of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) today 
just as in the past has to do with the failure or inability of governments to provide basic 
VRFLDOVHUYLFHVWRSURWHFWWKHIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVDQGIXOîOOWKHEDVLFQHHGVRISHRSOH
This situation has been further exacerbated in many cases by the collaboration 
between the State and the private sector, where the latter has been notorious for its 
XQEULGOHG WKLUVW IRUSURîWVHYHQZKHQ WKDWPHDQVGLVUHJDUGLQJVRFLRHFRQRPLFDQG
HQYLURQPHQWDOKD]DUGVFDXVHGWRSHRSOHLQWKHLQWHUHVWRISURîWPDNLQJ31. Situations 
like these have ignited the emergence and proliferation of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to protect and cater for the diverse needs and interests of citizens 
and communities in various conditions, most of which are quite dire. Thus CSOs have 
almost become an organised third force, in addition to the public and private sectors in 
WKHZLGHUVRFLHW\WKDWVHHNWRFKDQJHOLYHVDQGOLYHOLKRRGVDVZHOOLQïXHQFHSROLF\DQG
the general environment. 
This article is an attempt to present and analyse the emergence, role and operations 
of CSOs in The Gambia given its socio-economic and political history and environment. 
Emergence of Civil Society in the Gambia
30  Abortion is illegal in The Gambia but legal only under certain strict conditions.
31 The case of oil explorations in the Niger Delta of Nigeria is a classic example. But even in small and less endowed 




Hunger Campaign (FFHC - 1969), Action Aid International the Gambia (AAITG - 1979) 
and Young Men Christian Association (YMCA - 1979). Since then, CSOs have proliferated 
in the country. 
For the past 40 years, CSOs have been championing development work and initiatives 
LQ 7KH *DPELD DQG KDYH WUHPHQGRXVO\ FRPSOHPHQWHG WKH JRYHUQPHQWoV HIIRUWV LQ
bringing education, clean drinking water, health care and awareness of development 
issues to communities. While the government bears the ultimate responsibility of 
bringing development to the people and changing their lives positively, national and 
international CSOs, and community based groups have contributed tremendously in 
expanding services and providing relief and support to communities in every part of 
The Gambia. 
There are hundreds of charitable organisations with over 100 registered NGOs32 in the 
country and about 80 of them belong to the premier CSO consortium, The Association 
of NGOs in the Gambia (TANGO) which was established in 1983. Apart from its 10 
international members, the rest are local CSOs at varying levels of capacity, resources 
and coverage. Most of these CSOs are community-based organisations, while the rest 
are considered national CSOs because they have programmes that cut across regions. 
A review of the mandates and objectives of most CSOs in the country indicates 
that the prevalent issues of concern are socio-economic33 DV UHïHFWHG LQ WKH NLQGRI
interventions that have been undertaken in the past four decades. As a least developing 
country, ranking 172 in the UNDP Human Development Report 2014, with 58 percent 
of the population falling below the poverty line34 it is not hard to understand why 
development support appears to be directed towards social and economic issues. In 
fact a review of the early CSOs to emerge in the country would show the overwhelming 
inclination towards education, health and agriculture. This is in direct response to the 
low level of social services and poverty in the country as it emerged from colonialism. 
However, over the years this has been changing as more and more organisations began 
to realise that to effectively deal with socio-economic issues, it is necessary to urgently 
address human rights hence the adoption of rights-based approaches. One of the major 
organisations that made this paradigm shift early on was the AAITG which, about eleven 
years ago  from service delivery to rights based approaches to development focusing on:
32 There is a distinction between a CSO and an NGO in Gambian law. CSOs or charitable organisations are an array 
RIRUJDQLVDWLRQV WKDW UHJLVWHUÀUVWZLWK WKH0LQLVWU\RI -XVWLFH WRRSHUDWH OHJDOO\7KLV UHJLVWUDWLRQ LV UHTXLUHGDQG
VXIÀFLHQWWRRSHUDWHIRUDVORQJDVRQHZLVKHV%XWE\DQ1*2'HFUHHZDVSDVVHGZKLFKHVWDEOLVKHGWKH1*2
$IIDLUV$JHQF\XQGHUWKH2IÀFHRIWKH3UHVLGHQWDVDUHJXODWRU\PHFKDQLVPIRU1*2V$&62WKDWVHHNVWRDFTXLUHWKH
status of ‘NGO’ has the option  to register with the Agency in order to be legally recognised as an ‘NGO’ in the Gambia. 
,QWKLVDUWLFOH&62JHQHUDOO\FRYHUVERWKWKHFKDULWDEOHRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQG¶1*2V·,QVSHFLÀFFDVHV1*2ZRXOGEHXVHG
WRUHIHUWRRQO\WKDWVSHFLÀFRUJDQLVDWLRQUHJLVWHUHGZLWKWKH$JHQF\
33 TANGO Strategic Plan 2006 – 2010.
34 Gambia Bureau of Statistics. Other Sources indicate 61 percent. 
Six thematic areas in the Rights To End Poverty (RTEP) strategy, namely: Women’s 
Rights, the Right to Food, the Right to Democratic and Just Governance, the Right 
to a life of dignity in the face of HIV/AIDS, the Right to Education, and the Right to 
+XPDQ6HFXULW\LQ&RQÁLFWDQG(PHUJHQFLHV
While most CSOs still continue to focus on service provision, human rights issues, 
particularly women and child rights continue to gain currency as witnessed by the 
emergence of rights organisations especially in the child and gender sectors where 
the Child Protection Alliance is the leading child rights coalition along with Child Fund. 
$PRQJ WKHPDQ\ZRPHQoV ULJKWV RUJDQLVDWLRQV WKHPRVW QRWDEOH RUJDQLVDWLRQ KDV
been the Gambia Committee on Harmful Traditional Practices (GAMCOTRAP) which 
KDVEHHQZDJLQJDQXQUHOHQWLQJZDUIRUZRPHQoVULJKWVHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHîJKWDJDLQVW
harmful traditional practices and equality between men and women. 
CSOs and National Independence
CSOs arose early on in modern Gambia as tools for the liberation of the country from 
colonialism. Trade unions and peasant organisations have played a major role in the 
struggle for independence and the protection of the rights and welfare of workers. 
In the 1920s, Edward Francis Small, considered the Father of Gambian independence, 
organised farmers, city workers and citizens in general into co-operatives, trade 
unions and political organisations to demand better wages, improved working and 
living conditions and proper management by the State. In fact the co-operatives he 
VSHDUKHDGHG OHG WR WKH FUHDWLRQ RI WKH *DPELD &RRSHUDWLYHV 8QLRQ WKH FRXQWU\oV
îUVWDQGODUJHVWIDUPHURUJDQLVDWLRQZKLFKFROODSVHGGXHWRUDPSDQWFRUUXSWLRQDQG
mismanagement in the late 1990s. 
The 1929 strike for better working conditions, better pay and high cost of living was 
largely spearheaded by the Bathurst Trade Union. Other organisations such as the 
Gambia Native Defense Union and the Rate Payers Association rallied around the battle 
cry of, ‘No Taxation without Representation’ led by EF Small. These agitations by civil 
JURXSVLQWKDWSHULRGOHGWRWKHFUHDWLRQRIWKHîUVWFRQVWLWXWLRQDIWHUZKLFKLQ
the Bathurst Legislative Council allowed for one elected African in the city assembly. 
Edward Francis Small was elected to take that seatH[RIÀFLR6LQFHWKHQWKHïRRGJDWHV
of independence opened in The Gambia leading to series of constitutional conferences 
from 1959 to the attainment of independence in 197035.
Evidently, the forerunners for national liberation in The Gambia were civil society groups, 




question of independence to rest as the required majority voted ‘Yes’ making the country an independent sovereign 
republic.
70 71
Evolution of civil society in The Gambia
The emergence of community based organisations as a means for self-help to combat 
LQFUHDVLQJSRYHUW\DQGWKHKLJKFRVWRIOLYLQJîWVTXLWHZHOOZLWKWUDGLWLRQDO*DPELDQ
life.36 Gambian communities did not lack associations that sought to promote the 
needs of the people either on their own or who sought support to cater for their welfare. 
These associations were usually very loosely established. Thus, from a socio-cultural 
and historical perspective, one will realise that the idea of a CSO is deep-rooted in The 
Gambia as an integral feature of the communities and way of life. It is common within 
villages to have what is called ‘kafo’, which is a Mandinka37ZRUGIRUnDVVRFLDWLRQo
The emergence of formalised and technically more organised and competent civil 
society organisations did not eradicate the ‘kafolu38’, yet these modern CSOs have not 
managed to transform perceptions based on what has become apparent. Thus, by the 
nature of their modus operandi and the materials they utilise such as vehicles and the 
professionalism of their staff, these so-called modern ‘kafolu’ immediately became 
status markers, which generated a lot of misconceptions. 
However, it is apparent that with the emergence of independence and the creation of 
necessary legislature and institutions, and the proliferation of these modern CSOs have 
served to support the formalisation of traditional civil groups in the villages and towns 
RIWKHFRXQWU\0DQ\RIWKHVHJURXSVKDYHQRZUHîQHGWKHLUVWUXFWXUHDQGRSHUDWLRQV
in terms of governance and management. Many now have their own bank accounts, 
UHFHLSWERRNVOHWWHUKHDGVSRVWRIîFHER[HVDQGHPDLODGGUHVVHVDQGLGHQWLîHGRIîFHUV
with clear terms of responsibility. By virtue of these changes, many of these groups have 
been able to access funding and strengthen their presence and relevance, and therefore 
making the transition from traditional to modern CSOs. 
Public Perception of CSOs 
In spite of the long presence and far reaching impact of CSOs in the country, there 
however exist misconceptions about these organizations. For example, there is a 
perception that CSOs have lots of money and well-paid staff. This perception has been 
further strengthened by the proliferation of CSOs thus fanning the idea that CSO work 
is lucrative business. It is however true that more established CSOs remunerate their 
staff better than civil servants, who continue to leave the public sector. Consequently, 
PDQ\SHRSOHSHUFHLYH&62VWREHFRUUXSWRUUDWKHUDUHVHWXSIRUWKHVHOîVKLQWHUHVWRI
RQHRUIHZLQGLYLGXDOV6XFKSHUFHSWLRQVKDYHJLYHQULVHWRWHUPVOLNHnRQHPDQ&62Vo
36 In my community of Boraba, about 300km from Banjul, village associations have always existed since the days of 
my forefathers, and currently I am coordinating one called Boraba Taa-Nyatoo, i.e. Advancement of Boraba in our 
language.
37 Mandinka is the largest ethnic group and most widely spoken language in the Gambia accounting for 42% of the 
population.
38  ‘Kafo’ is Mandinka word singular form for group. The plural form is ‘kafolu’.
RUnEULHIFDVH&62Vo
Despite the foregoing, most people also recognise that CSOs are helpful and have served 
communities and regions where the government is unable or unwilling to reach. A study 
commissioned by TANGO in 2012 on the ‘Impact and Perception of NGOs in National 
'HYHORSPHQWo LQGLFDWHV WKDW p1*2V DUH UHOHYDQW DQG LQYDOXDEOH LQ WKH îJKW DJDLQVW
poverty, food insecurity, gender inequalities, lack of quality and parity in education of 
the girl-child and visually impaired, youth unemployment and low income generation 
activities.” Most people perceive CSOs as complementing government efforts in 
meeting national development objectives. The role and contributions of civil society to 
7KH*DPELDoVGHYHORSPHQWKDYHEHHQUHFRJQLVHGLQWKHFRXQWU\WKHHYLGHQFHRIZKLFK
can be felt by the quality and frequency of engagement of CSOs by the government. 




on it, including representatives from the Supreme Islamic Council, Gambia Christian 
Council, ActionAid, ACDHRS, Aid the Child Network, APGWA, Bafrow, CPA, CCF, FLAG, 
GAMCOTRAP, and others. Because of their extensive contributions there was felt to 
be no need for the creation of an alternative report by the NGO community at the 
time this report was being completed.
Civil society organisations and media
The media is an integral part of the civil society and the Gambia Press Union (GPU) 
is one of the oldest CSOs in The Gambia being formed in 1978. True to their nature, 
WKHPHGLDLQWKH*DPELDKDYHDOZD\VSURYLGHGFRQWLQXRXVSRVLWLYHFRYHUDJHWR&62Vo
activities. Thus, the relationship has been cordial. Probably what has not been taking 
place fully is the support that CSOs provide to the media. Over the years Gambian media 
has faced one of the worst experiences in the whole of the continent especially since 
2004, when a veteran journalist39ZDVJXQQHGGRZQE\XQLGHQWLîHGDVVDLODQWVZKR
still remain at large. This was followed by numerous arson attacks, assaults, arbitrary 
arrests and detentions, closure of media houses, enforced exiles and legal clampdown, 
against a backdrop of several draconian media laws. In all these cases members of the 
media generally felt that CSOs did not come to their aid in much the same way as they 
have supported CSOs.
Recently though, there has been growing strategic collaboration between GPU and the 
civil society. TANGO and AAITG have supported and partnered with the Journalists Union 
to commemorate a number of events such as the World Press Freedom Day, William 
39 Deyda Hydara was a foremost critique of violations of free press and co-founder of one of the leading dailies ‘The 
Point’ newspapers, as well as the correspondent for RFI.
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Dixon Colley Day and the anniversary of the assassination of Deyda Hydara, as well as 
conducted joint advocacy activities. Yet overall CSOs have not provided robust capacity 
building support in terms of either training or resources40 to journalists. Rather what is 
common is for CSOs to train journalists on development issues they are working on in 
order to build the reporting skills of the media in such areas as child rights, HIV/AIDS, 
gender, and climate change among others. This support is more in the interest of these 
development organisations and not primarily for the media and journalists. Given the 
legal and political challenges that the media faces, journalists are expecting that CSOs 
will pick up these as legitimate advocacy campaigns. But this hardly takes place. CSOs 
have taken a conspicuous absence in pushing for the respect of rights and protection 
of journalists and media houses and freedom of expression in the country. Media 
offences remain criminalised while there is a continuous arrest and trial of journalists 
DQGFORVXUHRIUDGLRVWDWLRQVDQGQHZVSDSHUVZKLOHPDQ\PRUHMRXUQDOLVWVKDYHïHG
the country in fear for their lives. The silence of CSOs on these issues remains deafening.
Rapport with the state and private sector: challenges and 
controversies
The existence and operations of CSOs in The Gambia has not been without hitches. 
Several CSOs have undergone turbulent times resulting from the nature of their 
management and governance systems.41  Given their loose formations and limited 
human capacity in terms of how to run organisations, many CSOs had overlapping 
DQGFRQïLFWLQJVWUXFWXUHVDQGV\VWHPVWKDWFUHDWHGLQWHUQDOFRQïLFWV)RUH[DPSOHLQ
its Excel Project 2007 - 2010 which aims to build the management and governance 
systems of CSOs, TANGO teams noticed that there are organisations in which members 
of the governing board execute management functions or vice versa. This clearly 
showed retrogressive internal governance practices. 
Other risks associated with CSOs have to do with management of resources, programme 
implementation and reporting.  Many CSOs lack the requisite technical and professional 
capacity in management and administration because of their independent nature and 
WKH PDQQHU RI WKHLU FUHDWLRQ 7KLV UHïHFWHG LQ WKHLU LQDGHTXDF\ LQ SURSHU îQDQFLDO
management, programme implementation, reporting and evaluation. A training needs 
assessment conducted by TANGO in 2012, with support from the African Capacity 
%XLOGLQJ )RXQGDWLRQ $&%) LGHQWLîHG FDSDFLW\ JDSV LQ D QXPEHU RI DUHDV LQFOXGLQJ




41 Under the EXCEL project run by TACSO, which seeks to support CSOs to properly structure their management and 
governance systems, it has been found out that many CSOs had staff, which serve both in the administration and 
governance bodies.
Apart from the professional and technical challenges that CSOs have in The Gambia, 
there also exist challenges in terms of resource mobilisation and relationships with the 
state, the private sector and development organisations. Some of the issues prevalent 
between CSOs and these partners have direct correlation to the management and 
governance systems of CSOs. Also, there are challenges that emerge from a political 
perspective. 
For example, in 199642 the  the military junta created an NGO Decree and established 
the NGO Affairs Agency, which aims to regulate the operations of NGOs. Since 2010, 
there have been attempts to review the decree in order to transform it into an Act in 
line with democratic practices. While some development partners and experts have 
welcomed the need for such a law and institution, concerns have also been raised by 
CSOs about some of the provisions in the proposed Bill. 
While The Gambia constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly and 
association, the Bill provides that unless an organisation is registered with the agency, 
VXFK RUJDQLVDWLRQ ZLOO QRW RSHUDWH DV DQ n1*2o LQ WKH FRXQWU\ $FFRUGLQJ WR $UWLFOH
18(1) of the Bill: “No organisation shall commence or carry on any activity as a Non- 
Governmental Organisation in The Gambia unless it is registered under this Act to do so”. 
Further, the Protocol of Accord that sets out the modalities of the Bill stipulates that: 
If the NGO’s activities are found not to be in conformity with Government’s 
development agenda or detrimental to the integrity of the Government and the 
peace and stability of the country, the Government shall revoke this Protocol of 
Accord.
This provision is a cause for concern as it negates the very nature of CSOs as agents 
of change. By their nature, i.e. in holding the state to account, CSOs either support or 
oppose government policy, decision or action. But this provision as it is does not allow 
for any opposition to government policy, decision or action because that would be seen 
as contravening the government. Thus effectively, this provision serves as a control 
mechanism through which the government can close down a CSO for merely holding a 
divergent or dissenting opinion. 
Access to information from government functionaries or departments, at both local 
and national levels, and even from the private sector is challenging. In such a situation 
LWZRXOGEHGLIîFXOWWREXLOGDV\VWHPDQGFXOWXUHRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGWUDQVSDUHQF\
in the absence of information. To improve the situation, TANGO collaborated with 
GPU to advocate for the promulgation of a Right to Information Act which would 
make information held by government agencies accessible to the general public. This 
campaign has not been successful as the government has not even considered drawing 
a freedom of information bill.
42 This was the height of the military dictatorship following the 1994 coup d’état. 
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In spite of this, CSOs enjoy a cordial working relationship with The Gambian Government, 
especially as long as one does not touch the sensitive issues of good governance, 
democracy and human rights. CSOs continue to be consulted and involved in policy 
processes by the government and many CSOs had obtained support from government 
related interventions such as the World Bank funded Community-Demand Driven 
Project which is run by the government to promote grassroots development. 
Regarding the private sector, there are limited partnerships mainly because of the 
small size of this sector. Accordingly, there has not been a strong bond between the 
two. However, an emerging partnership seems to be growing particularly between the 
telecommunication companies and some CSOs43. 
There is also inadequate coordination within the civil society sector itself and a strong 
competition for funding. Duplicity of efforts and resources leads to wastage and the 
LPSDFWRILQWHUYHQWLRQLVVRPHWLPHVGLIîFXOWWRPHDVXUH)XUWKHUPRUHVLQFHWKHZRUN
of CSOs is determined by the availability of funding, which sometimes compromises the 
QHHGWRDGGUHVVWKHUHDOQHHGVRIVRFLHW\RUWKHWDUJHWEHQHîFLDULHVORQJWHUPSURMHFWV
DQGSURJUDPPHVDUHVDFULîFHGIRUVKRUWWHUPDFWLYLWLHVWKDWDUHOHVVVWUDWHJLF
Despite the widespread CSO rhetoric of allowing locally targeted communities to 
participate in development projects and programmes, the reality on the ground shows 
limited real grass-roots involvement in decision-making and participation of targeted 
groups and communities. Major decisions are usually made by CSO staffs before starting 
WKHFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKYLOODJHUVRUFRPPXQLWLHV WKHPVHOYHV7KLVSUDFWLFH UHïHFWV WKH
needs-based approach that has been the mode over the decades but is now being 
replaced by a rights-based approach. The rights-based approach recognises individuals 
and communities as rights holders who have a right to development from duty bearers.
Successes registered by CSOs
The contribution of CSOs to the development of The Gambia is immense. While no 
studies have yet been conducted to quantify or to determine the impact of CSOs 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVREVHUYDEOH LQGLFDWLRQVZLOOVKRZWKDWWKHH[WHQWRI&62VoFRQWULEXWLRQ
has been far-reaching. This contribution can be attested to by the overwhelming 
presence of CSOs in the provision of development goods and services in almost all 
sectors and regions of The Gambia. In recognition of this contribution, TANGO launched 
LQ WKHîUVWHYHU1*2:HHNGHVLJQHG WRVKRZFDVH WKH UROHDQGFRQWULEXWLRQRI
CSOs to national development since independence. Tens of CSOs exhibited their works 
and series of policy dialogues and an awards ceremony were the highlights of the event 
that saw a huge reception from the various sectors of Gambian society. 
43 For example in 2009 Africell and West African Network for Peace building (WANEP) partnered in observance of World 
3HDFH'D\RQ6HSWHPEHU6LPLODUO\7$1*2KHOGDPDMRUSROLF\GLDORJXHLQRQORFDOGHYHORSPHQWÀQDQFLQJ
which brought together public and private sector to interface with CSOs on the question of redirecting corporate 
social responsibility towards development organisations. 
In the area of education and vocational training, CSOs have not only built schools for 
communities but have also sponsored the education of school children and provided 
school materials for them. In addition, CSOs have established and operated their own 
primary and secondary schools in various parts of the country. The same could be said 
RIWKHKHDOWKVHFWRUZKHUHRQHZLOOîQGQXPHURXVKHDOWKIDFLOLWLHVLQYDULRXVSDUWVRI
the country run by CSOs. For example the GFPA has for the past 40 years of its existence 
maintained family planning clinics in every administrative region of the country,44 
which also offer broad sexual and reproductive health services. This is complemented 
by a large movement of volunteers reaching out to poor and remote communities 
or individuals with health resources and information. Several other CSOs are equally 
engaged in capacity building for health workers in the private and public sectors, as well 
as providing drugs and other medical related resources.
While the majority of the Gambian population engages in agriculture, one will 
again discover that the activities of CSOs in this sector are so far reaching that many 
communities now owe their livelihoods to the support provided by CSOs. Such 
organisations as the Association for the Advancement of Women and Children (ADWAC) 
continue to be major players in rice cultivation among other agricultural interventions 
in the northern regions of the country. Several organisations are providing various forms 
of agricultural support such as training of farmers, provision of seeds, implements, cash 
and expertise to farming communities.  
In addition to the direct provision of goods and services to communities and individuals, 
the role played by CSOs in terms of awareness creation and advocacy for human rights, 
JRRG JRYHUQDQFH JHQGHU HTXDOLW\ DQG ZRPHQoV HPSRZHUPHQW SURPRWLRQ RI JLUOVo
education and quality service delivery and overall empowerment of the people has been 
UHPDUNDEOH,QWKHDUHDRIZRPHQoVULJKWVIRUH[DPSOH*$0&275$3DPRQJRWKHUVKDV
EHHQIRUHPRVWLQWKHîJKWDJDLQVWKDUPIXOWUDGLWLRQDOSUDFWLFHVQRWDEO\)*0IRUZKLFK
they have succeeded in sensitising many communities to abandon the deep-rooted 
cultural practice. 
(YLGHQWO\ZLWKRXW&62VoLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI7KH*DPELDWKHFRXQWU\
would have been faced with even more dire socio-economic challenges. The gains 
registered by the country in reducing poverty and achievements in the MDGs are heavily 
VXSSRUWHGDQGFRQWLQJHQWRQ&62VoLQWHUYHQWLRQV
44  Over the past few years though, FPA has been scaling down and many of these clinics have been closed due to limited 
ÀQDQFLDOFDSDFLW\
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is clear that the role and relevance of CSOs to the development of the Gambia is 
uncontestable. For CSOs to add value to their interventions and register impact by 
HQVXULQJMXGLFLRXVXVHRIîQDQFLDOPDWHULDODQGKXPDQUHVRXUFHVWKH\QHHGWRUHYLHZ
their approach and outlook from outputs to results. In other words, many CSOs are 
engaged in development work on the basis of outputs and activities such as how many 
schools have been built or how many activities have been implemented. 
What results and impact have they created? Have we been able to change behaviour 
by our schools and hospitals and the awareness programmes we run on the television 
and radio? CSOs need to begin to undertake results-based monitoring and evaluation 
as the basis to track and register impact. It is important that civil society organisations 
know how their efforts, certainly critical for survival and wellbeing, are contributing to 
EUHDNLQJWKHF\FOHRISRYHUW\LQFUHDVLQJWKHFDSDFLW\RIWKHVWDWHWRGHOLYHULQïXHQFLQJ
the decision-making process at the local and national level, and debates about the 
future of the State. It is argued that efforts that target solely service delivery without 
undertaking measures to eradicate social injustice and malaise in terms of advocacy 
and policy engagement can be ineffective or cosmetic. 
Another area of focus is policy processes. Ultimately everything starts and ends with 
policy. It is policy that determines the priorities of government and development trends 
in any particular country. Thus, CSOs need to understand what policy is and how public 
policy impacts on decision-making, power and development. One of the ways to ensure 
development outcomes is to build capacity to engage in policy-making processes such 
as policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation.
In addition, it is imperative for the government to also review the NGO Bill and repeal 
draconian provisions contained in it. CSOs do not have to share the same development 
objectives and perception with the government. In fact, CSOs can advocate for the 
change of development objectives, policy decisions and actions of a government. 
Thus, CSOs as change agents can raise campaigns against any government decision, 
policy, law or action that it considers as an impediment to the fundamental rights and 
IUHHGRPVRI WKHSHRSOHRU WKHLUDELOLW\ WR OLYH WKHLU OLYHVDV WKH\ VHHîWRUPHUHO\ WR
highlight government ineptitude especially where such gaps affect service delivery and 
access. 
,QDQXWVKHOO&62VDUHSHRSOHoVRUJDQLVDWLRQVWKDWDLPQRWRQO\WRSURPRWHGHYHORSPHQW
service to the people, but also to hold government accountable and make it transparent 
on behalf of the people. Finally, CSOs have to be professional, accountable and 
transparent if they are to play any meaningful role in the development of the country 
DVZHOO DV REWDLQ WKH FRQîGHQFH RI EHQHîFLDULHV WKH JRYHUQPHQW DQGGHYHORSPHQW
partners including the private sector. CSOs will lack the moral authority to hold any 
sector or government accountable if they are also found to be undemocratic and 
unaccountable. Furthermore, CSOs need to protect and exert their independence to 
ensure that they are not also seen as agents of foreign interests and organisations. 
One of the charges proffered against African CSOs by their governments is that they 
VHUYHWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHLUnIRUHLJQPDVWHUVoVLPSO\EHFDXVHWKH\UHFHLYHIXQGLQJIURP
foreign sources and promote issues that interest the donors. Though most CSOs receive 
funding from abroad, it does not necessarily mean that they are agents or promote the 
destruction of their societies to pander to foreign interests. 
7KH UROH DQG FRQWULEXWLRQV RI FLYLO VRFLHW\ WR 7KH *DPELDoV GHYHORSPHQW KDV EHHQ
recognised in the country, the evidence of which can be felt by the quality and frequency 
of engagement of CSOs by the government. The NGO Perception Study45 noted that CSOs 
KDYHH[HUWHGLPPHQVHLQïXHQFHDQGLPSDFWRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISROLF\GRFXPHQWV
and drafting law bills, especially on cross-cutting issues. The report highlighted such 
FRQWULEXWLRQVLQWKHHQDFWLQJRIWKH:RPHQoV$FWIRUPXODWLRQRIWKH*HQGHUDQG
Women Empowerment Policy 2010-2020 and the preparation of the National Report 
on the Beijing Platform for Action. The recent enactment of the Domestic Violence Act 
DQGWKH6H[XDO2IIHQFHV$FWDUHDOOSLHFHVRIOHJLVODWLRQLQZKLFKZRPHQoV
rights organisations in particular played a major role.
In highlighting the contributions of CSOs, the NGO Perception study concluded that 
there was general positive consensus that the quantum of the work interventions of 
NGOs is having a considerable impact on the lives of the people of Gambia in all the 
GLIIHUHQW5HJLRQVRIWKHFRXQWU\HYHQLQWKHIDUïXQJUHPRWHFRUQHUVZKHUHWKHHQDEOLQJ
arm of government cannot reach citizens. Nonetheless, the report noted that there 
ZDVQHHGWRHQVXUHVXVWDLQDELOLW\E\DVVLVWLQJWKHEHQHîFLDU\FRPPXQLWLHVWRFUHDWH
second generation strategies and mechanisms to bolster and/or replicate the gains 
GHULYHGIURPVXFKSURMHFWV ,WKLJKOLJKWHGWKH n*DPELD LV*RRGoFRPSDQ\E\&RQFHUQ
Universal to promote better storage and marketing of vegetables by rural women. The 
LVVXH RI FDSDFLW\ EXLOGLQJZDV DOVR KLJKOLJKWHG DV DPHDQV WR HPSRZHU EHQHîFLDU\
FRPPXQLWLHVWRFODLPRZQHUVKLSRIWKHEHQHîWVGHULYHGIURP&62LQSXWVE\GHVLJQLQJ
their own project sustainability strategies and activities before CSO projects close. In 
this regard the need to promote and practice mobilising methods or plans to generate 
VHOIUHOLDQWLQFRPHWRVXSHUVHGH&62DQGGRQRUUHVRXUFHVDWWKHHQGRIWKHSURMHFWVoOLIH
span were recognised as necessary measures to further strengthen and optimise CSO 
contributions. Essentially, the idea was to create the enabling environment to empower 
communities to take ownership and leadership of projects as a means to also make 
them sustainable. 
45 The study was commissioned by TANGO in 2012 and carried out by a senior lecture from the University of the Gambia 
Dr. Ralphina d’Almeida. 
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Civil Society: The Key to Ghana’s democratic 
transformation and consolidation




Society; examines the special relationship between Civil Society and the Media; and 
outlines the successes, challenges and prospects of Civil Society in that country, paying 
particular attention to their role in the formulation, implementation and monitoring 
RI SXEOLF SROLF\ *KDQDoV FRQVWLWXWLRQDO GHPRFUDWLF H[SHULHQFH DQG WUDMHFWRU\ DUH
intrinsically linked to the evolution of its Civil Society. Civil Society fought the various 
dictatorial regimes that ruled Ghana for most of the period between 1966 and 
FRPSOHPHQWHGJRYHUQPHQWoVHIIRUWV LQSURYLGLQJVRFLDOVHUYLFHVDQGHFRQRPLF
opportunities to the population during that period; insisted on a return to constitutional 
democratic rule; participated in fashioning a new Constitution; and has since protected 
and nurtured both the Constitution and the various institutions created, implicated 
RUVXSSRUWHGE\LW7KHSDSHULQHYLWDEO\FRQFOXGHVWKDWZLWKRXW&LYLO6RFLHW\*KDQDoV
democracy will fail.  
Definition of «Civil Society» In Ghana
In Ghana the term Civil Society is of common usage. It is generally used to describe that 
ZKLFKLVQRWSXEOLFJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUWKDWLVQRWIRUSURîW7KXV&LYLO
Society in Ghana is mostly organised as a conglomeration of registered and unregistered 
Non-Governmental or Community-Based Organisations. In sum, Civil Society in Ghana 
FRQVLVWVRIYROXQWDU\DVVRFLDWLRQVDQGJURXSLQJVIRUFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQWRLQïXHQFHSXEOLF
policy around shared interests, purposes and values, without seeking to take over the 
reins of government. 
They include registered charities, service delivery NGOs, advocacy NGOs, community-
based organisations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, business 





relieve poverty; protect the environment, health or human rights; promote community 
GHYHORSPHQWRU*KDQDLDQFXOWXUHRUDQ\RWKHUSXUSRVHEHQHîFLDOWRWKHFRPPXQLW\
According to the Bill, NGOs or CSOs can be religious or secular, but they cannot engage 
in partisan politics actively. 
7KLVGHîQLWLRQLVVLPLODUWRWKHGHîQLWLRQRI1*2VLQWKH*KDQD1DWLRQDO3ROLF\IRU1*2V
RIGHYHORSHGE\JRYHUQPHQWDQGDFRDOLWLRQRI&62V7KHSROLF\GHîQHV1*2V




CSOs have proliferated in Ghana during the past quarter century, as have the issues 
they address. The Commonwealth Network-Ghana puts the total number of formal 
CSOs in early 2012 at 30,000. These CSOs are engaged in advocacy efforts to build a 
stronger democracy in Ghana, to improve good governance or to bring socio-economic 
relief to many people in the country. 
It is possible to broadly categorize CSOs into service delivery and advocacy CSOs. Due to 
the fact that public spending on services often does not reach poor people, especially 
in developing countries like Ghana, most donor agencies resort to channeling funds 
WKURXJK &62oV UHFRJQL]LQJ WKHP DV LPSRUWDQW FRQGXLWV IRU DLG DQG DV SURYLGHUV RI
GHYHORSPHQWVHUYLFHV6HUYLFHGHOLYHU\&62oVKDYHWKXVSURYLGHGOHDGHUVKLSLQHGXFDWLRQ
healthcare, food security, housing, microcredit and social services in Ghana. Since 1993 
Ghana has been a constitutional democracy. This has led to the growth of advocacy 
CSOs that utilize the democratic spaces created by the Constitution to advocate for 
public goods and for the advancement of the marginalised and vulnerable. 
Evolution of CSOs in Ghana
,Q SUHFRORQLDO *KDQD &62V WRRN WKH IRUP RI \RXWK DQGZRPHQoV JURXSV WKDW NHSW
Traditional Authority in check by ensuring that they governed within the bounds of the 
traditional Constitution and acted in the public interest at all times. During colonial 
rule Ghana, then called the Gold Coast, saw the formation of CSOs such as the Fante 
Confederation and the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS). This was a time 
when Traditional Authority no longer wielded ultimate political power. The membership 
of these organisations included chiefs, lawyers, other professionals, the youth and 
ordinary persons. The CSOs of the time were set up to advocate for the civil, political 
DQGSURSHUW\ULJKWVRIWKHORFDOV6SHFLîFDGYRFDF\LVVXHVLQFOXGHGWKHODQGTXHVWLRQ
taxation without representation and forced labour.
CSOs in Ghana became more vibrant from the nineteenth century with urbanization 
and the expansion of the economy. From 1937 to 1938, associations of cocoa producers 
successfully kicked against the monopoly of the commodity market by the Association 
of West African Merchants, an organisation controlled by expatriates. Prominent among 
WKHVHZHUHWKH$VKDQWL&RFRD3ODQWHUVo8QLRQDQGWKH*KDQD)DUPHUVo&RQJUHVV7KH
cocoa farmers associations also objected to cocoa price policies, the surplus extracted 
by the cocoa marketing board and the policy of compulsory removal of cocoa trees 
infected with swollen shoot disease. The cocoa hold-up of the period demonstrated the 
organising potential of the cocoa farmers and their ability to threaten colonial interests. 
The period leading up to independence in 1957 witnessed an explosion of CSO activity, 
most of it linked to the independence struggle. 
7KHîUVW LQGHSHQGHQWJRYHUQPHQWRI*KDQDTXLFNO\DVVXPHGKLJKKDQGHGDWWLWXGHV
LQFOXGLQJ VWLïLQJ &62V )RU H[DPSOH RQH RI WKH IRUHPRVW &62V WKH 7UDGHV 8QLRQ
Congress (TUC), together with other co-operatives, which existed to protect and promote 
trade union activities, was drafted into the ruling party. Other CSOs resisted this move, 
leading, for example, to the demonstrations organised in 1961 by the Sekondi-Takoradi 
5DLOZD\DQG+DUERXU:RUNHUVo8QLRQ
7KHîUVWLQGHSHQGHQFHJRYHUQPHQWZDVRYHUWKURZQLQE\WKHPLOLWDU\)URPWKDW
time until 1993, Ghana was under military rule, except for two brief interregnums of 
civilian democratic rule, each lasting 27 months. During military rule CSO activities, 
especially advocacy activities, were severely restricted as a product of a general 
restraint on civil rights and political activities. During this period, service provision CSOs 
ïRXULVKHGJRDGHGRQE\DJRYHUQPHQWWKDWZDVXQGHUWDNLQJD6WUXFWXUDO$GMXVWPHQW
Programme with bitter consequences for its population and needed the economic and 
social reliefs offered by such CSOs. 
During the tenure of the last military and longest lasting government from 1981 to 
1993, an attempt was made to grow CSOs for upholding probity and accountability 
RISXEOLFRIîFHUV7KHVRFLDOLVWDQGSHRSOHFHQWHUHGFKDUDFWHURIWKLVUHJLPHDLGHGWKH
JURZWKRIWKHVHSHRSOHoVRUJDQLVDWLRQV$VLGHWKHVH&62V WKDWPLOLWDU\ UHJLPHIDFHG
stiff opposition and criticism from only a few advocacy CSOs such as the Ghana Bar 
$VVRFLDWLRQ*%$DQGWKH&DWKROLF%LVKRSVo&RQIHUHQFH&%&
All other CSOs were constrained to remain as service delivery NGOs. In August 1990, 
D ORRVH DOOLDQFH RI DOO WKH IRUPHU SROLWLFDO JURXSLQJV RI WKH îUVW VHFRQG DQG WKLUG
Republics formed the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ). The MFJ, together with 
organisations such as the GBA, the CBC, the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), 
the TUC, and the Christian Council of Ghana, demanded democratic reforms from the 
military government, leading to the 1992 Constitution and the return to democratic 
rule in 1993.
The 1992 Constitution came with a bill of rights which provided a bastion for even more 
civil society activity. CSOs were quick to recognise the bill of rights as a tool and the 
courts as a workshop. When CSOs had qualms about any issue they did not hesitate 
to seek redress or direction in the courts of law. Involving the courts this way led to 
the production of different, authoritative guiding principles to help steer the nation 
on what is considered a good path of constitutional democratic rule. Through civil 
society activism in the Supreme Court, that court has held that: Chapter Six of the 1992 
Constitution on Directive Principles of State Policy, and containing mainly economic and 
VRFLDOULJKWVDUHMXVWLFLDEOHWKHSXEOLFFRPPHPRUDWLRQDQGîQDQFLQJRIDQHYHQWWKDW
VLJQLîHGWKHYLROHQWRYHUWKURZRIDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\HOHFWHGJRYHUQPHQWZDVDJDLQVW
the letter and spirit of the Constitution; state-owned media have an obligation to be 
fair to all colours of opinion and also have to afford equal opportunity for the expression 
of a plurality of views and divergent opinions; and all citizens have the right to freedom 
of association and no person may be compelled to join an association. 
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Early on, with the return to democratic rule and in 1995, the then government came 
out with a draft “NGO Bill” with the ultimate aim of state control of NGO activity. The 
Bill encountered stiff resistance for directly attacking the autonomy of NGOs, leading 
WRDZLWKGUDZDORIWKHELOODQGUHïHFWLQJWKHDELOLW\RI1*2VWRDVVHUWWKHLUDXWRQRP\
from the government. Again in 2006, a different government of a different political 
persuasion attempted to pass the Trust and NGOs Bill to control NGOs. The Bill faced 
similar opposition and is now stalled. An attempt by the current government to revise 
the Bill again failed. Some of the main arguments against this Bill were that it did not 
ïRZIURPWKH1DWLRQDO1*2SROLF\GHYHORSHGE\JRYHUQPHQWDQG&62V LQDQG
was potentially unconstitutional as abridging the autonomy of CSOs.  
6LJQLîFDQWO\ LQ  WKHUH ZDV D 1DWLRQDO &RQIHUHQFH RQ &LYLO 6RFLHW\ LQ ZKLFK
representatives from different organisations around the country participated. The 
Conference resulted in the establishment of the Civil Society Co-ordinating Council 
(CivisoC) set up to represent civil society in the Structural Adjustment Participatory 
Review Initiative (SAPRI) in partnership with the World Bank and the government. 
CivisoC brought four new qualities to CSO cooperation. It caused cooperation among 
organisations with almost no history of collaboration. Secondly, the CivisoC network 
ZDVWKHîUVWEURDGVWUXFWXUHIRULQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGSROLF\GLDORJXHZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQW
Thirdly, its geographical breadth of participation was novel, especially in its inclusion 
of the three northern regions that have tended to be marginalised in most national 
processes. Lastly, the Council provided a holistic challenge to Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) as a development strategy, in contrast to past sectorial approaches 
such as criticism of wage freezes or effects on health services.
Today in Ghana, CSOs are as vibrant as they can be. So vibrant there are calls for the 
abridgment of the freedoms that allow them to operate so freely. CSOs are now so much 
DSDUWRI*KDQDoVGHPRFUDF\WKDWLWLVVDIHWRVD\WKDWZLWKRXWWKHPRXUGHPRFUDF\ZLOO
fail. From national policymaking, through electioneering politics to local governance, 
CSOs are active players, working with and against government when need be. Donor 
funding to CSOs in Ghana is also increasing from year to year and Development Partners 
VHHWKHPDVLQGLVSHQVDEOHWR*KDQDoVGHPRFUDWLFH[SHULPHQW
CSOs and the Media
The proliferation of CSOs and media organisations in Ghana has developed in tandem, 
underlining the symbiotic relationship between the two institutions. CSOs campaigned 
in support of the repeal of the criminal libel laws of Ghana at the beginning of this 
century and have effectively used the media for their survival. 
Through the media, CSOs are able to publish their research reports, share their 
grassroots-based evidence, and comment on or criticize government policy and 
interventions with relative ease. Media also facilitates mobilization activities of CSOs 
DQG WKXVPDNHV WKHPPRUHHIIHFWLYHDQGSRSXODU ,QFUHDVLQJO\ LW LVGLIîFXOW WRGUDZ
DFOHDU OLQHEHWZHHQPHGLDDQGFLYLOVRFLHW\7KLVGLIîFXOW\EHFRPHVPRUHSURPLQHQW
when media houses collaborate with CSOs for a common public cause.  
Successes of CSOs in Ghana
CSOs have been very effective in effecting progressive change in Ghana. The following 
is a summary of their key successes: 
1. CSOs have helped nurture constitutional democratic governance by insisting that 
it is currently the most acceptable form of governance ;
2. Flowing from the above, CSOs have used the courts to keep government and other 
actors in line with constitutional democratic principles and to uphold the rights of 
the citizenry ;
3. CSOs contribute to the analyses, debate and implementation of socio-economic 
policies of government, including the national budget ;
4. CSOs have initiated many policies in Ghana, some of which have been approved by 
Cabinet and others passed into law by the Parliament ;
5. &62VKDYHKHOSHGWRKROGSXEOLFRIîFHUVDFFRXQWDEOHIRUWKHXVHRISXEOLFUHVRXUFHV
6. CSOs are key actors in nurturing peace and security across the country ; 
7. CSOs play a critical role in mobilizing social capital for development activities ;
8. CSOs have a particular concern for the public good and for the welfare of the 
marginalised and vulnerable, including arguing for equitable distribution of 
national resources ; 
9. CSOs often play a mediating role between the State and citizen groups over major 
differences ;
10. )ORZLQJ IURP WKH DERYH &62V DUWLFXODWH FLWL]HQVo LQWHUHVWV DQG GHPDQGV DQG
GHIHQGFLWL]HQVoULJKWVDQG
11. CSOs provide goods and services to mostly unreached segments of the population. 
Case Study-Success Story
3HUKDSVWKHPRVWFULWLFDOVXFFHVVRI&62VLQ*KDQDLVWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQWRDQGLQïXHQFH
over major public policies in the last two decades. From the National Health Insurance 
Act and the Domestic Violence Act, through the Persons with Disability Act and the 
Whistleblowers Act, to the Mental Health Act and the Freedom of Information Bill, CSOs 
have initiated drafts, critiqued drafts, advocated hard for amendments to drafts, and 
insisted on the passage of Bills into Law. 
CSOs also contribute to the deliberation by Parliament on the annual budget; the 
formulation of national policies on the youth, the aged, anti-corruption and many others; 
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monitor the implementation of laws in the extractive sector in order to safeguard the 
ULJKWVRIWKRVHDIIHFWHGE\WKRVHRSHUDWLRQVDQGHQVXUHWKDWWKHQDWLRQEHQHîWVIURP
such economic enterprises; provide legal assistance to indigents and public spirited 
individuals who need to vindicate various rights and claim entitlements; and generally 
hold the public and private sectors accountable to the public interest. The recent history 
RISROLF\PDNLQJLQ*KDQDFDQQRWEHZULWWHQZLWKRXWWKHVLJQLîFDQWLPSULQWRI&62V
,QPRUHVSHFLîFWHUPVWKH3DUOLDPHQWDU\&HQWHUWKH&HQWHUIRU3ROLF\$QDO\VLV&(3$
and the Centre for Budget Advocacy (CBA) of the Integrated Social Development Centre 
(ISODEC) have for a long time been involved in analysing the budget and making inputs 
into the national budget; the Coalition Against Privatization of Water (CAP-W) fought 
tirelessly to ensure that privatization did not deprive the poor of access to safe drinking 
water; and MindFreedom Ghana, the Ghana Federation of the Disabled and the LADA 
Institute are working around the clock to ensure that the Mental Health Act is both 
passed and contains provisions which serve the best interest of persons with psycho-
social disability. 
Challenges facing CSOs in Ghana
Whiles acknowledging the enviable successes of CSOs in Ghana, there are some 
worrisome developments that need to be noted: 
1. There is no clear cut legal regime for the regulation of CSOs in Ghana and this has 
led to an increase in charlatans.
2. CSOs in Ghana still possess huge capacity shortfalls in the areas of policy analyses, 
strategic thinking and action, monitoring of policy implementation and advocacy. 
3. Many CSOs also have huge problems with internal democracy and organizational 
effectiveness. 
4. Networking amongst CSOs in Ghana could be far better than it currently is 
and many CSOs would be far more effective with well-structured protocols for 
collaborating with other CSOs. 
5. There are many instances of unhealthy and unnecessary competition among CSOs, 
further exacerbating the problem of limited collaboration and networking. 
6. There is a noticeable alignment of CSOs with the two major political parties in 
Ghana and some CSOs may well be funded or actively supported by them. 
7. Many well-meaning CSOs still experience resource constraints and are thereby 
ineffective. 
8. The almost complete dependence of CSOs in Ghana on external donor funding is 
frightening vis-à-vis their autonomy. 
9. The increasing willingness of government to attempt to overly control CSOs even in 
a democratic dispensation bodes ill for CSOs.  
10. There is an increasing void between CSOs and the constituencies that they 
represent and work for, leading to a professionalisation of the representative role 
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Contribution of civil society to national 
development in Guinea- 
Socio-economic and democratic 




The emergence of the civil society in Guinea is the result of a political and social process 
that occurred after the advent of the second Republic in 1984.  
A political environment conducive to the liberalization of private initiatives combined 
with the willingness of people to participate actively in their own development led to 
the birth of several formal and informal organizations that will constitute the basic 
elements of what is called in Guinea today “the civil society”.
However, like many other countries in Africa and in the world, it was not until the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the triumph of Western democracy that this mechanism for citizens 
was fully implemented.
This article aims at showing how the civil society in Guinea played an active and 
prominent role to convince its people to adopt the path of democracy and development. 
To achieve this objective, I will start this paper by giving the background information, 
explaining both the notional and legal contexts underpinning it, then its commitment 
to advocacy work and challenges, before concluding with some recommendations.
Background information 
Though the concept of civil society is new, the origin of the phenomenon in Guinea 
can be traced to the post- Second World War which experienced the emergence of 
PDQ\HWKQRUHJLRQDODVVRFLDWLRQVîJKWLQJIRUWKHSHRSOHoVULJKWVDJDLQVWWKHFRORQLDO
authority. As a real countervailing power, these associations led to the creation of many 
XQLRQVDQGWKHîUVWQDWLRQDOLVWSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVWKDWOHGWKHFRXQWU\WRLQGHSHQGHQFH
in 1958.  
'XULQJ WKH îUVW 5HSXEOLF  WKH FRXQWU\ZDV UXOHG DORQJ WKH OLQHV RI WKH
socialist model of Party-State in which the ruling party, the Democratic Party of Guinea 
3'*ZDVWKHVROHGHWHUPLQDQWRIWKHFRXQWU\oVHFRQRPLFSROLWLFDODQGVRFLRFXOWXUDO
programme. 
It was not until the advent of the military rule in 1984 and especially, the democratic 
wind that swept through Africa in the 1990s that we saw the emergence of true civil 
VRFLHW\RUJDQL]DWLRQV7KHîUVWRUJDQL]DWLRQVZKLFKZHUHIRUPHGZHUHDVVRFLDWLRQVRI
FLWL]HQVîJKWLQJIRUWKHGHSULYHGSRSXODWLRQVEHFDXVHRIWKH ODFNRI LQIUDVWUXFWXUH LQ
the country.
State mechanisms and non-governmental mechanisms devoted to women within 
WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQVo UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV 
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW), 
WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQVo 'HFODUDWLRQ RQ WKH HOLPLQDWLRQ RI YLROHQFH DJDLQVWZRPHQ WKH
Nairobi and  Beijing Conferences )  have allowed women to play a decisive role in the 
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creation of civil society in Guinea by the quality of their commitment and the variety of 
their areas of intervention. 
To support civil society in the area of management, the government of Guinea established 
a National Department in 1986 for assistance to cooperatives and coordination of 
interventions by NGOs, commonly known as SACCO, which unfortunately, has never 
been trusted by Civil Society Organizations because of its discriminatory practices.
Understanding the term ”civil society” in Guinea and the  legal  
framework
The emergence of civil society (CSO) in Guinea preceded the establishment of democratic 
LQVWLWXWLRQV VXFKDV WKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\2IîFLDO IRXQGLQJ WH[WVDUH2UGHUVRI WKH
President of the Republic promulgated in 1986 on the status of NGOs (072/PRG/
SGG/86) and in 1988 on the status of cooperatives (005/PRG/SGG/88).  
7KHVH OHJDO WH[WVZKLFKZHUHYHU\ OLEHUDODIWHU WKHGLIîFXOW\HDUVRI WKH6ÃNRX7RXUÃ
regime, allowed the emergence of a multitude of formal and informal organizations 
that began to engage more actively in the training and the implementation of collective 
development programmes.
7KXV DFFRUGLQJ WR'HFUHH 35*6** FLYLO VRFLHW\ LV GHîQHG DV  DOOPRGHUQ
traditional, apolitical and non-governmental organizations, working for economic, 
socio-political and cultural development, to promote lasting peace and effective 
democracy, playing an intermediary role between the State, political parties and citizens, 
in accordance with laws and regulations in force ». 
7KHGHîQLWLRQLPSOLHVWKDWLQ*XLQHDWKHFRQFHSWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVDOZD\VEHHQYHU\
broad, even tending to include unions. Although these unions are members of the 
CNOSC Board, they have regularly distinguished themselves from it.
0RUHRYHUWKHOLEHUDOL]DWLRQRIWKHHFRQRP\KHOSHGLQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRILQïXHQWLDO
HPSOR\HUVoRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGWKHPHGLDDQGPXFKODWHUDIWHUWKHOLEHUDOL]DWLRQWKHUH
emerged the reality of a strong civil society which is indispensable in the political, 
economic and social sphere.
To promote the associations, the National Assembly passed two laws in 2005: 
r Law L2005/013/AN of 4 July 2005 on the system of associations.
r Law L 2005/014/AN of 4 July 2005 governing economic groupings in the form of 
cooperatives and umbrella cooperative organizations.  
8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKHVH ODZVZKLFK FRQVWLWXWHG D VLJQLîFDQWSURJUHVV LQ WKH OHJLVODWLRQ
on CSOs are not yet operational due to lack of implementing instruments. Since 
2005, successive governments have not developed the necessary regulation for their 
implementation.  
Civil society’s participation in economic and democratic 
development
Widespread corruption during the last years of the Second Republic led to a near 
collapse of the Guinean State. Against this backdrop, the CSOs were strongly supported 
E\WKHGHYHORSPHQWSDUWQHUV WRRYHUFRPHWKHGHîFLHQFLHVRI WKH6WDWHDQGWR UHDFK
the people directly. This undoubtedly contributed to strengthening civil society, even 
though poverty and high unemployment rates in the country also  drove many people to 
create unscrupulous CSOs whose sole aim was to capture huge resources and available 
opportunities in the sector.  
According to SACCO, in 2000, there were 2500 organizations in Guinea (groupings, 
cooperatives), 700 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including, 70 foreign 
NGOs.46 The most recent and reliable statistics on record indicate 125 international 
NGOs, 555 national NGOs, 1257 coalitions.47  But only 30 % of these NGOs are actually 
operational.
The majority of the CSOs have legal status, even though they remain informal. This 
formalization does not always mean compliance with organizational arrangements 
contained in the statutes and regulations. The Boards of these NGOs rarely meet 
and are often confused with operational staff. The range of services covered by the 
CSOs of Guinea is broad and varied, encompassing key areas of national life: Health, 
environment, education, promotion of democracy and good governance, etc. 
The desire to contribute to poverty alleviation through the participation of people at 
the grassroots still remains the main motivation of the communities for investing in 
the CSOs.  This translates into a lot of dynamism and commitment to the communities 
within the country. 
7KH ELJJHVW FKDOOHQJH RI WKH &62V LQ *XLQHD LV WKH ODFN RI îQDQFH RU ORZOHYHO RI
îQDQFLQJ7KH DUHDV RI LQWHUYHQWLRQ RI WKH &62V DUH TXLWH YDULHG EXW WKH DPELWLRQV
DUH UDUHO\ DFKLHYHG DV D UHVXOW RI ODFN RI îQDQFLQJ )XQGLQJ SURSRVDOV IRU ELODWHUDO
and multilateral donors (UNDP, USAID, EU, etc.) often require consistent projects and 
guarantees for their implementation, conditions which the associations and other 
JURXSLQJVDUHQRWDEOHWRIXOîORUSURYLGHIRUODFNRIWKHQHHGHGFDSDFLW\WRFDUU\RXW
the project.
Relationship with the State and the advocacy capacity of 
Guinean civil society
Both the CSOs and the State have initiated and implemented joint projects in several 
46 Cited by Keita et al (2010)
47 Sustainability index for NGOs in West Africa, Edition 2009.
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DUHDV EHFDXVH WKH 6WDWHoVZLOOLQJQHVV WR VWUHQJWKHQ FLYLO VRFLHW\ LV VWLSXODWHG LQ WKH
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The Village Communities Support Project 
(PACV) is a good example of this. Within the framework of the decentralisation policy, 
&62V ZRUNLQJ IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI JUDVVURRWVo FRPPXQLWLHV FRXOG EH VXSSRUWHG
WKURXJK D îQDQFLQJ PHFKDQLVP WR XQGHUWDNH PLFUR SURMHFWV RQ EDVLF VRFLDO DQG
community infrastructure (education, health, water supply and clearing of access 
routes to villages) as outlined in the local development plan. 
However, despite this strong commitment, we realized that poor governance and 
government interference in the CSOs activities hinder their progress. There is sometimes 
a genuine mistrust of administrative authorities vis-à-vis civil society which is suspected 
of taking a stance to oppose the government and/or compete with the decentralized 
technical services of the State. 
There are also tendencies of manipulating members of the CSOs for political gain. 
There are many examples of youth associations and women groups which have 
VXIIHUHG IURP LQWHUQDO FRQïLFWV DQG HYHQ FROODSVHG GXH WR GLIIHUHQFHV SHUWDLQLQJ WR
VXSSRUWDFDQGLGDWHFRQWHVWLQJIRUWKH0D\RUoVSRVLWLRQRUWKH&5'RUHYHQVXSSRUWD
parliamentary candidate.
The problem of license is real   and seems to be a real obstacle to the development of 
the activities of CSOs, which, in spite of their willingness to formalize their operations, 
DUH FRQIURQWHG ZLWK GLIîFXOWLHV YLVDYLV RIîFLDOGRP ZKHQ îOLQJ WKHLU DSSOLFDWLRQV
For example, for more than 3 years, no national license was issued by the Ministry of 
Decentralization and Territorial Administration (MATD).  
In their individual operations, civil society organisations in Guinea have quickly realized 
that their programmes are very often determined by government policies.  They 
therefore decided to collaborate to free themselves from this straitjacket which limits 
their effectiveness and to establish their visions to make an impact on policies.
That is the reason why after a national forum, since 2002,  they have established a 
National Council for Civil Society Organizations (CNOSCG), with the aim of serving as an 
umbrella organization for  its members and defending  their visions to public agencies 
through advocacy.  
The CNOSC comprises two types of members: networks working at the national level 
made up of 80 coalitions grouped thematically, and local councils CSOs operating at the 
grassroots level can  join as members. There are currently 333 Sub-prefectural Councils, 
38 Prefectural Councils and 8 Regional Councils.
$1DWLRQDO2IîFHLVEDVHGLQ&RQDNU\ ,W LVFRPSRVHGRI 23 members with 15 elected 
members from among the representatives of the national networks, and 8 Presidents 
of the Regional CSO Councils (&526&7KLVRIîFHGHîQHVWKHSROLFLHVRIWKH&126&*
and their implementation is entrusted to a paid staff headed by a General Secretary. 
The CNOSCG collaborated with the unions during the strikes that occurred in February 
and June 2006 to form what, today, is referred to as, the social movement.  These strikes, 
paralyzed the entire country,  were a reaction to the apathetic attitude in the area of 
governance, led to unbearable living conditions for the people and to the refusal of 
President Conte to dialogue with other political actors,. 
The success of these mobilization efforts only revealed the strength of the CNOSG and 
allowed it to play an important role in the dialogue with trade unions and political 
parties for the creation of space for dialogue with the authorities in power. The idea 
was to constitute a tripartite dialogue: Political parties, social movements and State 
LQVWLWXWLRQV7KLVSODWIRUPJDYHVRPHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVWRîQGDZD\RXWRIWKHFULVLV
but they were ignored by the government, thus leading to the 2007 national uprising 
GXULQJZKLFKWKHDUP\îUHGRQSURWHVWHUVNLOOLQJPRUHWKDQDKXQGUHGGHPRQVWUDWRUV
Under pressure from this same movement, President Conté had to appoint a Prime 
Minister who was nominated and supported by civil society.
The Prime Minister in charge of the programme to end the crisis, feeling that  he was 
responsible to civil society, became accustomed to consulting the latter publicly and 
regularly, thus enhancing his image and legitimacy. The appointment of two civil 
society representatives among 25 members of the Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC) and especially, the election of the President of CNOSCG to chair this institution 
ZDVWKHîUVWRSSRUWXQLW\IRUWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWKHSROLWLFDODUHQDLQ
*XLQHD7KLVUHFRJQLWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\WKXVJDYHLWDXQLTXHRSSRUWXQLW\WRLQïXHQFH
the political governance of the country.
After the junta led by President Dadis seized power, members of the CNOSCG, acting 
on behalf of the civil society played individual roles, with some supporting the junta 
and others condemning it. However, when the political alliance which shook President 
Conte was revived, the CNOSCG joined the trade unions and political parties to form 
« the Guinea Lifeblood Forum », a motley alliance calling for  the return to civilian rule by 
organizing elections without the participation of the Head of the military junta.  
The constituted civil society became a stakeholder in the rally organized at the stadium 
on 28 September,  in Conakry which was violently put down  by the army with a tragic 
record of more than 150 dead,  several dozens of public rapes, hundreds missing and 
thousands injured; crimes described  by the UN as crimes against humanity.
Following the assassination attempt that rendered him powerless, the Head of the 
Junta, Captain Dadis Camara handed over power to General Konate to implement the 
Ouagadougou Agreements, achieved through the mediation of President Compaoré. A 
transitional government of national unity was constituted with several leaders of the 
CNOSCG being brought on board. 




deployment of monitors throughout the country on the day of the elections. 
The emergence of a new political party after the 2010 presidential elections led to the 
UHFRQVWLWXWLRQ RI *XLQHDoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ 7KH &126&*ZKLFK ZDV VXVSHFWHG RI EHLQJ
subservient to the party in power, remains torn apart by internal leadership disputes 
which still continue in spite of the election of a new President in 2014. Its supremacy is 
also threatened by the emergence of various initiatives which are trying to propose an 
DOWHUQDWLYH7KXVWKH3ODWIRUPRI&LWL]HQV8QLWHGIRU'HYHORSPHQWn3&8'oZKLFKZKLOH
UHFRJQLVLQJWKHUROHSOD\HGE\WKH&126&*LQWKHîJKWIRUGHPRFUDF\KDV LGHQWLîHG
the shortcomings and has proposed another route to come out of the current impasse. 
The PCUD has called for consultations with a view to reconstitute Guinean civil society, 
a call which has been vigorously resisted by the CNOSCG and the National Coalition of 
*XLQHDoV&LYLO6RFLHW\&21$62&*8,1((
The Ebola epidemic turned things upside down. Overwhelmed by the extent of the 
HSLGHPLF DQG WKH SHRSOHoV UHVLVWDQFH *XLQHD WXUQHG WRZDUGV FLYLO VRFLHW\ &62V
imams, priests, elders and patriarchs of regional steering committees) to conduct local 
sensitization, A large number of international NGOs also arrived in the country and those 
DOUHDG\LQSODFHEHQHîWWHGIURPVLJQLîFDQWîQDQFLQJIURPGRQRUV7KHVHUHVRXUFHVZHUH
a breath of fresh air to the CSOs, even if they were limited to implementing projects 
within the framework of a strategy they were not involved in elaborating. Partnerships 
were established with the National Committee for the Fight against the Ebola Virus, 
UNICEF, WHO etc. Within this context, watchdog committees were created under the 
DXVSLFHVRI&62VWRGHWHFWFDVHVKHOSWUDFHWKHFRQWDFWVDQGUHVROYHFRQïLFWVZLWKLQWKH
communities and between the communities and non-indigenes such as in 48Womey 
or Forécariah, to mention only the most publicised cases. The post Ebola period will no 
doubt constitute an important turning point for CSOs whose sustainability is vital to 
the strengthening of the primary health care system.
Challenges faced by the Guinean civil society  
The departure of the Chairman of the CNOSCG for the Independent National 
Commission in 2007, marked the beginning of endless leadership disputes and the over 
SROLWLFLVDWLRQRI*XLQHDoV&LYLO6RFLHW\
For the record, between 2007 and 2014, the CNOSC was not able to hold the statutory 
annual general assembly. It has functioned on the basis of a consensus with devastating 
consequences consisting in the re-appointment of the President when he was already 
48 In September 2014, a delegation of the State and journalists on a sensitisation mission in the village of Womey 
1]pUpNRUpZHUHPDVVDFUHGE\WKHSHRSOHLQÀWRIWRWDOFRQIXVLRQSHRSOHGLHGIROORZHGE\DVWURQJUHSUHVVLRQE\
the Guinean army.
appointed to head the CENI and co-opting Vice Chairpersons without assigning them 
PDQGDWHV ZKHQ WKH\ VKRXOG KDYH EHHQ HOHFWHG RQ WKH EDVLV RI D FOHDUO\ GHîQHG
position in accordance with the competence required. The result of this situation was 
that other leaders of the CNOSC were regularly poached to serve as ministers or as top 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHRIîFHUVE\VXFFHVVLYHJRYHUQPHQWVVLQFH
This long period of institutional corruption also marks the hyper politicisation of CNOSC 
and the rest of Guinean civil society, especially making the latter a spring board for 
ambitious leaders with « hidden agendas ». Thus many among them did not hesitate to 
FDVKLQRQWKHLULQïXHQFHDQGDELOLW\WRPRELOL]HDJDLQVWWKHPLQLVWHUVRUKLJKRIîFLDOV
within the 2009 and 2010 transition government and/or within the current government 
in power. 
Thus, the decay in governance by the CNOSC whose bureau only met in case of major 
events resulted in the weakening of its role. As a result of lack of strategic direction, 
today, the CNOSCG behaves as an NGO, implementing projects for NGO networks. Only 
about ten out of the 80 networks remain active till today and most often, the weakest 
DUHFDXJKWXSLQDîQDQFLDOGHSHQGHQF\RQWKH&162&7KHIXOO\RSHUDWLRQDOQHWZRUNV
are no longer in the CNOSC and the inclinations to create alternative platforms are 
more numerous.  Former leaders, including former ministers are regarded as disloyal to 
WKHFDXVHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGDUHXQDEOHWRZLQWKHFRQîGHQFHRIPHPEHUVDIWHUWKHHQG
of their government missions. They are all in the position of an impossible return to civil 
society or rather to the CNSOCG which constitutes the political arm. 
This resulted in a strong disinterest of the network of member CSOs, of which only 
about 10 out of 80 remain active, most often the weak ones among them. The networks 
which were functioning well did not identify themselves with the CNOSC anymore and 
the need to create a replacement platform was increasingly evident.
In recent years, several CSO sectorial networks were formed within the Guinean civil 
VRFLHW\ +HDOWK HGXFDWLRQ SURPRWLRQ RI ZRPHQo DIIDLUV FLYLF SDUWLFLSDWLRQ SRYHUW\
DOOHYLDWLRQUXUDOFRPPXQLW\VXSSRUWFRQïLFWSUHYHQWLRQHWF0RVWRIWKHVHQHWZRUNV
GLG QRW NHHS ORQJ DQG HYHQWXDOO\ GLVDSSHDUHG GXH WR ODFN RI îQDQFLDO DQG KXPDQ
resources.





by cronys and a hyper politicisation of CSOs which goes against all civic logic. It is 
undoubtedly impossible to base the activities of CSOs on volunteer initiatives due 
WRZLGHVSUHDGSRYHUW\LQWKHFRXQWU\KRZHYHUWKHïRXULVKLQJFURQ\LVPLVRQHRIWKH
greatest threats to Guinean civil society. 
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Conclusion and recommendations
The emergence of the civil society in Guinea is the result of a long process dating back 
to the colonial era, with a break during the First Republic, a breakthrough during the 
Second Republic and multiple challenges to face in order to ensure conquest of a new 
position in the Third Republic. 
Through their actions, Guinean CSOs have shown that they meet the needs of the 
people and therefore legitimately claim an advisory role on the choice of development 
policies to be implemented. 
Civil society has distinguished itself in its advocacy role since 1984. The 2009 – 2010 
military Transition government enrolled its elite and career oriented people in political 
positions which resulted in serious governance problems for its principal advocacy organ, 
the CNOSCG. It appears that since the election of a new management body in 2014, 
things seem to be getting back to normal however, the challenge faced by Guinean civil 
VRFLHW\LQîQGLQJLWVHOIDQHZSODFHDQGDQHZVFRSHRIDFWLYLW\ZLWKWKHSRVWWUDQVLWLRQ
government which appears to be poised for a second 5 year mandate, still remains. 
Undoubtedly, the CNOSCG will not be able to maintain its dominant and exclusive 
position and must reckon with the pluralism brought on by the democratisation of the 
country.
To ensure a strong Guinean civil society in the new democratic context of the country, 
we recommend the following: 
r The State or the future National Assembly should endow civil society with a 
clearer legal framework, to ensure independence from political parties. This legal 
framework has been pending since the adoption of the laws of July 2005. Civil 
society must put pressure on government to publish regulations enforcing the law 
by adapting them to the new democratic context of the country. 
r  7KDW *XLQHDoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ DEDQGRQV LWV -DFREHDQ FXOWXUH RI FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ WR
embrace a multiplicity of umbrella organisations. To this end, the CNOSC and the 
CONASOC must accept the principle of consultation with civil society proposed by 
the PCUD as an opportunity to reconstitute and not as an affront to their quasi-
monopoly. 
r 7KHTXDOLîFDWLRQ RI FLYLO VRFLHW\oV KXPDQ UHVRXUFHV VKRXOG EH LWV îUVW SULRULW\ $
strategy should be developed at the national level to mobilize motivated individuals 
within the CSOs through long term prospects. Sustaining and targeting training 
in areas such as strategic planning, setting up projects, fundraising, advocacy, 
PRQLWRULQJ DQG HYDOXDWLRQ VKRXOG VROYH WKHGHîFLW RI RSHUDWLRQDO DQG WHFKQLFDO
capacities. 
r The CNOSG bureau should take the helm of this umbrella institution and make 
strategic choices based on interests of the coalitions that compose it, and devoid of 
political opportunism of few individuals who have the mandate to lead it. Should 
the realization of the CNOSCG fail, it will take the next few years to raise new 
FRDOLWLRQVIRUFLYLOVRFLHW\WRPHHWWKHQHHGVRIDGYRFDF\LQRUGHUWRLQïXHQFHSXEOLF
policy.
r The development partners should continue to allocate resources to civil society 
while strengthening its abilities to achieve the expected goals.
r Competition with international NGOs in the access to resources of international 
GRQRUVPXVWEHUHEDODQFHGWRWKHEHQHîWRIQDWLRQDO1*2VZKLFKDUHVLJQLîFDQWO\
less expensive and which have the advantage of having a better knowledge of the 
realities and local dynamics. 
r Finally, civil society should continue to play its “watchdog” role over the nascent 
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«Civil society is a much-used concept. For analytical purposes, however, it is diffuse. Most 
of those who do use the concept agree at least that it refers to people acting together 
in the social space existing between the state and the private sphere» (Rudebeck, 
2001:32). According to Chabal (2008), civil society49 generates more participation and 
democratic consolidation, promoting and institutionalising free expression. 
In Guinea-Bissau, the right to development has not been possible without freedom, 
pluralism of expression and citizen participation in problem solving. Hence, the failure 
of previous national development policies has been attributed to external imposition, in 
the context of state authoritarianism and illegitimacy (Lopes, 1987; Galli, 1989; 
Cardoso, 1995; Koudawo and Mendy, 1996; Sangreman, 2003). After twenty years of 
GHHSO\GDPDJLQJSROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\FRQïLFWWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIPXOWLSDUW\V\VWHP
has supported political liberalization in the country. 
This article aims primarily to identify and analyze the origins and progress of civil society 
in Guinea-Bissau50 since the introduction of democratic norms. This study also intends 




The Democratic Transition in Guinea-Bissau: participation 
in development as Civil Society led change
Some sectors of civil society (Church, Unions, Non-Governmental Organizations, Media 
and Community-Based Professional Associations) contributed to the promotion of 
GHPRFUDF\ DQG HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW WKH îJKW DJDLQVW VRFLDO LQHTXDOLWLHV DQG
improvement in the living conditions of the population.
One key civil society player is the Catholic Church. Despite, suspicions of its linkages 
to colonial interests, the Church survived the independence struggle and subsequent 
social crisis caused by the dismantling of the Welfare State in the 1980s. The Catholic 
&KXUFKUHDIîUPHGLWVVRFLDOLQïXHQFHRQKHDOWKDQGHGXFDWLRQZKLOHLQFRUSRUDWLQJLQ
WKHLUîHOGRIDFWLRQPXVOLPFRPPXQLWLHV.RXGDZR
49 The dimension of the concept used here is one that recognizes multiple characteristics of association and political 
integration, institutionalized or not, thus enabling the recognition of other local cultural values or traditional.
50 Guinea-Bissau is a country of the west coast of Africa with 36,126 square kilometers, is bordered in the north 
with Senegal, southeast to Guinea and in the southwest by the Atlantic Ocean. Apart from the mainland, also 
includes a set of eighty-eight islands that constitute the archipelago of Bijagos. Portuguese colony since the 
ÀIWHHQWKFHQWXU\ FDUULHGRXWDQDUPHGVWUXJJOH IRU IUHHGRPWKURXJK3$,*&$IULFDQ3DUW\ IRU WKH ,QGHSHQGHQFH
of Guinea and Cape Verde, led by Amilcar Cabral for eleven years to proclaim independence unilaterally in 
1973, recognized a year later by the former colonial power. Currently has a population of about one and half 
million inhabitants, is a member of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, ECOWAS, UEMOA and AU.
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7KH SROLWLFDOPLOLWDU\ FRQïLFW LQ  SXW DQ HQG WR  \HDUV RI DEVROXWH SRZHU
XQGHU WKH UHJLPHRI*HQHUDO -R½R%HUQDUGR1LQR9LHLUD7KLVFRQïLFWVWUHQJWKHQHG
VWUHQJWKHQHGWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH&KXUFKZKLFKZDVUHïHFWHGLQLWVG\QDPLVPXQGHUWKH
leadership of Bishop Arturo Ferrazzetta who defended and promoted peace and was 
always very close to the population. 
In Guinea Bissau, NGOs initially focused their actions on promoting development 
by advocating for basic education, health, clean environment and human 
rights. However, until 1991, legislation on Development Support Associations did not 
exist in the country (Solidami, 1991) 51. 
7KHUH ZDV D SUROLIHUDWLRQ RI 1*2V   DIWHU WKH SROLWLFDOPLOLWDU\ FRQïLFW RI 
ZKHUHRYHUKXQGUHGDQGîIW\1*2VUHJLVWHUHGXQGHUWKH1*23ODWIRUP+RZHYHUDNH\
weakness of the NGOs since their establishment relates to the fact that most of them 
are totally dependent on external support (Handem, 2008: 41-43).
With respect to media agencies, they have experienced a greater pluralism, especially 
DW WKH HQG RI WKH QLQHWLHV 7KH îUVW PHGLD KRXVH WR EUHDN 6WDWH PRQRSRO\ ZDV
the Expresso Bissau (private weekly newspaper created in 1992), followed by the private 
radio stations Radio Pindjiguiti and Radio Bombolom, which were both established in 
1995.
The strongest vitality manifested in local52 and community-oriented radios, giving 
greater visibility to the problems affecting the daily lives of people.  
With respect to the different types of associations, there was clearly a fast-paced 
multiplication with special emphasis on socio-professional associations (doctors, 
lawyers, architects, economists, and vendors) and community-based (urban and rural), 
women and youth. The most dynamic sectors that comprised youth organisations 
DQG ZRPHQoV JURXSV ZHUH PRVW SURPLQHQW LQ WKH QLQHWLHV +DQGHP 
$FFRUGLQJWR%DUURVLWZDVLQWKHîUVWKDOIRIWKH\HDUWKDW\RXWK
movements developed more strongly. They reinforced their organizational character, 
with the rise and appearance of independent networks (national and thematic) in order 
to promote and increase a greater civic participation of young people in the democratic 
process.
51 To some authors (KOUDAWO, 1996; IGOE and KETSALL, 2005; Temudo, 2005; LIMA KALLAS, 2010), the 
new discourse around ideas of «civil society» and «participation» was focused on NGOs and in the case of 
Guinea, rapidly absorbed and reproduced by an elite in search of new revenue in the austerity policies. NGOs have 
become the new tools for fundraising. In the understanding of others (Handem, 1991; Handem, 2008; 
SANGREMAN et al, 2006), investment in the non-governmental sector was both an opportunity to continue to invest 
in national institutions able to meet the challenge of development (rural and social) in the context of the State 
dismantling due to the effects of structural adjustment policy.
52 &RQWUDU\WRWKHVHGHYHORSPHQWVWKHWHOHYLVLRQGLGQRWH[SHULHQFHDQ\VLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHDJDLQVWLWVSOXUDOLVPVLQFH
the political liberalization until today, continuing to operate the only state television in a irregular regime 
and almost exciting, changing direction depending on the orientation and interests of the successive governments.
In the Guinean context, these associations have demonstrated high productivity and 
relevance both in urban and rural areas, being less dependent on the international 
FRRSHUDWLRQ RU SULYDWH VHFWRU ORJLF RI DFWLRQ $W WKDW WLPH WKH PRVW VLJQLîFDQW
contribution of Guinea Bissau civil society - actually spear-headed by urban 
civil society actors - focused on three areas: a) ensuring basic services (access to 
education, health); b) promotion of human rights and citizenship; c) information and 
DZDUHQHVVUDLVLQJHQYLURQPHQWFRQVHUYDWLRQGLYHUVLîFDWLRQRISURGXFWLRQ
Having however realized that, though vital, urban civil society cannot alone sustain 
democracy in predominantly rural countries such as Guinea-Bissau (Rudebeck, 2001), 
the development of community-oriented initiatives - construction of hospitals and 
VFKRROV PDQDJHG E\ WKH EHQHîFLDU\ FRPPXQLW\  E\ 1*2V FKXUFKHV SHDVDQWV
associations and young people evolved. This joint initiative favored the reduction of the 
impact of the absence of the state in rural areas. The attempt was to ensure a high level of 
ownership of these initiatives by local people. The implementation of this joint-venture 
yet exposed a lack of cohesion and collaboration among organizations involved in the 
same sector. On the other hand it brought up a lack of coordination between the local 
community and the state.
,Q WKH îHOG RI KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG FLWL]HQVKLS WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI &LYLO 6RFLHW\
Organizations contributed decisively to safeguard civil rights and obligations of 
the State, through the reports of violations, providing legal support to victims 
and counseling, even when these actions put into question the very safety 
of activists and their organizations.  With time civil society was considered as the main 
defender and protector of the poor as well as propaganda agencies for the state.
Participation of Civil Society to development: commitment 
or dead end? 
The current understanding of the concept and the «image» of civil society evolved from 
the perspective of alternative projects of democracy and citizenship, in which there 
was an obligation to take on social responsibilities avoided by the state (Avritzer, 1994).
7KHSROLWLFDOPLOLWDU\FRQïLFWZDVDWHVWRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGFRPPLWPHQWRI
civil society in general and the Civil Society Movement for Democracy and Peace 
Consolidation53 in particular, as a national platform of CSOs. 
+RZHYHU GXULQJ WKH SHULRGV RI SRVWFRQïLFW WUDQVLWLRQ DQG SRVWFRXS
3UHVLGHQW .XPED <DOD  FRQîUPHG WKH JHQHUDO ODFN RI WUXVW LQ SROLWLFLDQV DQG
53 $FFRUGLQJ WR6DQJUHPDQHWDO  LWKDG LWVREMHFWLYH WKHPHGLDWLRQRI WKHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ WKHZDUULQJ
parties and simultaneously sensitizing the international community on the need to continue to support the 
population and the efforts of peace consolidation. It should be noted that actions to promote the development were 
H[WHQGHGWLOOWKHSRVWFRQÁLFWSKDVH
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parties54 DQG WKHUHE\ UHDIîUPHG WKH PRUDO SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO DXWKRULW\ RI FLYLO
society. This period was also characterized by intense political activity, during 
which the parties gained new impetus. They grew to over 24 parties who cut across 
wide-ranging sectors of the Guinean society, including several leaders from other civil 
society organizations such as faith based organisations, NGO activists, trade unionists, 
businessmen and journalists. 
This development made  it a very participatory process, creating opportunities to 
HQKDQFHDQGLQïXHQFHWKHSXEOLFGHEDWHRQWKHQDWLRQDODJHQGDWRWUDQVODWHFRQFHUQVRI
WKHSRRUHVWDQGPRVWGHSULYHGSRSXODWLRQVDQGWRHQFRXUDJHUHïHFWLRQDQGVHDUFKIRU
alternatives for governance. The strategic approach of Civil Society was to give hope 
in a real way through the provision of «alternative policies» to enhance relationship with 
Northern donor organizations.
Nowadays, there has been a more consistent, integrated and sustainable starting 
strategic point of action of Civil Society Organizations. It allows a greater political 
engagement and commitment in their relationship with the state in some areas.
An important sector where CSOs and the state have had a mature collaboration is at 
the level of transparency in the management of the Oil and the extractive industries. 
To this effect a Working Group was set up consisting of government departments, 
parliament, associations, and peasant confederations, national and foreign NGOs in the 
îHOGRI VXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW ,Q VRPH1*2VPDQDJHG WRSXW WKH LVVXHRI
oil on the public agenda. Two years later, the state took action to monitor this sector by 
DGRSWLQJDOHJDOIUDPHZRUNWKDWSURWHFWVWKHFRXQWU\oVUHVRXUFHV,QWKH:RUNLQJ
Group signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government - through 
WKH0LQLVWU\RI1DWXUDO5HVRXUFHVDLPLQJWRVXSSRUWWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQîQGLQJUHOHYDQW
information for better decision-making processes.
However, this vision and approach of the relationship between CSOs and the state is 
not something that is still widespread at country level. Another important issue 
is Human Rights. Despite violations of human rights over the past decade, the 
support to organizations that defend and promote human rights in Guinea-Bissau is 
not a priority for most donors. The percentage of support for the Development of 
activities related to human rights was 0.89% in the period 2004-200955. The conduct of 
these organizations are such that volunteers are hired and paid allowances instead 
of employing permanent and experienced staff to pay them for their work. Also, the 
dependence of the country and organizations on external funds is maximal and this 
dependency does not always coincide with domestic priorities.
54  The unbridled struggle for access and preservation of power, a view of the «vision of the state assets,» the combination 
of limited resources coupled with the dispute over its ownership has been, since ever, factors of instability and political 
struggle in Guinea, since the administrative positions, are not regarded with a sense of community service, but in 
anticipation of the privileges that the exercise of this function warrants (NÓBREGA, 2003).
55  For more and better information consult the data of OECD (2011), Guinea-Bissau: Aid at a Glance.
In these two sectors - gender and human rights - a structure has not been established 
for the promotion and support for CSOs. Therefore, the question of the development 
 and building of the capacity of civil society actors is today a major challenge that 
LQïXHQFHVVRFLDOFRKHVLRQ
Conclusion
The participation of civil society is seen as a means of preventing the decline 
RI FRQîGHQFH LQ WKH SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO V\VWHP GHPRQVWUDWLQJ D FOHDU
pressure against social disintegration and enabling a smooth development 
(SANGREMAN et al, 2006: 34 -35). The inability of the state in meeting the basic 
QHHGV RI WKH SRSXODWLRQV DQG WKH GLIîFXOW\ LQ H[WHQGLQJ WKH SUHVHQFH RI LWV
institutions throughout the country, leads to the inclusion of more so-called «non-
state» actors, which cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it will take an intense and 
permanent dialogue between sovereign bodies (i.e. parliament), public institutions and 
Civil Society to achieve a state which will allow them to articulate possibilities and 
strategies that foster consensus and commitment.
The Guinean historical case marked by authoritarianism showed that none of the 
political transitions led to a political consolidation. Civil Society has often been 
plagued by the alliance between the Political and the Military Society, leaving aside the 
claims and demands of the population.
Finally, if the successive democratic transitions are still, however, hampered by 
the economic weakness of the country, devastated by the 1998-99 political-
PLOLWDU\FRQïLFWDQGWKHSROLWLFDOLQVWDELOLW\WKLVZLOOQHFHVVDULO\LPSO\DOLQNEHWZHHQ
the different manifestations of civil society (formalized and non-formalized) in 
the rebuilding of a new model, culture and commitment. This model should involve 
the projection of an economical entrepreneurship and a social contract capable of 
creating ingredients for a vital market, that is, if the economy is implanted in a broader civil 
society, as postulated Keane (1998: 29) and that hosts social interactions based on 
norms such as trust, reliability, honesty, friendship, ability to compromise with the 
group and non-violent mutual recognition.
7KH IDFW WKDW LQWHUQDO FRQïLFWV DQG SROLWLFDOPLOLWDU\ LQFLGHQWV RYHU  WKH ODVW GHFDGH 
have not been mobilized by large sectors of the population (which continues to support 
unequivocally a long lasting peace), was due to the action of the civil society which, 
despite its limited resources, has increasingly added its critical voice to development 
in the country. This has contributed to the recognition that the role of civil society in 
strengthening and consolidating the Guinea-Bissau State has been phenomenal. The 
future of CSOs in Guinea-Bissau hinges on the existence of stable governance and 
sustainable actions promoted or supported by donors. This would be possible when 
the learning experiences are evaluated and integrated into the political and economic 
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spheres of development to prevent or control the detrimental effects of external 
LQWHUYHQWLRQV ,W DOVR UHTXLUHV VHOIîQDQFLQJ FDSDFLW\ DQG VWUHQJWKHQLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
structures for internal coordination among national actors (state, local, non-
Governmental and private).
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Strengthening effective stakeholder 
engagement to promote durable 
development in Liberia
Eddie Jarwolo and Jasper Cummeh1
1  Jasper Cummeh: article published posthumously
LIBERIA
Introduction
At the close of the 1980s the world witnessed a major revolution: the crumbling of the 
%HUOLQ:DOODQGE\H[WHQVLRQWKHHQGRIWKHn&ROG:DUoDQGWKHFRPPHQFHPHQWRID
new era in international diplomacy. Coincidentally, while the Berlin Wall crumbled on 
November 9, 1989, Liberia stood on the brink of its own major epoch: the commencement 
of armed struggle to unseat an unpopular regime. 
Subsequently for Liberia mayhem ensued56 over a period, and during this period, there 
was a widespread introduction57 of new and powerful, international social-economic 
actors: Civil Society Organisations (CSO). CSOs primarily concentrated on providing 
humanitarian aid, but they also needed to work with local groups to deliver this aid as 
HIîFLHQWO\DVSRVVLEOH7KHUHIRUHLQGLJHQRXV&LYLO6RFLHW\2UJDQLVDWLRQVSUROLIHUDWHGLQ
numbers. 
However, when the humanitarian and emergency intervention phase ended, many 
of these groups became practically dormant for want of a vocation, thus a new set of 
skills was needed, as new issues emerged. People needed representation58, education, 
counseling and life skills59. Some CSOs adapted very fast, whereas others struggled. 
This does not imply that other groups involved in speaking and advocating for civil and 
political rights did not exist as well; even if the organisations60 were operational their 
work, including and the environment in which they work, was dangerous.
Peacebuilding became paramount for groups that were not engaged in social welfare, 
EHFDXVHVHYHUDOFHDVHîUHDJUHHPHQWVKDGEURNHQGRZQ7KHQHHGIRUFRQVXOWLQJDQG
SROLWLFDOO\LQïXHQFLQJWKHZDUORUGVZDVXUJHQW
This article looks at the past and current state of legal, political, economic and 
international variables affecting the work of the Liberian Civil Society, and how civil 
society actors have tried to cope with several challenges. The article also explores the 
contributions and impact that the civil society sector has had on the Liberian society. 
)LUVWWKHRULJLQRI&62oVLQ/LEHULDLVEULHï\H[SORUHG7KLVLVWKHQIROORZHGE\DORRNDW
the meaning of the term civil society. 
56 On December 24, 1989 (a month and two weeks after the collapse of the Berlin Wall), the Liberian Armed Struggle 
commenced on the Border between Ivory Coast and Liberia. Armed insurgents entered the country overnight, gained 
and controlled territory that the Government of Liberia once had control over. They announced an armed struggle 
with the intent to topple the Administration of Samuel Doe.
57 Civil Society Organisation existed in the country before; however, they were not as prominent, prevalent and powerful 
as they came to be during and in the immediate aftermath of the war.
58 Representation as used in this case means a voice for the community. Note that community structures and leadership 
were overturned by the war. Community mobilization for development issues needed someone to spearhead them, 
such spearheading resulted into representation.
59 Skills important for survival and trade in the economic market place, such as tailoring, tye-dying, soap making, 
carpentry, masonry, mechanic, artisanship, etc.




In addition, the paper also looks at the hindrances and challenges faced by Liberian 
CSOs.  There is a strong call for support to Civil Society since the sector stands for the 
channel through which the social contract between elected representatives and the 
people they represent is cemented.
Evolution and Current Understanding of “Civil Society” in Liberia 
Liberian Civil Society can be traced largely to the Student Movements of the ‘50s and 
‘60s (Jasper Cummeh, 2010). Unlike labour unions61 which were barred from engaging 
in political activities62, student movements and organisations could sparingly express 
political views. Schools campuses were hotbeds of fresh and new paradigms of socio-
SROLWLFDOWKRXJKWV7KLVFRQîUPHGWKHQRWLRQWKDWnXQLYHUVLW\DQGVWXGHQWJURXSVDUHD
microcosm of the Liberian Society”63. 
The student groups of ‘50s and ‘60s metamorphosed into political pressure groups in 
the ‘70s, which mostly called for equality, participation and political space64. Over time 
in the ‘80s, the principle of human rights, especially civil and political rights, became 
a prominent issue under the military regime of President Doe65. Subsequently, war 
erupted and the focus of civic groups shifted towards issues of emergency, relief and 
peace building. After the war in 200366WKH/LEHULDQFLYLOVRFLHW\HQWHUHGDnJROGHQHUDo
with relatively more donor support for consolidating democracy.
Civil Society in the Liberian context is considered as a “network with shared interests 
outside of Government, organized to advance positive social change for society”. (Jasper 
Cummeh, 2010) 
Excluded from the Liberian Civil Society are political parties, and to some extent trade 
unions, since they are limited in expressing political views even though they may 
champion the welfare of their members (Baysah, 2009). Within civil society, there is a 
division between NGOs and civil society Organisations, amongst which are community 
based groups and private volunteer Organisations. 
61  Article 81 of the Liberian Constitution bars labor unions from taking part in political activities
62  Although the labor unions are barred from politics, in the ‘90s and 2000’s they have been relatively active on issues 
involving their members’ welfare. They have barely issued statements concerning the ills in the society. A prominent 
ODERU RIÀFLDO IURP WKH 3RUW:RUNHUV 8QLRQ FRQWHVWHG WKH  (OHFWLRQV DQGZRQ LQ0RQWVHUUDGR &RXQW\PRVW
populous) as Senior Senator.
63 The origin of this statement is unknown, but it is a widely quoted epithet amongst the University of Liberia politically 
active students.
64 Liberia has been built on the pillars of marginalization. A small group of elites formed the Liberian state following 
their return from slavery. This group held on to power for over one hundred years. Despite the formation of the state, 
WKHUHH[LVWHGDPDMRULW\FRQVLVWLQJRILQGLJHQHVZKRZHUHNHSWRXWRIWKHORRSRISRZHU%RWKRIÀFLDOO\DQGOHJDOO\
they were not considered as Liberians, but as heathens. To be a Liberian, one had to become ‘civilized’, i.e. accept 
Christianity, attend school and become educated, and become acculturated as a ‘congo’ person (interesting, what is 
the meaning of a “congo” person?). 
65 Samuel Doe came to power through military coup in 1980. He overthrew the Americo-Liberian political hegemony 
that had ruled the country for more than one hundred years.
66 2IÀFLDOO\ /LEHULDQ FRQVLGHUHG WKH GHSDUWXUH RI 7D\ORU LQ  WKH VLJQLQJ RI WKH &3$ LQ $FFUD *KDQD DQG WKH
subsequent selection an Interim Government, as the end of the 14 year of Civil Crisis.
The division exists by virtue of the process that gives each of them legitimacy: 




Civil Society has a very cordial working relationship with the Liberian Media. Both 
sectors reinforce one another. However, CSOs have complained about elements within 
the media that demand a small monetary amount in order to publicize their work 
through coverage in the news and on other media outlets (Porte, 2011). 
The relationship between the private sector and civil society is quite narrow, almost 
non-existent; there is hardly any remarkable collaboration, but there are various 
opportunities that could be exploited. 
7KH /LEHULDQ *RYHUQPHQWoV HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK &62V KDV IRFXVHG ODUJHO\ RQ SUR
GHPRFUDF\JURXSVDQGVRWKH*RYHUQPHQWoVRZQGHîQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPp&LYLO6RFLHW\q
hovers squarely in the neighbourhood of watchdog groups. The greater public has 
adopted a largely similar, narrow understanding of Civil Society, referring to pro-
democracy as well as watchdog groups. 
Over the last decade Liberian Civil Society Groups have strived to generate impetus in 
order to render their name and image more recognisable and acceptable.67 Besides the 
efforts Civil Society has made, several other factors could be responsible for the cordial 
relationship between the Government and Civil Society. One of these factors is the 
presence and active tripartite engagement between the Government, the International 
Community represented through various agencies and Organisations; and Civil Society 
Actors. Another factor is the civil and political background of the current political 
actors. Some of them have their roots in civil and political activism. Probably it is safe 
WRVD\WKDWWKHUHDUHFXUUHQWO\PRUHFLYLODFWRUVZRUNLQJDFWLYHO\DQGLQïXHQWLDOO\LQWKH
Government of Liberia than at any other time in the history of the country. 
In August 2008, the Liberian Government hastily appointed the Liberian Anti-Corruption 
Commission (LACC). This action received wide spread criticism and condemnation 
because Civil Society Organisations that worked along to reach the process as far as the 
passage of the anti-corruption bill into law were not consulted or involved in the vetting 
SURFHVV (YHQ PHPEHUV RI WKH 1DWLRQDO /HJLVODWXUH FULWLFLVHG WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQoV
actions. In the public sphere, people are now more comfortable when the civil society 
is involved in an endeavour68 that seeks to promote governance or service delivery; less 
FRQîGHQFHLVDFFRUGHGWRSURFHVVHVZKHUHFLYLOVRFLHW\SDUWLFLSDWLRQLVPLQLPDORUQRQ
67 ,QWKH/LEHULDQ6HQDWHRIÀFLDOO\UHFRJQL]HGWKHQRPHQFODWXUH&62VRU&LYLO6RFLHW\2UJDQLVDWLRQVDQGGHÀQHG
them as a group to be consulted (in what? The sentence seems incomplete)
68 6HYHUDO*RYHUQPHQWRI/LEHULD·VIDFWÀQGLQJPLVVLRQVDQG%RDUGVRI,QTXLULHVKDVLQFOXGHG&LYLO6RFLHW\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
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existent. This is an important niche that civil society has carved for itself. It has played 
and continues to play a key role in promoting the principles of accountability, even 
though advocacy does not often yield positive responses or results.
Civil Society and Development
There are strong indicators of civil society involvement in development, including their 
contribution to negotiating peace (Kellow, 2011), promoting democracy, consolidating 
peace69 and contributing to provision of social services70.  One of the most notable 
examples of the ways in which Liberian CSOs largely contribute to development is 
through its activities aimed at improving governance. 
Civil Society contributes to representing the views of the grassroots level, and to 
promoting social and human rights based principles71 in governmental policy-making 
processes. 
An example of this is the willingness of the Ministry of Planning to include Human 
Rights Based principles in planning development projects largely as a result of the role 
of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Tracking Network in using the HRBA principle, 
and using simple tools such as the Community Score Cards to track development. The 
Government acknowledges that the use of such tools puts pressure on it to perform 
(Sua, 2011). 
The civil society has also been invited to play an important role in ensuring the 
PDLQVWUHDPLQJRI+XPDQ5LJKWVEDVHGSULQFLSOHV LQ/LEHULDoV356,,DQG LQWKH9LVLRQ
 SURJUDP 0D\VRQ  7KH FLYLO VRFLHW\oV SUHVHQWDWLRQ DW WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Forum for Fragile States held in Monrovia and the International Meeting to review the 
Human Rights Based Approach, both held in July 2011 also recognized the need to work 
in partnership with stakeholders such as Civil Society in the development process72. 
At the same time, some other Organisations are contributing to the provision of health 
and education services, or monitoring Government deliverables in those areas. To name 
a few,  with support from the World Bank,  Actions for Genuine Democratic Alternatives 
(AGENDA) and Citizens United to Promote Participation and Democracy (CUPPADL) 
monitor health and education; Coalition for Transparency and Accountability in 
Education monitors procurement in education, and the WASH Coalition monitors the 
69 Various Organisations, such as  Initiative for Positive Change (IPC), West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP), 
Committee for Peace and Development Advocacy (COPDA), Inter-religious Council of Liberia (IRCL), Peace Building 
5HVRXUFH&HQWHU3%5&DQGDKRVWRIVHYHUDORWKHU2UJDQLVDWLRQVPRQLWRUFRQÁLFWVLJQDOVDQGUHSRUWDSSURSULDWHO\
70 Groups like Concerned Christian Community, YMCA, National Adult Education Association of Liberia, and a host of 
other Organisations provide services to the education sector.
71 CSO’s carry out budget analysis to ascertain whether Government is committed to its human rights obligations 
enshrined in the treaties it has signed
72 The meeting between CSO’s, GOL and the UN family took place in Gbarnga, Bong County, Liberia; July 8-9, 2011. It 
brought together over 50 delegates
provision of safe drinking water.  In April 2008, the Media,73DQG&62oV74 presented to 
the National Legislature a draft bill aimed at passing into law a Freedom of Information 
Law75. Women CSOs have contributed immensely to the passage of inheritance law, 
the setting up of the Criminal Court “E” (This court deals with sexual offences), and the 
amending of the New Rape Law. 
Youth groups have been instrumental in the adoption of the National Youth Policy, and 
groups working on the security sector are pushing for security sector reform, especially 
a Police Service Commission, in order to de-politicize the National Police.  Most notably, 
the level of consciousness and awareness of the population of its rights and obligations 
to improving governance is increasing. More people are engaging in political discourse 
and debating issues concerning their well-being, unlike the period up to the late ‘80s 
ZKHQSHRSOHFRQVLGHUHGSXEOLFRUSROLWLFDO LVVXHVDV WKH nSHRSOH WKLQJo76. In addition, 
many indications show that the number of female candidates canvassing for elected 
positions in the Elections of 2011 has increased77. 
The Ebola Outbreak and Liberia’s Response: A Civil Society 
Perspective 
The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) was a health problem but it was equally a governance 
LVVXHWKDWH[SRVHGWKHLQKHUHQWZHDNQHVVRI/LEHULDoVKHDOWKFDUHGHOLYHU\V\VWHP7KH
death of a boy in the forest region of Gueekedou, a Guinean Town near the Liberia 
border turned into a major regional public health crisis in modern history.78 The rapid 
VSUHDGRIWKHYLUXVSXVKHG/LEHULDoVKHDOWKV\VWHPWRWKHOLPLWVDQGDOVRH[SRVHGWKH
limited capacity of the international community in addressing infectious diseases. 
:KLOH LW LV WUXH WKDW /LEHULDoV KHDOWK V\VWHPZDV ZHDN WKH (9'ZDV ERWK D KHDOWK
emergency and a new phenomenon that the nation as a whole did not know how to 
respond in mitigating the transmission. By June 2014, the virus began to take its toll on 
the country with the death of several health practitioners and the situation worsened. 
$PRQWKODWHUVFKRROVZHUHIRUFHGWRFORVHDQGDLUOLQHVVXVSHQGHGïLJKWVWRDQGIURP
Monrovia.79 
73  The Liberia Media Working Group, representing the Press Union of Liberia, the Publishers Association, Broadcast and 
Print Institutions, the Association of Liberian Community Radios, 
74 The Civil Society Advisory Committee--Umbrella CSO body. Also present were individual Organisations.
75 In October 2010, the National Legislature passed into law the Freedom of Information Law. Civil Society has been 
invited to serve on the Committee to interview and hire the Commissioner for the FOI Commission. The process is led 
by the Civil Service Commission.
76 The ‘people thing’ –a term or phrase use to refer government issues as things belong to the Americo-Liberian 
Hegemony that ruled Liberia over 100 years.
77 Up to present, there are three (3) Presidential female candidates,  nine (9) Senatorial female Candidates; and 
Seventeen (17) Representative Candidates.
78 C.Ni Chonghaile, How Ebola turned a Guinean family tragedy into a West African crisis, The Guardian, October 9, 
2014
79 The only Airline that did not suspend its operations was Brussels even though it put into place some safety measures.
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By August 2014, the pandemic appeared to be out of control and this compelled the 
government to declare a national State of Emergency and ordered all dead bodies 
to be cremated. The World Health Organization (WHO) followed suit and declared 
Ebola as an International Public Health Emergency. The American Government also 
described the virus as an international security threat and people traveling from Liberia 
to other countries were subjected to stringent medical protocols. The international 
medical charity, Medical San Frontiers described the International response efforts as 
“dangerously inadequate”. 
By mid-September 2014, the transmission rate reached almost 300 per week. With the 
severity of problem, the American Government ordered the deployment of over 2,000 
American soldiers under “Operations United Assistance”. The mandate of the troops 
according to the US Government was to build Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) across 
the country but this pronouncement was marked by suspicion among the population. 
Despite the rumor and suspicion among the role of the troops in Liberia they did build 
ETUs in several hard hit counties. 
There were other parallel regional and international support. The African Union 
created the African Union Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa (ASEOWA) and the 
United Nations established the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response 
(UNMEER). The Chinese also erected ETUs and provided medical supplies. The WHO 
opened a 120-bed clinic at Island Clinic while MSF managed two clinics at the ELWA 
Hospital, one of which was manned by a Liberian Medical Doctor. 
These collective international efforts were supported by national interventions 
particularly the involvement of civil society organizations, media, community volunteers 
and leadership structures. This collectivity of response led to some positive results. By 
PLG2FWREHUFDVHVEHJDQWRGURSIRUWKHîUVWWLPHLQIRXUPRQWKV%\-DQXDU\
cases dropped to nine per week and by March there were no reported cases. The country 
began its count down and on May 9, 2015, Liberia was declared “Ebola free by the 
:+2qWKHîUVWRIWKHWKUHHDIIHFWHGFRXQWULHVLQWKHVXEUHJLRQ7KUHHPRQWKVODWHUWKH
virus re-appeared but this time, the government and community members were better 
equipped to handle the situation and it was immediately brought under control. There 
was a second round of declaration by WHO that Liberia was “Ebola Free”.  
Civil Society Response:
&LYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQL]DWLRQVPDGHVLJQLîFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHQDWLRQDO(ERODUHVSRQVH
Recognizing the need to coordinate its intervention, build synergy and maximize results, 
civil society organizations grouped themselves into the National CSOs Ebola Response 
Taskforce comprising over 25 organizations.80 The taskforce had an operational strategy 
80 The taskforce functioned under the auspices of the National Civil Society Council of Liberia, the body responsible to 
coordinate all interventions by CSOs.
divided into three distinct yet inter-related clusters: advocacy, media and public health 
outreach and community mobilization. Organizations were grouped in each of the 
clusters based on their expertise and experience.  
Advocacy: 
Following the declaration of the National State of Emergency by the government 
and the deployment of security personnel as part of the Ebola response, the CSO 
Taskforce convened an extra-ordinary session of a cross section of CSOs to respond to 
the proclamation. It was the view and consensus of CSOs that although the virus was 
spreading it remained a health issue and the conditions for which a state of emergency 
should be declared as contained in the Constitution did not exit.
According to the 1986 Liberian Constitution, Article 86(b), a “State of Emergency may 
be declared only where there is a threat or outbreak of war or where there is civil unrest 
affecting the existence, security or well-being of the Republic amounting to a clear and 
present danger.”  
Civil Society challenged the Constitutionality81 of the State of Emergency and 
highlighted that Ebola did not pose a civil unrest and was not a security threat to the 
QDWLRQ*RYHUQPHQWRIîFLDOVKRZHYHUKDGDFRQWUDU\YLHZRQWKHPDWWHUDQGVXSSRUWHG
it. Following the declaration of the State of Emergency, soldiers of the Armed Forces 
of Liberia (AFL) were deployed in a densely populated slum area of Monrovia called 
West Point to address a situation where residents looted materials and mattresses 
earmarked for an Ebola center. The soldiers came in clash with residents and that led to 
the death of a teenager who was shot by a soldier. The death of the boy was condemned 
by CSOs and they called on the government to de-militarize the Ebola response. In a 
strong worded statement, the American Ambassador reiterated the call for the soldiers 
to return to the barracks. 
By June 2014 when things were chaotic and it appeared that the government had lost 
control, there were growing calls for international support to help with the response. 
The CSOs Taskforce was heavily involved in the campaign to rally international response. 
In partnership with Global Witness, the Taskforce issued a press statement, calling for 
DVKLIWDQGPDVVLYHîQDQFLDODQGPDWHULDOFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHîJKWDJDLQVWWKHYLUXV
Within two weeks, international response doubled and with improved coordination, the 
level of transmission began to reduce.  
Accountability: 
Accountability of public funds remains a major governance issue in Liberia and this 
was a challenge in the management of Ebola resources. To ensure transparency and 
accountability in the use of Ebola resources, the CSO Taskforce instituted a monitoring 
81 CSOs challenge to the declaration was done through the appearance on several radio programs and panel discussions. 
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system to track expenditures. The Taskforce wrote several national and international 
NGOs to provide information on resources received and the type of interventions they 
were used for.82 The Taskforce also called for an independent audit of expenditures 
made under the Ebola Trust Fund (ETF). 
,Q $XJXVW  WKH*HQHUDO $XGLWLQJ &RPPLVVLRQ *$& UHOHDVHG LWV îQGLQJV RI DQ
audit conducted on the Incident Management System (IMS), the body that coordinated 
WKH JRYHUQPHQWoV (EROD UHVSRQVH7KH UHSRUW UHYHDOHG WKDW îQDQFLDO WUDQVDFWLRQV E\
the IMS were marred by irregularities and that the IMS did not adhere to standards 
and procedures as outlined in the Public Financial Management Law as well as the 
Public Procurement and Concession Commission.83  The Taskforce commended the 
GAC for the report and called on the government to take appropriate actions against 
individuals who were culpable. The Taskforce also reminded the government that even 
during emergency periods, the expense of public resources should be marred by the 
fundamental principles of transparency and accountability.  
Media Outreach: 
At the initial stage of the outbreak, communities were in a state of denial. The 
JRYHUQPHQWoVLQLWLDOPHVVDJHDERXWWKHGLVHDVHZDVDOVRPDUNHGE\IHDUDQGPLVWUXVW
of public institutions. In a perception survey conducted by International Alert, Liberian 
had negative perceptions concerning the performance and trustworthiness of the 
government. 57% of respondents of the survey stated that they did not trust the 
government and this was a cause for them not believing that Ebola was real.84
To counter the message that put fear in the population, the Taskforce developed 
messages that contained some positive elements such as Ebola is real, it is here, it kills 
but you can survive if you seek medical attention at the early stage of contracting the 
virus. These messages were produced in Liberian English and disseminated across the 
country using over 44 community radio stations. 
&RPPXQLW\UDGLRVZHUHDOVRDWWKHIURQWOLQHLQWKHîJKWDJDLQVWWKHVSUHDGRIWKHYLUXV
7KH 7DVNIRUFH SURYLGHG îQDQFLDO VXSSRUW WR  VWDWLRQV WR LQFUHDVH WKHLU EURDGFDVW
time and strengthened their capacity to produce behavioral change messages. Instead 
RI XVLQJ WKH YRLFHV RI KLJK SURîOH SROLF\ PDNHUV PHVVDJHV ZHUH UHFRUGHG LQ ORFDO
languages using the voices of religious and traditional leaders: ”the message is as good 
as the messengers”. In recognition of the role the media played in the Ebola response, 
the President of Liberia in July 2015, gave an award to the media at a public event in 
KRQRURILQGLYLGXDOVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWPDGHVLJQLîFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQLQHUDGLFDWLQJ
the virus. 
82 Of the 35 organizations that received the communication, only one provided verbal acknowledgment of the letter. 
83 The report can be accessed at www.Gac.gov.lr
84 See Surviving Ebola: Public perceptions of governance and the outbreak response in Liberia, June 2015. The full report 
can be accessed at www.international-alert.org
Community Mobilization: 
While it is true that a lot of citizens listen to radio, the manner of transmission of the 
virus required engagement with family and community members. In pursuit of this, the 
Taskforce was engaged in mass community outreach and social mobilization. Through 
its network across the country, civil society was able to mobilize over 3,000 community 
volunteers mostly young people who worked as contact tracers and educators, creating 
awareness among households on the breaking the mean transmission of the EVD, 
encouraging treatment at health centers and stopping the stigma of survivals, etc. 
The community outreach also included forums with local leaders--traditional, 
FRPPXQLW\UHOLJLRXVDQGJRYHUQPHQWtWRKROG&RPPXQLW\/HDGHUVo)RUXPV&/)VWR
identify issues and discuss means for addressing them. A total of 67 CLFs were held in 
RIWKHFRXQWLHV\LHOGLQJDVLJQLîFDQWVHWRIGDWDWKDWKLJKOLJKWHGFRQFHUQVDQG
LGHQWLîHGDFWLRQVWKHFRPPXQLWLHVWKHPVHOYHVFRXOGWDNHWRWDFNOHWKRVHFRQFHUQV
The house-to-house engagements coupled with the community forums were 
instrumental in the mitigating the spread of the virus. The President of Liberia 
acknowledged community ownership of the Ebola response when she spoke at an 
Ebola Response Lessons Learnt Conference held in March 2015. She stated: “To you 
our communities, you have every reason to take ownership because at the end of the 
day, the nation and how it goes and succeeds depends upon you. You are the ones that 
determine the fate of your country,” 
Policy Dialogues:
2UJDQL]LQJ SROLF\ GLDORJXHV RQ VSHFLîF WKHPDWLF LVVXHV DOVR PDUNHG FLYLO VRFLHW\
response. In all, four dialogues were held and each one was informed by the development 
of a policy brief. Thematic issues discussed included the Restoration of regular health 
services in the wake of a decline in the number of Ebola cases; Accountability and 
Management of Ebola resources, the Ethical and social implications of the Ebola trial 
vaccine and the effectiveness of the implementation of the Ebola protocol in the wake 
of the re-opening of schools. Policy makers, researchers, academies, and civil society 
actors normally formed a panel to discuss each of the thematic areas mentioned. 
While it is true that the mitigation of the level of transmission of the virus was a 
collective effort, Liberia civil society organizations and the media were active players 
in the response process. It is incumbent upon civil society to leverage lessons leant 
from that period and use them to constructively engage the recovery program. It is self-
evident that CSOs do not have expertise in emergency preparedness. This is a thematic 
area that will require capacity building support for civil society organizations so that 
they are better prepared to respond to other forms of emergency that may arise. 
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Challenges, Hindrances and Options for improvement
&62VKDYHPDGH WUHPHQGRXVHIIRUWV LQSURPRWLQJ/LEHULDoVSHDFHDQGGHYHORSPHQW
%XW WKH\ DUH KHDYLO\ FKDOOHQJHG E\ WKH HQYLURQPHQW LQZKLFK WKH\ îQG WKHPVHOYHV
The legal and political environment is relatively accommodating, but the constant lack 
RIDGHTXDWHîQDQFLDOVXSSRUWDQGWKHSRRUVWDWHRIQDWLRQDO LQIUDVWUXFWXUHVHULRXVO\
KLQGHU &62Vo SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG LWV FDSDFLW\ IRU HIIHFWLYH DFWLRQ &RQQHFWLYLW\ DQG
FROODERUDWLRQEHWZHHQDQGDPRQJVW&62oVLQXUEDQDUHDVXFKDV0RQURYLDDQGWKRVH
in rural parts are limited. A centralized governance system affects the way civil society 
structural operate as a collective body.
Nevertheless, there has been tremendous development within the Civil Society arena. 
Liberian Civil Society has now grown from being only focused on civil and political 
rights to focusing more on socio-cultural and economic rights. The posture and stature 
has metamorphosed from the hard-core interest-driven activists demanding radical 
changes, to a more evidence-based advocate using statistics and compelling arguments 
WRLQïXHQFHFKDQJH
With changing environment and changing focus and methodology comes the challenge 
RIPDUVKDOLQJWKHULJKWNLQGRIUHVRXUFHVKXPDQPDWHULDOîQDQFLDODQGWHFKQRORJLFDO
The right kind of professionals would offer the right kind of skills and expertise.  However, 
CSOs are currently offering low wages to their staff and employees, because an estimate 
IRXURXWRIHYHU\îYHGRQRUVDUHQRWSURYLGLQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOVXSSRUW85, capacity building 
support86 or long term funding for the work of the Organisations.  
Dwindling resources and a drastic socio-economic environment that affects 
philanthropic giving for causes other that humanitarian or religious aspiration pose a 
threat to local sustainability. With a few exceptions87, the Government of Liberia is far 
away from contemplating any support whatsoever for the work of Liberian Civil Society. 
Organisations themselves are reluctant to approach policy makers on the issue for a 
well-placed fear of compromising neutrality.
Presently, most donors provide project funding which is highly restricted to project 
activities alone. Certain donors do not provide funds for paying the salaries of staff or 
85 Institutional support refers to uunrestricted funds of which expenditure the Organisation can decide  independently. 
As an example, if an invaluable training opportunity presents itself, the Organisation has to apply for separate 
funding in order to participate  However, within the donor Organisation, the bureaucratic procedures might   outlive 
the time or date of  the training, or the time for submitting a proposal has passed.  Without such funds, Organisations 
cannot act effectively outside projects, such as respond to spontaneous but important initiatives. 
86 Most donor capacity building support is in the form of short trainings. The Liberian Civil Society Organisations 
meeting with Trust Africa in 2010 requested an expansion of these funds.  In the future, there is a pressing need to set 
XSV\VWHPVDQGSURYLGHÀQDQFLDOVXSSRUWH[FOXVLYHRISURMHFWIXQGLQJVRWKDWWKH2UJDQLVDWLRQJURZVDQGEHFRPHV
potential to attract more resources  from other institutions. Also considered as capacity support is the long term 
funding  to overheads: rent, fuel, electricity and internet infrastructure.
87 Through the National Budget support is provided to the Federation of Liberia Youth; the Young Men Christian 
Association (YMCA), the Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WOCSOSOL), etc.
for capacity building, even though competent human resources and equipment are 
QHHGHG WR UHQGHU WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDQG LWVZRUNHIîFLHQW(OVH WKHVXPVSURYLGHG IRU
hiring, managing, training and compensating human resources cannot attract high 
level professionals88. Yet paradoxically, these donors may prefer to pay huge sums to 
expatriates consultant89 to do work that could be sourced locally, perhaps with a better 
quality.
&62VOLNHRWKHULQVWLWXWLRQVRSHUDWLQJLQWKHSRVWFRQïLFWHQYLURQPHQWDUHFRQIURQWHG
by poor technological resources, such as internet, electricity, equipment and other 
infrastructure. While these infrastructures are poor, their costs are very high, and they 
are important factors for effective action. Internal mobility is furthermore constrained 
by bad roads and highways, which entrenches the practice of marginalization and low 
level of participation for people living in rural parts. These constraints affect the way 
groups based in Monrovia and other provincial urban90 capitals communicate and work 
with one another. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
Liberia civil society operates in an environment that is more conducive than the 
SROLWLFDOVSDFHWHQ\HDUVDJR1R&62oVRIîFHVKDYHEHHQFORVHGGRZQ1R&62oVDFWRU
is languishing in jail neither are any draconian laws made to curtail the freedom of 
association that civil society enjoys. In 2007, when the Liberian Government commenced 
GUDIWLQJWKH&62oV&62oV3ROLF\WKH*RYHUQPHQWDWWHPSWHGWRVLGHOLQHWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
of CSOs. The initial reading and tone of the draft policy was unappealing and so CSOs 
mounted a campaign to get a space at the table. Eventually, the Government backed 
off the path it was taking91, and the document was henceforth, drafted ‘word for word, 
OHWWHUIRUOHWWHUo92DORQJZLWK&62oVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
Notwithstanding, the relatively free environment, there are laws in the Liberian 
statutes that oppose or threaten the principles of free speech93; the police use these 
88 For instance,  Master’s degree holders and above, or people with years of experience.
89 Some expatriate work includes training exercises, some of which  have been replicated several times, and there are 
local civil actors who have built expertise in doing similar trainings. 
90 There are 15 counties, and each has a provincial capital. By local standards these capital are urban, but by international 
standards they are rural, not even compared to Monrovia.
91 7KH*RYHUQPHQWFKDQJHGLWVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQÀUVWLWZDVUHSUHVHQWHGE\$VVLVWDQW0LQLVWHU-DPHV.RUPRQDVKHDGRI
delegation. This position was changed to Simeon Moribah, who worked with the UNDP before and understands CSOs’ 
issues.
92 This was a phrase Minister Toga Gayeweah Mcintosh (then Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, now Minister 
of Foreign Affairs) used in response to how he would allow CSO’s to participate in the process. This is what truly  took 
place. Drafting was done largely in the conference room of  an NGO called NARDA, with the document projected on the 
screen. Every word or phrase was vetted and agreed to. Again, the GOL is revising the document, and representatives 
IURPGLIIHUHQWQHWZRUNVDUHRQWKHFRPPLWWHHJUHDWH[DPSOH7KHVHYLHZVIURPWKHÀHOGDUHYLWDODQGRIXWPRVW
importance)
93 The laws threatening free speech are: (1) Criminal Malevolence (2) Sedition (3) Libel against the President. Criminal 
0DOHYROHQFHLVWRVD\DQ\WKLQJQHJDWLYHDJDLQVWDQRIÀFLDORIJRYHUQPHQWWKDWLVFRQVLGHUHGXQWUXH6HGLWLRQLV
to stir up dissent or hatred for the state such that indigenous people want to secede (3) Libel against the President is 
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laws sparingly, especially when the use is politically motivated94. ‘These laws target Civil 
6RFLHW\$FWLYLVWV0HGLDDQGSROLWLFLDQVo*RQJORHUHIHUHQFHZKHQDQ\RIWKHVH
laws are implemented, the case generates public condemnation. 
The international community has helped Liberia enormously, but this has been a largely 
benign effort. More support is needed to promote a vibrant Civil Society and maintain 
a cogent accountability between the people and their elected representatives; for now 
this is the promise that a highly skilled Civil Society presents.  
Civil Society requires and should be given more international support; this is not 
possible for political parties because they are restricted by laws from receiving support 
from non-Liberian sources. Nonetheless the opportunity for international funding, 
local Civil Society, especially those doing community services, and service delivery work 
should strive as much as possible to partner alongside Government to help Government 
achieve those task that it cannot achieve alone. This is highly unattainable for groups 
GRLQJSROLF\LQïXHQFLQJEHFDXVHLWLVXQWKLQNDEOHWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQWZRXOGVSRQVRU
their work to facilitate its own criticism.
Liberian Civil Society has grown tremendously in size and in focus. It has won the 
approval of the people for the issues it represents and advocate. It has made in rows in 
WHUPVRIWKHLQïXHQFHDQGIRRWKROGVLWKDVLQSROLWLFDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQV%XWLWQHHGVWR
move further. 
Civil Society must create a representative link of accountability between itself and the 
people it represents or claim to represent. People need more ownership and voice in 
the internal governance of civil society Organisations. This is a cardinal right that the 
population cannot exercise in political institutions because of the ‘so say one so say 
DOOoSKHQRPHQRQ$ZLQGRZRIRSSRUWXQLW\RSHQVIRU&LYLO6RFLHW\WRîOOLQWKHJDSDQG
SOD\DSLYRWDOUROHLQIRVWHULQJFLWL]HQSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGKRZ&62oVDQGLWVDFWRUVXVH
this window will determine the ultimate utility value that Civil Society brings to the 
democratic space.
to say negative and untrue things about the presidency. These are aspects that can be handled civilly (what means 
“civilly”? Think of a better term), not criminally.
94 Recently, in June 2010, the spokesman for the political party, Movement for Progressive Change was arrested and 
detained for a crime called Criminal Malevolence. 
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From community development to 
socio-economic and democratic 
progress: contribution of Malian civil 




Many African countries experienced major changes during the 1990s triggered by what 
ZDVNQRZQDVWKH(DVW:LQGLQWKHODWHV0DOLZDVRQHRIWKHîUVWFRXQWULHVWR
experience these major changes with the fall of one party systems and the coming into 
being of multi- party governments in March 1991. The involvement of government and 
activities of political parties contributed largely to raising awareness, resulting in better 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDQGVLJQLîFDQWVWUHQJWKHQLQJRIWKHYDULRXVNLQGVRIIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDO
groups, henceforth categorized as civil society organisations – CSOs.
Within this context, the term civil society must be understood in its broadest sense, 
as comprising all organised groups which have collectively and freely come together 
outside the framework of the state and public sector. The national validation and 
PHHWLQJV\QRSVLVZRUNVKRSRI0DOLoVFLYLOVRFLHW\2FWREHU%DPDNRDGRSWHGWKH
IROORZLQJGHîQLWLRQ“Civil society comprises all institutions (associations, organizations, 
DOOLDQFHV WUDGH XQLRQV HWF ZKLFK KDYH D QRQSURÀW REMHFWLYH DUH IUHHO\ FRQVWLWXWHG
independent of policy and state administration, and whose aim is not to take over or 
exercise power”.
In Mali, civil society organisations have not been as active as they have been over the 
past two decades, participating in all sectors of activity in order to attain national 
development. It is therefore appropriate to take a retrospective look at the development 
of these organizations and, particularly, attempt to highlight their contribution to 
socio-economic development and to the strengthening of the culture of democracy in 
the country.
We will attempt an analysis of the contribution of CSOs to the following key sectors:
r The social sector (education and health)
r The economy
r Good governance and citizenship
This article does not purport to present a comprehensive overview of the activities of 
civil society in Mali, rather, it is intended to be a critical analysis of their achievements 
and shortcomings in some sectors. The aim of this article would be achieved if it is able 
to contribute to discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of CSOs, provide solutions 
WR WKH LGHQWLîHG FRQVWUDLQWV LQ RUGHU WR H[WHQG WKH ERXQGDULHV RI GHYHORSPHQW DQG
good governance.
Brief Overview of CSOs in Mali
 The Origin and Growth of Civil Society in Mali
The origin of civil society in Mali dates back to the period where traditional societies 
existed. In fact, over the years, almost all ethnic groups had various social groupings 
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which served as an interface between the traditional authorities and the rest of the 
community. We can cite the example of the “tons” (or groups) and the early Bambara 
societies. They had their own rules governing their lives, though undocumented, and 
KDG D QRQSURîW REMHFWLYH 7KHLU REMHFWLYHZDV WR EULQJ KDUPRQ\ DQGZHOOEHLQJ WR
society through mutual aid and education.
Under the First Republic, the growth of civil society was affected by the choice of a 
socialist regime after independence, characterised by a strong centralisation of power 
which made the State the key driver for development. For example almost all schools 
throughout the country had parent teacher associations, however, they were not 
involved in the management of the schools. Producer and consumer cooperatives were 
not independent and were compelled to implement state policies.
The Second Republic95EURNHDZD\IURPVRFLDOLVWUXOHVOLJKWO\LPSURYLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\oV
ability to express itself. Trade unions became more active in protecting the rights of 
WKHLUPHPEHUV9LOODJHDVVRFLDWLRQVEHFDPHPRUHLQïXHQWLDODQGSOD\HGDQLQFUHDVLQJO\
active role in the management of the affairs of the village. Undoubtedly however, it was 
after the 1991 revolution that civil society became really dynamic, becoming actively 
involved in all sectors of work and exercising some level of control over government 
action.
Presently, there is no law regulating the activities of civil society in its entirety. The 
associations and other groups which make up civil society are regulated by law number 
04-038 of August 2004 which repealed Ordinance No.41/P-CG of March 28, 1959 
UHJXODWLQJ DVVRFLDWLRQV (DFK JURXS KDV VSHFLîF OHJLVODWLRQV UHJXODWLQJ LWV ZRUNLQJ
relationship with the state. NGOs for example have a framework agreement with the 
0LQLVWU\ RI 5HJLRQDO$GPLQLVWUDWLRQDQG /RFDO&RPPXQLWLHV WKURXJK WKH*UDVVURRWVo
'HYHORSPHQW6XSSRUW8QLWZKLFKGHîQHVWKHLUULJKWVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
Civil society today has a better understanding of its role and is making efforts to play 
this role. Aware of their weaknesses as individual entities, civil society organisations 
are coming together under umbrella organisations to better protect their interests 
and strengthen their capacity to undertake interventions. Thus Community Health 
Associations (ASACO) have established FENASCOM (Federation of ASACOs in Mali), 
Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) have established FENAPEM (Federation of PTAs 
in Mali). Recently created groups include National Council of Civil Societies (CNSC), 
Federation of NGO Coalitions (FECONG) etc.
:LWKWLPH0DOLoVFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVOHDUQWWRHVWDEOLVKVRPHOHYHORIFUHGLELOLW\IRULWVHOI
due to its positive activities. As indicated above, it is involved in all areas of national life. 
95 This refers to the period from the November 1968 coup d’etat to the 1991 “revolution”
For example the contribution of NGOs to development efforts is estimated at about 
80 million FCFA per year96. The CSCOM has, to a large extent, made the minimum level 
of healthcare accessible to people. NGO activities have led to an increase in the school 
going rate through support to parent teacher associations to enable them deepen their 
involvement in the management of the school and to ensure good quality education.
Civil society, working particularly through its National Council, NGOs and coalition 
of NGOs, is actively involved in the development of a Strategic Framework for 
Poverty Reduction which serves as a point of reference for development projects and 
SURJUDPPHV7KXVWKHUHOHYDQFHRI'MRXPÃ6\OODoVVWDWHPHQW
“For the Malian government as well as Mali’s development partners, the role of civil 
society in strengthening the democratic process and attaining economic and social 
development cannot be overemphasized. This option can be found in the constitution 
of Mali and in the various economic and social sector policy documents97”
Contribution of civil society to economic progress and 
democratic development
Civil society has undertaken numerous interventions in the area of health and has had 
various levels of success depending on the geographical area of the intervention and 
the prevailing local conditions. Mali already has a long history of Community Health 
Centres (CSCOM) which are managed by Community Health Associations (ASACO). The 
KHDOWKVHFWRUSROLF\FRPSOHWHO\ LQWHJUDWHVJUDVVURRWVoFRPPXQLW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVVLQFH
WKH\FRQVWLWXWHWKHîUVWOHYHOIRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQDOKHDOWKSROLF\WKH
base of the “health pyramid”). There are today about 714 CSCOM98 throughout the 
country. NGOs which are mainly clustered under the umbrella Group for health and 
population are equally very active in the area of health.
The above examples demonstrate the success civil society has chalked in the health 
sector99. In January 2002, the Ministry of Health, through the National Aids Control 
Programme, signed contracts with close to 130 national NGOs to implement the 
“One NGO, One Community” initiative within the framework of formulating a local 
response to HIV/AIDS. Following a study on female genital mutilation undertaken by 
96 This amount represents the cost of projects undertaken by the 400 NGOs recognized by government, according 
to the 2010 report of the Local Development Support Unit (CADB). CADB is a unit within the Ministry of Regional 
Administration and Local Communities (MATCL) which manages the relationship between government and NGOs. 
97 D. Sylla : Etat des lieux de la société civile malienne, 2002.
98 L. Codjia, F. Jabot, H. Dubois : Evaluation du programme d’appui à la médicalisation des aires de santé rurales au Mali 
– Rapport intermédiaire, 2008, p.9.
99 Examples of success stories were obtained either from interviews with civil society leaders, reports on activities or 
from documentation published on the internet. 
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the Population Council and ASDAP, a local NGO, in collaboration with the family and 
community health division, the Ministry of Health in January 1999, circulated a letter 
banning this practice in social health facilities.
Civil society has also been active in the area of education. One good example of 
enthusiasm and collaboration among the various civil society organisations and the 
government can be found in the case outlined below which took place in the village of 
Sougoula, in the rural community of Ouélessebougou, about 75km south of Bamako.
In the year 2000, Sougoula and two other neighbouring villages made a request at the 
Regional Directorate of Education for the establishment of a second cycle100. Unable 
to grant the request of all the three villages, the Directorate requested the villages to 
construct and furnish nine (9) classrooms as a prerequisite for granting their request. 
Thus, Sougoula, which already had six (6) classrooms, mobilised to put up three (3) 
DGGLWLRQDOFODVVURRPV7KHYLOODJHEHQHîWWHGIURPVXSSRUWIURPWKH$IULFDQ,QVWLWXWHIRU
Management and Training (INAGEF) in collaboration with CLUSA, an American NGO. In 
the spirit of solidarity, the village 101Ton (or association in the Bambara language) village 
association contributed a sum of FCFA 1,761,600 and instituted a contribution which 
yielded FCFA 1,223,500; natives of Sougoula living in Bamako contributed FCFA 690,000, 
while the youth of the village provided the manual labour. The PTA and the leaders of the 
association were responsible for ensuring that the administrative processes required 
by the Town Council were undertaken. At the end of the day, Sougoula succeeded in 
constructing and furnishing the classrooms with additional support of 20 desks from 
the Directorate. Lessons started on the 16th of October 2000.
&LYLO VRFLHW\oV LQWHUYHQWLRQV LQ WKH HFRQRPLF VHFWRU DUH PDLQO\ IRFXVHG RQ LQFRPH
generating activities, savings/credit accounts, as well as the establishment of businesses 
and provision of support/business advisory services. In addition to NGOs, the key 
organisations are the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Permanent Assembly 
RI &KDPEHUV RI 7UDGH LQ 0DOL $3&$0 WKH 0DOLDQ 1DWLRQDO 5HWDLOHUoV 7UDGH 8QLRQ
(SYNACODEM). The economic sector provides partnership opportunities between the 
government (particularly at the local level) and civil society for the provision of some 
services such as tax recovery and health services. In 2002, Research Triangle Institute 
(RTI) in partnership with the African Institute for Management and Training (INAGEF) 
and the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Communities (MATCL) organised 
DVHULHVRIWUDLQLQJLQîQDQFLDOPDQDJHPHQWIRUWKHORFDOO\HOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQG
leaders of civil society in the following regions: Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou and Mopti. 
During a training session at Koulikoro, a participant, Madam Aminata Konaté made 
100 ,Q0DOL·VHGXFDWLRQDOV\VWHPWKHUHDUHWZROHYHOVRIEDVLFHGXFDWLRQQDPHO\WKHÀUVWF\FOHIURPWKHVW\HDUWRWKH
6th year) and the second cycle (from the 7th year to the 9th year).
101 A word in Bamanan, the national language, which can be translated as « Group »
insulting remarks at the locally elected representatives who were working on the 
common budget. She complained about the fact that all requests for support made by 
her association which provides support to underprivileged children had been denied. 
6KHZDVDOVRDQ LQïXHQWLDOPHPEHURI DQDVVRFLDWLRQRI VDQGZLQQHUV DW.RXOLNRUR
Based on her poor understanding of the role of the town council, she was inciting the 
other sand winners against the payment of municipal tax. After the training, Madam 
Konaté apologised publicly to all the locally elected representatives and other actors. 
She promised to convince her colleagues to pay their taxes and to sensitize all the other 
actors to regularly pay their taxes. Several months after the training, a study undertaken 
by INAGEF revealed that Madam Konaté had kept her promise.
FENASCOM has just gone into partnership with the Ministry of Employment and 
Professional Training through the Agency for the Promotion of Youth Employment 
(APEJ). The reasoning behind this initiative, according to the two parties is the fact that 
RQ RQH KDQG WKH &6&20 ODFNV TXDOLîHG SHUVRQQHO SDUWLFXODUO\ TXDOLîHG SHUVRQQHO
in the rural areas, and on the other hand, the Ministry receives graduates from the 
university and professional health institutions looking for jobs.
The activities of civil society in this sector mainly focus on rights protection (human 
rights, the rights of women and consumers) citizen monitoring and/or control, training/
sensitization. We can cite the following cases as examples:
7KHîUVW3653102 prepared by government and adopted in 2001 was contested by the 
CSOs. Government was obliged to revise it and upon completion of the review, it was 
noted that the document prepared by the CSOs under the title “Democratic Governance” 
ZDVDOPRVWIXOO\DGRSWHGLQWKHîQDOYHUVLRQRIWKH3653
The CNSC put in place a follow-up group which was responsible for monitoring the 
execution of the budget in the municipalities, circles and regions. Also within the 
framework of community outreach, an exceptional phenomenon took place in the form 
of the emergence of local radio stations in Mali in the early 1990s. According to URTEL, 
(Union of Independent Radio and Television Stations), there are 168 community radio 
VWDWLRQVRIDOOW\SHVLQGHSHQGHQWRIVWDWHUDGLR7KHVHUDGLRVWDWLRQVKDYHDVLJQLîFDQW
impact in terms of providing information to/sensitizing the masses.
Community radio stations represent an effective tool for information dissemination. 
The following is a good case in point.
With support from USAID, the Diafarabé village, located in the central delta of the 
102 From 2012, the concept of PRSP or Strategic Framework to Fight against Poverty, has been replaced by CSCRP or 
Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction. This new concept focuses on economic growth as a necessary 
PHDQVWRÀJKWDJDLQVWSRYHUW\
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river Niger, about 500km from Bamako, set up a radio station. Soon after completion 
of installation works, the village experienced torrential rains which lasted an entire 
GD\$WDERXWSPWKHROGGDPZKLFKSURWHFWVWKHYLOODJHIURPïRRGVJDYHZD\7ZR
\RXWKZKRZLWQHVVHGWKLVQRWLîHGWKHPD\RUDQGUXVKHGWRWKHUDGLRVWDWLRQZKLFK
made an emergency call and remained open until everybody was assembled and the 
inhabitants and their belongings were out of danger. The following day, having heard 
the emergency call on radio during the night, inhabitants of surrounding villages went 
in their numbers to Diafarabé to help reconstruct the dam.
Today, Mali enjoys some level of political stability and has succeeded in establishing 
a supposed consensus driven democracy. Civil society has contributed considerably to 
WKHVXFFHVVRI0DOLoVGHPRFUDF\WKURXJKYDULRXVDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKLQFOXGHWKHIROORZLQJ
r In 1994, as part of efforts to attain national reconciliation following the Touareg 
revolution in the north of Mali, the government made an appeal to civil society 
to help consolidate peace through a consensus- based approach. It is based on 
this that civil society actively participated in the organisation and facilitation of 
UHJLRQDOPHHWLQJV LQ HYHU\ UHJLRQ WR HQFRXUDJH SXEOLF GHEDWH RQ WKH FRXQWU\oV
future prospects. In all, seventeen regional meetings were organised, capped by a 
national synopsis and restoration summit held at Bamako. These meetings resulted 
in what was known as the “Flame of Peace” in Tombouctou in 1996, a ceremony 
during which rebels surrendered their weapons to be burnt.
r As part of the development of the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction (GPRS3) for the 2012 – 2016 period, government entrusted civil society 
with the task of developing a national peace and security policy.
r Civil society is involved in the follow-up of the implementation of GPRS through a 
citizen monitoring mechanism. This mechanism is used at the community, local, 
regional and national levels within the context of meetings organised by civil 
society (community, local, regional and national contexts). 
r The National Council of Civil Societies (CNSC) put in place a follow-up group to 
monitor the execution of the budget at the community, sub prefecture, prefecture 
and regional levels. These groups collaborate with the oversight committees of the 
Advocacy and Lobbying Networks (RPL) in the three regions of Mali (Sikasso, Mopti 
and Gao) of the district of Bamako.
The resurgence of the touareg uprising in the north with unprecedented intensity 
from 2011 considerably destabilized the whole country, making it possible for various 
MLKDGLVWJURXSVDQGGUXJWUDIîFNHUVWRïRXULVK7KLVLQVWDELOLW\UHDFKHGLWVFOLPD[ZLWK
WKHPLOLWDU\FRXSGoÃWDWLQ0DUFK7KHUHEHOVZKRIHOWWKH\ZHUHLQDSRVLWLRQRI
power, took advantage of the situation to openly voice out the expectations they had 
secretly nurtured until then, which is the independence of the northern regions of Mali 
which they call Azawad. This break up, announced from the Republic of Mali, seemed 
to have been rightly avoided as a result of a peace and reconciliation agreement which 
was birthed out of lengthy peace talks held in Algiers and signed in Bamako on the 
15th of May by the Government and on the 20th of June by the rebels. In spite of this 
agreement, the country encountered a cycle of violence which was witnessed in every 
region. Faced by this unprecedented situation, civil society tried to add its efforts to that 
of government in order to restore real and sustainable peace as well as ensure national 
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ ,Q IDFW LQDGRFXPHQWWLWOHG&LYLOVRFLHW\oV MRLQWYRLFH103 civil society 
committed to « ensure compliance at all costs with the obligations which emanated 
IURPWKH$OJLHUVSHDFHWDONVDQGDOVRRUJDQL]HDFLWL]HQoVZDWFKGRJWRNHHSDQH\HRQ
public governance ». This move is part of recommendations of the round table talks 
on decentralization (held from 21st to 23rd October 2013) which advocates for greater 
regionalization while respecting the territorial integrity of the country, as a solution 
to the crisis. Civil society went further to propose a « decentralization which gives 
communities within the districts the opportunity and means to drive and direct local 
and regional development while ensuring respect for human rights and the needed 
coherence in national development ».
Analysis and Recommendations
In spite of the progress made, it is worth noting that there are still numerous challenges 
DQGWKDW0DOLoVFLYLOVRFLHW\FDQDQGPXVWGREHWWHU7KHFKDOOHQJHVLQFOXGHWKHIROORZLQJ
among others:
r Weak capacity in view of the magnitude of the role they must play. For example, 
when government entrusts civil society with a task as important as developing 
a national policy on peace and security, the proper thing to do is to ensure that 
there are adequate resources to undertake this task. On the other hand, civil society 
must show that it is up to the task by ensuring that it has the required capacity to 
undertake it.
r The issue of viability and sustainability of organisations which is linked to 
LQVXIîFLHQWORFDOUHVRXUFHVWKXVWKHQHDUWRWDOGHSHQGHQFHRQH[WHUQDOIXQGLQJ
r The risk of political exploitation and manoeuvring, given that some actors may 




r Civil society must pay particular attention to strengthening its capacity 
by encouraging alliances and groups within coalitions and other umbrella 
organisations. CSOs must above all, also ensure that they themselves espouse 
103 Coordination, CSO Forum: Collective of civil society in Mali - Common Voice of civil society, in August 2014
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democratic governance- hold statutory meetings, change the leadership, have 
regular internal control.
r Being aware of the complementary roles they play, government and civil society 
must come up with ways of ensuring the viability of CSOs. Areas for consideration 
could include strengthening partnerships and/or subcontracting some relevant 
state services. Besides, considering the current trend where donors prefer to provide 
direct budgetary support to the government, the latter could encourage donors to 
îQDQFLDOO\VXSSRUWWKHDFWLYLWLHVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\
r &LYLOVRFLHW\PXVWFRQVWDQWO\EHFRQVFLRXVRIWKHLUUROHDVWKHSHRSOHoVDGYRFDWHDQG
avoid being manipulated by politicians.
Conclusion
0DOLoVFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVPDGHJUHDWVWULGHVRYHUWKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHV:KHWKHULQWKH
area of economic and social development or in the promotion of democracy and good 
JRYHUQDQFHLWVDFWLYLWLHVKDYHKDGYHU\VLJQLîFDQWLPSDFW ,W LVKRZHYHUQHFHVVDU\WR
maintain and improve on the gains made. The task ahead is huge because in order to 
guarantee a good future and the best living conditions for all Malians, it is necessary 
to ensure that majority of the people receive at least minimum education and 
sensitization. The fact that the state has the will is irrelevant; it will not be able to rise 
to this challenge alone, neither can civil society alone notwithstanding its enthusiasm 
and strong commitment.
&LYLO VRFLHW\ ZLOO JDLQ PRUH E\ EHLQJ PRUH nDJJUHVVLYHo HQWHUSULVLQJ FRPPLWWHG LQ
LWV OREE\LQJ LQ RUGHU WR KDYH PRUH LQïXHQFH RQ H[LVWLQJ OHJLVODWLRQ DQG JR WR WKH
extent of proposing new legislation which could better improve the atmosphere and 
the framework of its interventions. Given the fact that the government and people 
have recognised its role, civil society must demonstrate more creativity to ensure the 
sustainability and viability of its constituent organisations.
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Civil society in the face of socio-political 




Niger is a country which has a relatively active and visible civil society however, this status 
was not easily achieved. It is the result of a slow process which became entrenched with 
time owing to the events which marked the socio-economic life of the country.
$OWKRXJK1LJHUoVFLYLOVRFLHW\ZDVDFWXDOO\IRXQGHGGXULQJWKHoVLQWKHZDNHRIWKH
FRXQWU\oVGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQLWVRULJLQVGDWHEDFNWRDQHDUOLHUSHULRG,QIDFWRUJDQLVDWLRQV
RI YDULRXV LQFOLQDWLRQV ZHUH LQ H[LVWHQFH VLQFH WKH HDUO\ oV ZKHQ 1LJHU DWWDLQHG
LQGHSHQGHQFH,QWKRVHGD\VWKH\ZHUHNQRZQDVDVVRFLDWLRQVDPRUHnDSSURSULDWHoWLWOH
for the period towards the end of colonial rule, which marked the beginning of the initial 
organisational structure of civil society. It is important to emphasize the establishment 
of the Union of Nigerien Schools (USN) in 1960. This organisation established itself as a 
strong critic of the new government. Since that period, it has maintained its reputation 
as a critic of government policies, particularly educational policies.
Apart from this school based organisation, the existing associations focused on 
recreational and/or professional activities. They could not in any way be compared to 
the civil society organisations we have today. Civil society organisations make their 
presence felt in the various sectors of political, economic and social life. They established 
WKHLUURRWVSDUWLFXODUO\GXULQJWKHQDWLRQDOVRYHUHLJQFRQIHUHQFHRI1LJHULQWKHoV
and have since undertaken a lot of activities, strengthened by a favourable national 
OHJDO IUDPHZRUNDQGE\ WKHXQLTXHSRVLWLRQ LWRFFXSLHVZLWK WHFKQLFDODQGîQDQFLDO
partners who have made them an integral part of their programme of action.
*LYHQWKLVEDFNJURXQGWR1LJHUoVFLYLOVRFLHW\LWLVQHFHVVDU\WRH[DPLQHWKHPWKURXJKD
SUHVHQWDWLRQDQGFODVVLîFDWLRQRIWKHYDULRXVJURXSVRIDFWRUVDQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSWKH\
have with others in the sector. Then we will examine factors that have led to their growth 
and their involvement in the political, social and economic life of the country. Finally, to 
conclude the discussion on these developments, we will make some recommendations 
aimed at strengthening civil society. 
Civil society is a constant feature in political discussion. It emerged with the growth 
of the democratic process. In Niger, it has become a strong symbol of democracy. In 
fact trade unions, (student associations and labour unions) have played a key role in 
LWV HPHUJHQFH 6XEVHTXHQWO\ GXULQJ VSHFLîF SHULRGV LQ KLVWRU\ YDULRXV DVVRFLDWLRQV
and trade unions have distinguished themselves in the public domain through the 
PLOLWDQWDFWLYLWLHVRIWKHLUPHPEHUVDGYRFDWLQJIRUGHPRFUDF\RUHYHQîJKWLQJIRUGHDU
life (Tidjani Alou 2006). Such events have largely led to the visibility of civil society by 
making it an integral part of the public life of Niger.
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1LJHUoVFLYLOVRFLHW\FDQEHFRPSDUHGWRDJURXSRIKHWHURJHQHRXVRUJDQLVDWLRQVZLWK
various objectives (Abarchi and Tidjani 2006; Buter and Sani 2003; Floridi and Tata 
2005) which have been brought together under this title coined by Hegel and Gramsci, 
key propagators of civil society. In African countries in general and Niger in particular, 
the notion of civil society has gained popularity in view of the observed phenomenal 
growth in the number of associations.
,QVSLWHRIWKHDERYH1LJHUoVFLYLOVRFLHW\ LVFRQVLGHUHG LQGHFLVLYH7KH OHDGHUVKLSKDV
often been criticised for malfeasance or even running after per diem. This tendency 
has resulted in a negative reputation for civil society which many compare to an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQZKLFKZRUNVQRWIRUWKHJHQHUDOLQWHUHVWEXWWRIXOîOWKHVROHLQWHUHVWVRI
its leadership. This is however, only one aspect of civil society, it is also considered in 
public life as a place for disillusioned militants, working towards a collective objective 
and also to promote the general interest. It is true that this reputation is based on the 
fact that some organisations which hold themselves out as custodians of democracy, 
engage in business related activities in the name of civil society.
In order to outline the key characteristics of civil society in Niger, six major traits have 
EHHQ LGHQWLîHG  SUROLIHUDWLRQ  DWWDLQLQJ SURIHVVLRQDOLVP  IRUPLQJ JURXSV 
activities undertaken in the political arena (5) personalization (6) gaining a foothold in 
the urban areas.
For close to about 20 years, the number of civil society organisations has grown as 
well as the variety of sectors they operate in . (Yaya 2011: 9-10). Today they are in the 
hundreds in a country where not too long ago, activities of informal associations were 
suspect. The boost in the activities of associations is a reality in Niger. The Ministry of 
the Interior and the Ministry for Community Development which have oversight of 
civil society organisations are hardly able to determine their exact number, neither are 
they able to determine which organisations are really active and operate according to 
the laid down regulations. In a recent report (Yaya 2011:15) prepared on behalf of the 
European Union, it was noted that in 2008, there were between 871 and 1085 civil 
societies, according to sources. This uncertainty still remains today. This shows that 
many civil society organisations are still operating as informal organisations or have 
become informal, resulting in an indomitable civil society.
1LJHUoVFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVDJHQXLQHREMHFWLYHWREHFRPHSURIHVVLRQDODQGVHHNVWRSURPRWH
its activities in areas in which it has competencies. An important part of their activities 
is to source for funding in a context where activists and members do not always pay 
their dues. This desire to be professional makes them dependent on their donors and 
weakens their ability to operate autonomously with respect to their freedom and 
capacity to undertake interventions. They become more like operators, busy executing 
their contracts rather than playing their original roles of independent and committed 
activists.(Tidjani Alou 2012)
On the other hand, the ability to be professional translates into a deeper involvement of 
these associations and NGOs in providing employment in a country plagued by endemic 
unemployment of young graduates. Thus, they play a role in building a very dynamic 
sector which contributes in its own way to economic growth and compensates for the 
inability of the State to recruit the ever growing number of young graduates.
It is important to note that the current trend for civil society is to rally together in 
ODUJHDVVRFLDWLRQVDURXQGVSHFLîFWKHPDWLFDUHDV7KHVHDVVRFLDWLRQVHPHUJHGGXULQJ
the 2000s. Initially, the trade unions were the ones grouping themselves in large 
power bases. While the trade unions experienced a proliferation of power bases, 
associations rather came together to strengthen their capacity to take action and 
reduce their fragmentation. The following are examples of this phenomenon: Coalition 
of Associations of Livestock Farmers of Niger (CAPAN), National Platform (PFP), Coalition 
of Human Rights and Democratic Organisations (CODDHD), Network of Development 
Based NGOs and Human Rights and Democratic Associations (RODADDHD), Network 
of Educational Sector Organisations in Niger (ROSEN), Network of Organisations 
for Budgetary Transparency (ROTAB), Coalition of NGOs and Women Associations 
(CONGAFEN) etc. (Yaya 2011: 58-59). Such proliferation worsens the lack of transparency 
among associations.
,W LV LPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDW LQ1LJHUFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVDUH LGHQWLîHGE\WKHLU
consistent intervention in the area of politics. This trend is in line with the role they have 
played in entrenching the democratic process. They were at the forefront of various 
unrests that took place towards the end of the authoritarian regime which was in place 
VLQFHWKHHDUO\oV7KHLUDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHDUHDRISROLWLFVLVWKHUHIRUHVLJQLîFDQWGXHWR
YDULRXVSRVLWLRQVWKH\WRRNRQPDMRULVVXHVZKLFKKDYHPDUNHG1LJHUoVSROLWLFDOOLIH
In this regard, we can cite the example of the role they played in 2005, through the 
n)DLUQHVV(TXDOLW\ &RDOLWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH +LJK &RVW RI /LYLQJo D FRDOLWLRQ RI ZRUNHUVo
unions and civil society organizations (Tidjani Alou 2006). Through this coalition, they 
demonstrated against some aspects of the budget which increased VAT on essential 
FRPPRGLWLHV7KHLUDFWLRQVOHGWRWKHPRELOLVDWLRQRIPDVVHVRISHRSOHLQ1LJHUoVELJ
towns (towns, countries which are no longer inhabited) and obliged the government 
UHVFLQGLWVGHFLVLRQDOWKRXJKLWZDVHQGRUVHGE\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOîQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
This trend of interventions in the area of politics was also observed during the 2009 
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SROLWLFDO FULVLV ZKLFKZDV D UHVXOW RI 3UHVLGHQW 7DQGMDoV GHVLUH WR H[WHQG KLV WHQXUH
7KLV FULVLV VKRZFDVHG WKH GHHS SROLWLFDO ULIWV ZLWKLQ 1LJHUoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ ZLWK VRPH
organisations in favour of the extended tenure of the President of the Republic in spite 
of the decision of the constitutional court and others against the prolonged tenure.
It is interesting to note that many actors in civil society who were against the extension 
were appointed to prominent positions in the transition government put in place after 
the February 18, 2010 coup.
It is important to note that these civil society organisations tend to become personalized 
due to the fact that they identify with their leader. The leadership hardly rotates, the 
associations maintain the same leaders for long periods. At the end of the day, this 
trend calls into question the enthusiasm which characterises these organisations and 
can result in a weak democratic base of these organisations.
It is important to note that nigerien civil society organisations are concentrated in the 
urban areas. The very prominent among them have very little presence in the rural 
DUHDVZKHUHWKHUHDUHPDLQO\ZRPHQoVJURXSVDQGIDUPHUDVVRFLDWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHGE\
development projects.
II- Factors which promote the involvement of civil society
Various factors have facilitated the growth of civil society. These include the 
democratization of the political system, the favourable legal framework in place and 
the posture of funding organisations which have made civil societies their development 
partners.  
This is probably the most important factor. Democratization has opened up the sector 
by creating the conditions favourable for associations to thrive. We are witnesses to the 
exercise of public freedom enshrined in the laws of the republic. Although legislations 
relating to associations were adopted in 1984 under the emergency rule, the regimes 
which derived from the national conference quickly liberalised this legal framework 
with a view to adapting them to suit the new political realities of the country. Since 
then, the number of associations has grown, covering almost all sectors of political, 
HFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOOLIH7RGD\WKHVHRUJDQLVDWLRQVH[LVWDQGDUHLGHQWLîHGDORQJVLGH
political parties. They have become key actors in the socio political life of the country.
Democratisation has not only facilitated the development of civil society in Niger, it 
has also provided the right context for the adoption of legislations which promote the 
LQYROYHPHQWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQ7UXO\LWZLOOEHGLIîFXOWWRWDNHQRWHRI
all the legislations which relate to public involvement in Niger. It is possible however, to 
LGHQWLI\VRPHOHJLVODWLRQVLQZKLFKFLWL]HQVKLSSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVFOHDUO\GHîQHGDVDNH\
FRQGLWLRQIRUWKHH[HUFLVHRISHRSOHoVULJKWVDVDFRQGLWLRQIRUFRQVROLGDWLQJGHPRFUDF\
the rule of law and human rights and an essential pillar of good governance. The 
constitution is the normative legislative framework however, other legislations also 
provide substantial clarity. These relate to General Civil Service Regulations, the electoral 
code, the Charter on access to public information and administrative documents, rules 




and Political Rights (PIDCP), International Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(PIDESC), Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 
(CEDEF). We can also add the United Nations declaration on the right to development 
and the Vienna declaration and programme of action.
During the past few years, there has been tremendous change in activities related to 
cooperation for development purposes. Civil societies are now involved in partnering 
with such organisations and this new phenomenon can be observed in Niger as well. 
7KH VXFFHVVLYH FRXS GoHWDWV DQG WKHZHDN HFRQRPLF SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH VWDWH KDYH
facilitated the repositioning of some donor organisations towards civil society which 
now use their response mechanisms. Thus, many civil society organisations have taken 
the opportunity to consolidate themselves in the development sector. An NGO such as 
Karkara has become a key actor in the rural sector due to the numerous projects it has 
implemented. ANDDH holds a similar position in the human rights sector.
This change in international cooperation has undoubtedly promoted the development 
of civil society organisations which now have a lot of opportunity to undertake activities 
within their sector of intervention, competing with the state services which have lost 
their monopoly. In this regard, we can cite the example of the European Union which has 
systematically provided support to civil society since the Cotonou convention. In Niger, 
this support has been provided through the Niger Civil Society Support Programme 
(PASOC) which is beginning a second phase. Other donor organisations such as the 
UNDP have in place intervention programmes which provide various forms of support 
to such organisations (capacity development, ordering of various services)
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III- Perspectives
We can envisage various perspectives, though not exhaustive, which can serve as 
guidelines for action.
This probably relates to very well known activities which need to be undertaken to enable 
1LJHUoVFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVVWUHQJWKHQWKHLUFRPSHWHQFHDQGWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI
their interventions at both the operational and institutional level. Indeed a lot of effort 
has been made at these levels however, they are inadequate vis a vis the challenges civil 
societies face.
This issue raises questions about the civic commitment of these organisations due to 
their level of involvement in the execution of development projects. Though desirable, 
this involvement leads to the mobilisation of the most energetic activists and normally 
makes them focus their activities rather on executing development projects. (Tidjani 
Alou 2012). Besides CSOs must work towards developing, within their ranks, ethics 
ZKLFK SURPRWH JRRG JRYHUQDQFH DQG SODFH YDOXH RQ VHOïHVVQHVV ZKLOH UHGXFLQJ
the much criticised tendency to use their organisations for personal gain. Efforts to 
instill ethics into the sector are evident in some countries where there is a strong will 
to develop a civil society charter. In Niger, these efforts hardly yielded much due to 
divergent opinions expressed by these organisations and their fear of being exploited 
and made dependent on the state.
In view of the urban nature of these organisations, there is the need for civil society to 




simply being a new phenomenon, this marks an important transformation in the socio 
political and economic life of the country. Obviously civil society is constantly growing 
and has its strengths and weaknesses, with time however, it has gained some level of 
legitimacy and undeniable social basis which makes it an important and ubiquitous 
player. In fact it can promote the emergence of sustainable social movements which will 
provide the people of Niger with an intervention framework capable of improving their 
participation at all levels. Consequently, its dynamics deserve to be better fashioned.
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Modern civil society organisations (CSOs) in Nigeria emerged from social, economic, 
political, and human rights contestations that had impacts on national development 
during the colonial period and the years of democratic struggle. In the latter phase, 
the contributions of CSOs were shaped by the rise of of military dictatorships while, 
in the former, by an urge  to terminate British rule. In this sense, Nigerian civil society 
LV WKHPRVWVLJQLîFDQW IDFWRU IRUJHQHUDWLQJSROLWLFDOFKDQJHERWKSULRU WRDQGDIWHU
independence in 1960. The activities and concerns of modern CSOs are, therefore, an 
elaboration, continuation and adaptation of ideals that were developed within this 
historical context. While their engagements respond to alternations in the overbearing 
power and weakness of the state, modern CSOs draw on the impulses and strategies of 
the nationalist mass movements that preceded them. This partly explains the ardent 
activism that has sometimes come to characterise them.
In this paper, the examination is made on the nature, evolution and progress of civil 
VRFLHW\ LQWKH1LJHULDQVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W LWVULVHWRLQWHOOHFWXDOVLJQLîFDQFH
and institutional prominence within that context; public images and perceptions 
of its role in national development; its major challenges and accomplishments and; 
ultimately, its continued relevance to a country plagued by factional politics, endemic 
regional rivalries, and levels of insecurity and developmental stasis that continually 
threaten its aspirations of evolving a prosperous and inclusive democracy.
Origins and Progress of Civil Society in Nigeria
Nigerian civil society was at the forefront of rural and urban protests against foreign 
rule and the colonial state. In the background to nationalist struggle, leadership in 
civil society was not provided by educated elite as it is in the current setting. Instead, 
it emerged from the loose and non-formal coalitions and networks of indigenous 
communities. In the Egba Uprising of 1918, for instance, more than 30,000 Egbas were 
mobilised by their warlords to protest the imposition of direct taxation and British 
Forced Labour Policy.  This uprising was an attempt to “regain the autonomy lost in 
1914104 and restore the traditional checks on the autocracy of the [British-backed] alake” 
(Roberts et al., 1984: 429). More than 1,000 of the protesters were killed by British forces 
but, like the Iva Valley Shooting at the Enugu colliery, which took place three decades 
later in 1949 and claimed the lives of 22 miners, this massacre served to mobilise public 
outrage and support for the nationalist struggle once it had started.
Taxation was a bone of contention between the colonial state and civil society, the casus 
belli of frequent demonstrations and other expressions of mistrust and antagonism in 
the colonial state. it is a typical source of tension in many colonial states and the Boston 
104  The year 1914 was a watershed in Nigerian history because of the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern 
Protectorates by the British authorities, which transformed Nigeria into a single political entity.
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Tea Party of December 16, 1773 is a case in point in US history. This was a demonstration 
organised by American colonists to destroy a shipload of tea sent by the East India 
&RPSDQ\LQGHîDQFHRIWKH7HD$FWRI0D\SDVVHGE\WKH%ULWLVK3DUOLDPHQW
The protest became an iconic turning point in American history and is still referred to in 
the so-called Tea Party movement in contemporary American politics.
As early as 1895, a proposal to institute a House and Land Tax met with stiff resistance 
in Lagos, Nigeria. In 1908, the Land Acquisition Ordinance and introduction of a water 
rate were strongly opposed by (Coleman, 1958). This opposition was not co-ordinated by 
formal organisational leadership as such but by the will of the people. Indeed, nowhere 
was this anti-tax opposition more sustained, spontaneous, inclusive and territorially 
H[WHQVLYHWKDQLQWKH:RPHQoV5LRWV105 of 1929 (Mba, 1982). 
Along with other crucial events, these were the precursors of formal nationalist struggle, 
which coalesced in the General Strike of 1945 led by Michael Imoudu of the Railway 
:RUNHUVo8QLRQ)RXU\HDUVHDUOLHU,PRXGXKDGOHGXQLRQLVWVRQDîYHNLORPHWUH
march to the Government House to demand better conditions. He was detained under 
the Nigerian General Defence Regulation of 1941 but released in time to co-ordinate 
the 1945 historic strike.
It is against this background that the oppositional character of modern Nigerian civil 
society is to be understood. It was forged early in the nationalist era and tempered later 
E\PLOLWDU\GLFWDWRUVKLS0RGHUQFLYLOVRFLHW\LQ1LJHULDLVWKXVWKHEHQHîFLDU\RIERWKDQ
elite leadership presumption that was inevitable during the independence campaign 
and a radical left-leaning orientation and rhetoric that are its enduring legacies.  With 
this presumption, it is easy to understand why control of civil society typically resides 
in an activist class in urban centres and intellectuals who overlook the fundamental 
discrepancies between them as a class and the underserved poor who are their 
presumptive constituency. In the process, the historical capacity of marginalised groups 
WRRUJDQLVHWKHPVHOYHVIDLOVWRîQGH[SUHVVLRQ,QVWHDGLQDIRUPRIDKLVWRULFDODPQHVLD
that is a severe indictment of the sector, that ability is only acknowledged theoretically 
by modern CSOs but hardly every in real practice. It is eroded and left undeveloped at 
precisely that point when it should be enhanced as part of the commitment to increase 
inclusiveness and participation in civil society.
The Public Image of Civil Society
The proliferation of CSOs in Nigeria has affected public perception of their competence 
DQG FRPPLWPHQW $OWKRXJK VHUYLFH DQG VDFULîFH DUH FDUGLQDO YDOXHV IRU FLYLO VRFLHW\
practitioners, recent developments seem to indicate that, for many actors, life in the 
105 7KH W\SRORJ\ RI WKHVH SURWHVWV LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH UDLVHV TXHVWLRQV LQ IHPLQLVW HSLVWHPRORJ\ 7KH TXDOLÀFDWLRQ RI
the protests as a ‘women’s’ riot, for instance, results from dismissive tendencies of patriarchal scholarship, which 
draws attention to the presumed novelty of the dramatis personae rather than the unfair tax regime that was the 
IRFXVRIWKHLUSURWHVWV%\W\SHFDVWLQJWKHVHSURWHVWVDV¶ULRWV·WKHHSLVWHPRORJ\VXJJHVWVFROOXVLRQEHWZHHQRIÀFLDO
historiography and a reductionist imperialist perspective of the events. 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is just another job. This perception is promoted 
by the tremendous growth of the community. In consequence, public perception of civil 
society can be distinguished by the respect it reserves for the historical accomplishments 




1. Perceived lack of co-operation and co-ordination among CSOs, demonstrated by 
their unwillingness to share resources. This duplicates functions, delays project 
execution and leads to overall loss of quality. 
2. The perceived absence of structures promoting permanent relationships between 
&62VDQGEHQHîFLDU\FRPPXQLWLHV7KLVFUHDWHVDSURMHFWPHQWDOLW\RQERWKVLGHV
that does not foster commitment or sustainable development.
3. The use of the generic term “civil society” to describe organisations of diverse 
ideological persuasions, methods and ethical commitments, with no strong sense 
of cohesion within that community. This instils doubts about the authenticity of 
their independent claims.
4. The absence of publicised sanctions for civil society operatives. This encourages 
public perception that the environment is one that protects impunity and lack of 
accountability.
5. The notion that there is limited job security and high staff turnover. This translates 
LQWRORVVRISXEOLFFRQîGHQFHLQSURJUDPPHVWKDW&62VLQVLVWVKRXOGEHVXVWDLQHG
6. The suspicion that many CSOs are not run in accordance with objective management 
principles but are instead run by a “one-person shows” or “family affairs” approach. 
This reduces the moral and material investment that their publics can make and 
adds to the contradictions of ownership.
7. The absence of strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms or peer review/
compliance system in the coalition of CSOs. This reduces perceptions of 
accountability among CSOs.
It is important to create feedback systems that capture popular opinion as part of real-
time performance tracking. Without cohesion, social appreciation will be restricted to 
CSOs that make meaningful impacts in the lives of people but not for all CSOs as a 
generic unit.
Understanding Civil Society in the Nigerian Context
$VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGGHîQLWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LVQRWDOZD\VJLYHQLQPDQ\ZULWLQJVLQFOXGLQJ
Between State and Civil Society in Africa (Osaghae, 1994), and For a Restructured Civil 
Society, a Responsible Bourgeoisie and Conscientious Professionals in Politics  (Ngaidé, 
2009).  Hence the questions:
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:KDWLVFLYLOVRFLHW\"'RHVLWH[LVWRULVLWHPHUJLQJ",VLWFRQÀQHGWRWKH´PRGHUQ
sphere”, whose organisations are predicated on a differentiation between the political 
and the social, and the social and the economic? Or does it include the “traditional” 
sphere where the organisation of life proceeds on the basis of diffusion, and not a 
differentiation, between the economic, the social and the political? Is the problem 
solved by making a distinction between “modern civil society” and “traditional civil 
society”…? Or is it thereby simply shelved? On the other hand, does not the notion of 
a ‘civil society’ as a modern construct lead at best to a one-eyed vision of social and 
political processes? (Mamdani, 1995:3)
As active non-state actors, CSOs are a self-generating, self-supporting, self-perpetuating 
and self-regulating community of change agents who voluntarily organise political, 
economic, or cultural activities, independent of the state and, in some instances, beyond 
the market. Broadly speaking, they include private business enterprises, labour unions, 
trade unions, professional associations, religious bodies, student organisations, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), hometown associations (HTAs) and community 
cultural associations. 
In building a cohesive civil society in Nigeria, the extant model must be reworked to 
delink the activity of civil society from the exclusive preserve of West-leaning CSOs and 
leverage advantages available to these organisations as well as other local associations. 
Without such primary or internal synthesis, a perspective that shows the origination of 
the oppositional character of civil society in colonial experience cannot be achieved. In 
Nigeria, therefore, civil society can be viewed as a sphere of acquired and ascribed social 
statuses, relationships and institutions promoting societal stability and individual/
group wellbeing but that are distinct from the market and institutions of the state. Civil 
society organisations are a part, but not all, of that sphere. As a sphere, the concept of 
“civil society” is, by its nature, inclusive. 
Modern CSOs share space with other organisational and non-organisational forms of 
civil engagement in all their loose, stable-and-not-so-stable, sporadic and ad hoc forms. 
In this respect, what is sometimes referred to as “the modern sector” sets the functions 
of consanguineous family networks aside. Yet, in the rural areas, this extended family 
system is the aboriginal civil society and forerunner of all subsequent agencies or 
secondary institutions. It is distinguished by the unity of its functions around an 
embracive concept of development. Its operations buttress the Hegelian point that 
civil society is “the sphere of relations between the family and the state, a place where 
PXWXDOQHHGV DUHPHW DQG FRQWUDFWXDO WHUPVGHîQHGq /H9DQ  KHQFH WKH
characterisation of the extended family system as the amalgam and predictor of future 
functions and the institutional processes of industrial society (Isiugo-Abanihe and 
2ERQR7KLVpUDQJHRIUHODWLRQVKLSVqLQFOXGHp2IîFLDOPRELOLVDWLRQSURJUDPPHV
SRZHUIXO WUDGLWLRQDO DXWKRULW\ îJXUHV ODUJH LQIRUPDO HFRQRPLHV DQG FRUSRUDWLVW
arrangements” (LeVan, 2011:136).  
One can add to this list the persistence of elaborate networks of consanguineous and 
kin and pseudo-kin relationships. The result of the conceptual dichotomy and political 
usurpation of the term “civil society” is that Nigerian HTAs, which contribute to local 
development but not to neoliberal democratisation as such, are routinely excluded from 
its application. According to LeVan, because “they appear to have little in common with 
labour unions, human rights groups, or front organisations, democratisation studies 
usually neglect an important sector of civil society common in Africa” (p. 146). 
This situation can be redressed by instituting programmes of integration, co-ordination 
and conscientisation that will “resist divisions” in civil society (Djinnit, 2011).106 Such 
programmes should acknowledge that the “division in civil society” appears at two 
broad levels: (1) absence of cohesion within the bloc of modern CSOs and (2) polarisation 
between that bloc and their more indigenous but less sophisticated and under-funded 
counterparts. The combined effect of this plural polarisation, or double dichotomy, is 
that it hinders effective civil society participation in advancing economic and cultural 
development.
Success and its Consequences
The formation of the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) by Olisa Agbakoba, Clement 
Nwankwo and other lawyers and journalists, in October 1987, was a momentous point 
LQWKHKLVWRU\RI1LJHULDQFLYLOVRFLHW\,WPDUNHGWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHFRXQWU\oVUREXVW
human rights movement (Shettima and Chukwuma, 2002). Its immediate purpose 
was to challenge the human rights record of the military junta. Amnesty International 
reported that, from June 1993 – a full year after the provocative annulment of 
presidential elections – to 1994, over 200 pro-democracy protesters were killed by 
Nigerian security forces. On 10 November 1995, playwright and environmental rights 
activist Kenule Saro-Wiwa and eight others were hanged for protesting against the 
DFWLYLWLHVRIPXOWLQDWLRQDORLOîUPVLQWKH1LJHU'HOWD,QGHHGWKHVLJKWRIDEORRGLHG
Olisa Agbakoba who was taken away by security forces was one of the iconic media 
images of those times and the end of this dark phase of Nigerian history can legitimately 
be regarded as an outcome of these struggles.
Other groups like Campaign for Democracy (CD) and the National Democratic Coalition 
(NADECO) were founded to press for democracy and good governance following the 
annulment of the June 12, 1992 presidential election by General Ibrahim Babangida. 
7KURXJKQXPHURXVDIîOLDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQV&'PRELOLVHG1LJHULDQVWRPDNHWKHQDWLRQ
ungovernable and force the military out of power. Massive protests rocked the country. 
,W ZDV WKH îUVW WLPH VLQFH WKH HQG RI WKH FLYLO ZDU WKDW FLYLO VRFLHW\ WRRN DFWLRQ WR
FKDOOHQJHVWDWHDXWKRULW\ LQ WKLVPDQQHU ,KRQYEHUHDQG6KDZ 7KHFRXQWU\oV
present democracy is the direct outcome of these efforts. More than 20 years after the 
106 Extracted from extempore remarks by Mr. Said Djinnit, United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General 
81656*IRU:HVW$IULFDDQG+HDGRIWKH812IÀFHIRU:HVW$IULFD812:$2FWREHU'DNDU6HQHJDO
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event, “June 12” is observed by CSOs through seminars, symposia or symbolic marches 
DV D VLJQLîFDQW GDWH LQ WKH ELUWK RI WKH FRXQWU\oV GHPRFUDF\ ,Q WKH VRXWKZHVW LW LV
sometimes regarded as a de facto SXEOLFKROLGD\SDUWO\LQFRQFHVVLRQWRWKHLQïXHQFHRI
Nigerian civil society on state processes.
From 1999, when civil rule returned to Nigeria, CSOs relapsed into their traditional role 
of engaging the state and building citizenship consciousness on varied issues. This led 
WRWKHJURZWKLQQXPEHURIFLYLOVRFLHW\JURXSVPDLQO\LQWKHKHDOWKîHOGZKHUH+,9
AIDS and other reproductive health matters had captured donor attention. 
Contradictions set in from that point.  The donor orientation of the new movement 
was in large responsible for its drive. The scrimmage for funding bred mutual suspicion. 
Cohesion was impossible. Internal rivalries replaced the unity of purpose that ousted the 
military regime. Sectarian differences overshadowed universal commitments. Owing to 
their role in ending military rule, some civil society activists retained a worldview that 
was permanently suspicious of the state. While their actions ushered in an era of hard-
won democratic transition, the process was not accompanied by effective transitions 
in their own engagement philosophy. The Joint Action Committee of Nigeria (JACON) 
which was led by Chief Gani Fawehinmi fell within this group. Its partial metamorphosis 
into the National Conscience Party was an attempt to place the opposition in power and 
not an indication of tergiversation among its leaders. As a trend, this was a dialectical 
continuation of the same struggle but it would appear that its delicate dialectical 
nuance was lost on some of its latter-day inheritors, who now went into politics for the 
self-aggrandizement it brought rather than the state platforms it could have provided 
for serving the people.
2WKHUDFWRUVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHLPSHUIHFWLRQVRIWKHVWDWHEXWEHOLHYHGWKDWVXIîFLHQW
JRRGZLOOKDGEHHQVKRZQE\JRYHUQPHQWVLQFH$EGXOVDODP$EXEDNDUoVDGPLQVLWUDWLRQ
midwifed the transition that brought Olusegun Obasanjo to power in 1999.  The 
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), at the time led by Clement Nwankwo, fell within 
WKLVVHFRQGFDWHJRU\6KHWWLPDDQG&KXNZXPD,QGHHGDWLQFHSWLRQ2EDVDQMRoV
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQHVWDEOLVKHGDQ2IîFH IRU WKH6SHFLDO$GYLVHURQ&LYLO 6RFLHW\ LQ DELG
to strengthen linkages and build trust between government and civil society groups. 
His role as host of the African Leadership Forum and his historic imprisonment for his 
critical stance against the military regime gave credibility to this relationship. But the 
partnership was short-lived. The necessary regulatory framework for stabilizing the 
UHODWLRQVKLSZDVPLVVLQJ ,WZDV D VSHFXODWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS DW EHVW7KH LQFXPEHQWoV
ELGIRUDQXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWKLUGWHUPLQRIîFHSUHFLSLWDWHGDFULVLVWKDWXQUDYHOOHGWKDW
relationship.
The collaboration fell apart. Despite continuous engagement by civil society groups 
VLQFH WKH 2EDVDQMR DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ IHZ RUJDQLVDWLRQV KDYH EHHQ DEOH WR LQïXHQFH
national policy to the degree achieved in Ghana, Kenya, or South Africa (USAID, 2004) or 
alter the character of the state (Okafor, 2006). Trade unions are the only group to have 
consistently done this with regard to minimum wage for workers and the protection of 
oil subsidy. They were joined in the latter function (protection of oil subsidy) by youth 
movements and social media platforms, which mobilized mass protests and shut down 
the country for nearly two weeks in January 2012.
As a result of their exclusion from governance, civil society groups formed alliances with 
opposition political parties. This bonding expanded the space for participation but it 
could prove ominous in the long term. With the landslide victory of the All Progressive 
&RQJUHVV$3&RYHUWKH3HRSOHoV'HPRFUDWLF3DUW\3'3LQWKHJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQRI
there are signals that the autonomy of CSOs as a self-conscious community with an 
agenda and modus operandi quite distinct from the state and market might have 
been compromised. The APC was originally a broad coalition of opposition parties. It 
attracted many seasoned rights activists to its fold. In securing victory at the polls, it 
presents a unique opportunity for the study of civil society transformation in Nigerian 
society. The Muhammadu Buhari administration has become an interesting case study 
RIKRZ$IULFDoVODUJHVWGHPRFUDF\ZRXOGPRXOGWKUHHPXWXDOO\FRQWUDGLFWRU\HOHPHQWV
LQWRDIXQFWLRQDOSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\LHWKHDOEDWURVVRI%XKDLUoVIRUPHULQFDUQDWLRQ
as a military dictator, (2) the persistence of an elite capture of the state and its corrupt/
dysfunctional bureaucracy, and (3) the tensions produced by the presence of so many 
rights activists and former members of the overthrown party.
The political disentanglement of this ménage a trois will not be easy. Some civil 
society actors have adopted realignment with the state as a conscious strategic 
choice. However, it is important for the sector they represent (or have left behind) 
to improve their own internal cohesion and build coalitions among themselves. 
Nigerian CSOs need to intensify multilateral partnerships with the private sector by 
encouraging improved corporate social responsibility (CSR) for sustainable community 
development in access to housing, health, education and employment opportunities, 
environmental preservation and improved infrastructure. This type of collaboration is 
QRWZHOOGHYHORSHGSRVVLEO\GXHWRWKHQRQSURîWFODXVH LQ LQVWUXPHQWVHVWDEOLVKLQJ
many CSOs. With careful legal attention, work with the private sector need not lead to a 
violation of that clause or spirit since the CSR instrument of many private organisations 
is coextensive with the mandate of some CSOs.
It is instructive to note that many oil and gas companies and other private organisations 
became more focused in addressing CSR issues with the intervention of civil society groups 
like the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and Environmental 
Rights Action (ERA). The activism of such groups made Shell Petroleum Development 
Company Ltd. and other oil companies to scale up community development efforts in 
Bayelsa and Rivers States. The continued negative impact of private sector activities 
have affected the development of trust relationships in some areas, leaving the civil 
VRFLHW\SULYDWHVHFWRUUHODWLRQVKLSXQGHUGHYHORSHGGXHWRFRQïLFWRIYDOXHV
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Nevertheless, Nigerian civil society groups have a long history of collaboration with 
external development partners. This dates back to support received by the labour 
movement for capacity building activities during the military era. Over the years, 
development partners like USAID, DFID, European Union, World Bank, Global Rights, 
OSI/OSIWA, and IMF have streamlined areas of co-operation with local development 
partners to address areas of need. In some instances, the relationship takes the form 
of country compact contracts, where the government, CSOs and external development 
partners design a framework for collaboration. An example is the National Strategic 
Health Development Plan 2010-2015. In other cases, there is direct funding by external 
development partners to the civil society groups.
Challenges and Accomplishments
As agents of change, Nigerian CSOs are confronted by real institutional, legal and 
social barriers. Having evolved with greater visibility, and encouraged to act by willing 
international partners, civil society groups are faced with at least seven strategic 
challenges:
1. 7KHGHPDQGVZKLFKFLYLOVRFLHW\PDNHVRQWKHVWDWH7KHVHDUHQRWDOZD\VUHïHFWHG
within civil society itself, with particular reference to the rigorous entrenchment of 
ethical culture, transparent governance and accountability.
2. The built-in need within civil society for charismatic personalities. This means 
ownership of organisations is sometimes personalised with minimal adherence to 
management by objectives. The situation constrains ideas and may in fact breed 
poor leadership. 
3. Leadership squabbles. These reproduce splinter bodies in civil society with 
effectively the same mission statements and a tendency to rehash facts and 
perpetually reinvent the wheel. 
4. 7LPHDQGIXQGZDVWDJH7KLVUHVXOWVIURPLQHIîFLHQWIXQGXWLOLVDWLRQDQGGLVVLSDWLRQ
of energy in the operations of civil society groups as strong groups tend to work in 
similar thematic areas and publish similar annual reports without collaborations 
that conserve resources and re-channel them to other areas of need. 
5. Planning and budgeting that are still tied to external donor cycles. This affects long-
term strategic planning and reduces the capacity for sustained implementation. 
6. High staff turnover that is induced by poaching. This adversely affects the 
inculcation of a spirit of partnership among groups and promotes a sense of 
competition among them. 
7. The combination of foreign funding and an anti-state history. This sustains the 
VWDWHoVVXVSLFLRQRI&62VDQGUHGXFHVSURVSHFWVRIWKHLUFRRSHUDWLRQ LQDUHDVRI
need.
On the positive side, Nigerian CSOs were the primary push behind electoral reform, 
SDVVDJHRIWKH)UHHGRPRI,QIRUPDWLRQ$FWDQGRYHUDOOLPSURYHPHQWVLQZRUNHUVo
conditions of service. They successfully pushed for a reversal of government policy on 
fuel subsidy. As one wing of the sector, the Nigerian media are the most outspoken in 
Africa and, together with other civil society elements, form part of a drive for increased 
îVFDO WUDQVSDUHQF\ LQ WKHSXEOLF VHFWRU7KHLUDFWLRQVKDYHSURGXFHGH[SDQGHGPDVV
interest in budgetary politics and the entrenchment of gender equity as a principle of 
inclusive governance.
While these are undeniable achievements, more needs to be done by CSOs to confront 
the tasks of institution building, economic development, end of public corruption and 
improved security. These cannot be readily achieved while many CSOs fail to disseminate 
project outcomes effectively or without local validation of content or results. The 
performance of many CSOs in the contemporary period will be sub-optimal, if CSOs 
GRQRWKDYHIXQFWLRQDODQGUHJXODUO\XSGDWHGZHEVLWHVRULIWKH\DUHIDLUO\GLIîFXOWWR
be reached physically. Capacity building and adherence to project protocols remain key 
challenges. Projects encounter delays in the release of funds but these delays do not 
always justify non-completion of proposed projects. 
$OWKRXJKIHHGEDFNVWUDWHJLHVPD\YDU\E\SURMHFWîHOGRULHQWHG&62VVKRXOGEHPRUH
participatory and less ad hoc in their approach. Feedback should extend beyond project 
life cycles. Typically, programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation are 
concluded without input from target communities. There is low sense of community 
ownership. Against this background, Moru (2005) observed that many of the challenges 
WKDW FLYLO VRFLHW\ JURXSV IDFH LQ1LJHULD DUH VHOILQïLFWHG 7KHUH LV OLWWOH FRRUGLQDWHG
effort at building community consensus and mass mobilisation for actions requiring 
broad appeal. They seek inclusiveness by non-inclusive means. Divisions within the 
ranks of civil society along ethnic and regional lines frustrate the chance of collective 
advocacy and the development of a united purpose. 
To address these challenges, it is important to build on the existing coalitions of CSOs 
within the country and region to enforce a peer review and collaboration mechanism. 
Such synergizing would enhance quality assurance in research, budgeting, programming, 
advocacy, intervention, participatory monitoring and evaluation by leveraging the 
strengths of thematically-linked CSOs. The combative styles of engagement developed 
in the era of an intransigent dictatorship should be complemented with strategic 
thinking and how to utilise that in policy dialogues. Nigerian CSOs must embrace the 
reality of retaining an activist outlook while creating room for constructive proactive 
engagements with political leaders, the private sector and external bodies.
Conclusion
1LJHULDQ&62VDUHDSHUPDQHQWî[WXUH LQ WKHFRXQWU\oVSROLWLFDO ODQGVFDSHEXW WKHUH
are structural (external and internal) constraints to the independence and effectiveness 
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ZLWKZKLFKWKH\DFW,QWKHELGWRLQïXHQFHSROLF\PDQ\RUJDQLVDWLRQVKDYHFRPHXQGHU
VWURQJ SROLWLFDO LQïXHQFH &RRSWDWLRQ KDV HURGHG WKHLU WUDGLWLRQDO DXWRQRP\ 7KLV
means that internal cohesion is one of the main goals that civil society must achieve as 
it engages with the state and private business in the new democratic order. Owing to 
the end of active physical struggle, it is imperative for civil society to become proactive 
for more effective engagement. Practitioners should consolidate their skills in research 
and analysis as a means of validating the empirical premises of proposed actions. 
Correspondingly, engagement with donor communities should synchronise priorities 
and achieve equality in agenda setting. Civil society cannot be seen as independent of 
the internal state but dependent on an external donor community for direction. While 
it is clear that their activities were necessitated by the failure of the state to provide 
basic and advanced civic services, reactions are mixed concerning their autonomy and 
apparent freedom from oversight. The thrust of civil society should be to activate the 
type of state that would drive economic and political development by challenging 
existing structures and critiquing state responses to developmental problems. 
The diversity of CSOs in Nigeria is a measure of expansions in the democratic space. 
The number of human rights organisations is high, but the number of organisations 
working in the areas of health, food security, poverty alleviation, and social service is 
extraordinarily large in Nigerian civil society. The competences of the organisations 
FDQYDU\YHU\PXFK7KLVFDQPDNHFROODERUDWLRQGLIîFXOW,WLVWKHUHIRUHLPSRUWDQWWR
protect the unity of the sector. This can be done through collective training and capacity 
EXLOGLQJLQUHVHDUFKHWKLFVVWUDWHJLFWKLQNLQJSROLF\DQDO\VLVDQGVFLHQWLîFSURJUDPPH
management. Other actions include collaborative information generation, increased 
information sharing and use, joint planning and execution, establishment of theme-
based coalitions or peer review and consultation. These are steps that Nigerian CSOs 
PXVWWDNHDVDFRPPXQLW\DVWKH\IDFHXQDFFXVWRPHGFKDOOHQJHVLQWRGD\oV1LJHULD
1HZWKUHDWVWR1LJHULDQQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWVKRXOGGHîQHWKHIRFXVRIIXWXUHFLYLO
society engagement. These include travesty of justice, corruption, power and energy 
problems, high youth unemployment and cost of living, bad road, waterways and other 
transportation networks, decline in educational facilities, poor health care delivery 
systems, crime and insecurity, urban alienation, home-grown insurgency and the 
pVOXPPLîFDWLRQqRISRRUVHWWOHPHQWVDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI UDSLGXUEDQGHYHORSPHQW
*RYHUQPHQWKDVQRWPDGHVLJQLîFDQWLPSDFWLQWKHVHDUHDVSDUWO\EHFDXVHFLYLOVRFLHW\
seems not to view these as reason or contexts for contestations with the state and the 
private sector. There are too many groups chasing a limited set of goals. As a result, 
many civil society groups need to reinvent themselves and expand their focus. The 
spectre of 494 Nigerian organisations clustered around 12 priority areas is analogous to 
having too many civil society cats feeding at a few funding troughs. 
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Civil society in Senegal: institutional 





The XX century is characterised by a paradox: major progress has been made in the 
VFLHQWLîFWHFKQLFDODQGHFRQRPLFVHFWRUVKRZHYHUFKDOOHQJHVUHODWHGWRGHYHORSPHQW
and mass poverty have worsened. In many African countries, this has led to awareness 
creation and a determination on the part of the people not to rely solely on the state but 
to build their own capacities to enable them overcome their challenges.
7RZDUGVWKHHQGRIWKHoVWRWKHHDUO\oV6HQHJDOZLWQHVVHGDVWURQJJURZWKLQFLYLO
VRFLHW\LQWHUPVRIVL]HLQïXHQFHDQGFDSDFLW\7KLVZDVLQïXHQFHGE\SURFHVVHVUHODWHG
to the structural adjustment programme, withdrawal of state involvement, globalization 
of the economy, growth of democratic governance, the growth of telecommunications 
and particularly the increase in general poverty.
We have seen the phenomenal growth in the number of national, regional and 
international NGOs which with time, have become indispensable actors in the 
provision of basic social services as well as in the preparation of development policies 
and programmes.
We have witnessed the emergence of civil society as a key actor in society. It however, 
KDVYDULRXVIDFHWVLQWHUPVRILWVQDWXUHDQGFRPSRVLWLRQ$OVRFLYLOVRFLHW\LVGHîQHGLQ
various ways, in terms of its conceptual approach, historic origin and national context.
7KHîUVWFKDSWHURIWKLVDUWLFOHZLOOSURYLGHDQLQVLJKWLQWRWKHJHQHUDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
of civil society in Senegal, its development with the passage of time and the present 
understanding of the concept of civil society in Senegal. The second chapter will discuss 
WKHOHYHORILQYROYHPHQWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\oVDFWRUVLQ6HQHJDOoVGHYHORSPHQWSURFHVVDQG
the third chapter will assess the challenges faced by civil society in Senegal. Finally 




share a common ambition namely to be guided in their work by the ideals of solidarity, 
which do not work for the State neither are they subject to the government. Civil 
society refers to all citizens who interact with the State and actors in the market. These 
RUJDQLVHGDFWRUV1*2VQRQSURîWDVVRFLDWLRQVPRYHPHQWVWUDGHXQLRQVWKHUHOLJLRXV
community) work in the public domain and relay the concerns of citizens based on 
universal rights to the State and the business sector. According to the African Meeting 
for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO), civil society “comprises all the actors who 
are not political parties, governments or the media”
$QRWKHU GHîQLWLRQ RI &62V ZKLFK DSSOLHV WR 1*2V LQ SDUWLFXODU KLJKOLJKWV WKH
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innovation that NGOs have brought to the North –South cooperation. The objective of 
NGOs is to provide support to people with a view to improving their living conditions, 
îJKWLQJ DJDLQVW SRYHUW\ DQG SURPRWLQJ VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW 1*2V XQGHUWDNH
this work in collaboration with the State. In Senegal, the State Secretariat for Human 
Development is responsible for NGOs. This Secretariat later became the Ministry for 
Human Development then was changed to the Ministry of Women, Children and the 
Family and again to the Ministry of Social Development. From the Ministry of the Family, 
Food Security, Women Entrepreneurship, Micro Finance and Children, the responsibility 
for NGOs was given to the Ministry of Interior at the end of 2011. 
 History of the development and current understanding of the concept of 
civil society in Senegal
The origins of civil society in Senegal dates back to the colonial era. Forced labour and the 
FRQVFULSWLRQRIPHQWRIRUPWURXSHVRI6HQHJDOHVHîJKWHUVSURYRNHGWKHRSSRVLWLRQoV
collective reaction against the colonial authorities. Later, due to the growth of the 
working class and the educated middle class comprising mainly government workers 
DQGWHDFKHUVDQHZIRUPRInFLYLOVRFLHW\oVSUXQJXS,WKDGDQHZJHQUHRIDFWRUVZKR
had a new mission: to make demands. Their main demand was for equal rights and 
better conditions for workers. This civil society was therefore a conglomeration of 
trade unions and employers unions. In 1947, railway workers went on strike for several 
months to demand the same rights enjoyed by their French counterparts. Senegalese 
women from the four municipalities which existed in the colonial era were given the 
right to vote at the same time as French women.
The youth constitute another category of actors in civil society. They are grouped 
in Cultural and Sports Associations. The key activity of this civil society is organising 
JHQHUDOVSRUWVFRPSHWLWLRQV7RZDUGVWKHHQGRIWKHoVWRWKHHDUO\oVDGLIIHUHQW
kind of NGO emerged, women groups, housing cooperatives, groups with a focus on 
economics, human rights organisations, consumer rights associations etc.
Majority of Senegalese understand civil society to mean NGOs although NGOs only 
constitute a part of the totality of civil society. For RADDHO107, civil society represents 
the fourth arm of government aside the executive, judiciary and legislature. It is a 
counter force. It is considered that civil society comprises organisations and networks 
which operate outside the state apparatus. These organisations are expected to exhibit 
some attributes such as independence, autonomy and non partisanship.
In Senegal, the fact that the leadership of NGOs and trade unions are also leaders 
107 RADDHO (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme) is a regional Senegalese NGO. It was established 
in 1990 and aims at promoting, and protecting human rights in Senegal and Africa. It has a strong network of 
partnerships in Senegal, Africa and throughout the world
of political parties creates confusion and raises questions as to the legitimacy and 
transparency of the CSOs.
This confusion affects the reputation of CSOs in Senegal to the extent that the 
government considers them as opposition parties. There is tension in the rapport 
between government and civil society. For example Senegalese President Abdoulaye 
Wade in answering a question posed by the Marianne newspaper in February 2010 
said the following: ‘There is no civil society in Senegal, there are only masked politicians 
ZKRFDQQRW OLYHXS WR WKHLU UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV ,îQG WKLVSVHXGRFLYLO VRFLHW\RIIHQVLYHo
7KLVVWDWHPHQWZDVFRQîUPHGLQ-XQHE\WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU6RXOH\PDQH1GÃQÃ
Ndiaye. According to him, there is even no civil society in Senegal. ‘There are people who 
belong to political parties and others who have political opinions but do not have the 
FRXUDJHWRWDNHSDUWLQWKHSROLWLFDOJDPHOLNHWKHUHVWRIXVo
6HQHJDOoVFLYLOVRFLHW\LVJURZLQJLQDQHQYLURQPHQWPDUNHGE\NH\IDFWRUVRISROLWLFDO
social and economic dysfunction.
r Associations: In Senegal, associations can be found in almost every village and 
VXEXUEYLOODJHDVVRFLDWLRQVJURXSVZLWKDIRFXVRQWKHHFRQRP\ZRPHQoVJURXSV
cultural and sports associations, the dahiras, community based organisations etc. 
Due to the limited scope of their interventions they are not able to show interest 
LQ VWUDWHJLF LVVXHVZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKHîJKWDJDLQVWSRYHUW\7KH\ UDWKHUSURYLGH
prompt response to issues relating to small groups.
r Foundations : They are regulated by more recent statutes than those that apply to 
associations (1995 law). They are less in number than the associations and NGOs 
and generally operate in religious and humanitarian areas.
r Non Governmental Organisations: 7KH GURXJKWV H[SHULHQFHG LQ WKH oV ZHUH
an important landmark in the development of NGOs in Senegal. They focused 
their activities in the rural areas where they put to test innovations in the area 
RIZDWHU UHVRXUFHV DQG DJULFXOWXUH ,W ZDV RQO\ IURP WKH oV WR WKH oVZKHQ
the structural adjustment programme was in place that NGOs interest in the 
SRSXODUXUEDQHFRQRP\ZDVQRWHG7KHSHULRGIURPWKHoVWRWKH\HDUZDV
PDUNHGE\WKHGHVLUHRI1*2VWRPRYHIURPWKHLULQLWLDOH[SHULHQFHVWRLQïXHQFLQJ
SXEOLFSROLFLHV7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRID FRQVRUWLXPRI1*2V LQ WKHPLGoV WKH
CONGAD108 SURPRWHG WKH FRQVROLGDWLRQ RI 1*2V DV IXOO\ ïHGJHG DFWRUV LQ WKH
development process. This position enabled them to dialogue with the State and 
donor organisations.
r Social movements: Social movements particularly trade unions, women and youth 
108 CONGAD: Conseil des ONG d’appui au Développement. Established in 1982, its objective is to promote cooperation 
and sharing among NGOs and protect their interests. It has 200 national and international NGOs. 
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organisations have been avenues for mobilization of people and sector based 
demands.
r Marabouts and the Clergy: This is a very important group in view of the fact that 
it has been the subject of interest and questions. They play the role of social or 
esoteric alternatives or better still spiritual and educational mediators.
r New emerging actors in Senegal’s civil society: (1) The intellectual elite: In Senegal, 
there are movements such as the circle of intellectuals which comprises people 
ZKR KDYH VWURQJ LQïXHQFH HLWKHU RQ QDWLRQDO SXEOLF RSLQLRQ RU RQ D SDUWLFXODU
VRFLDOJURXSRUFDWHJRU\7KHKLSKRSPRYHPHQWLVEDFNLQ6HQHJDOoVFLYLOVRFLHW\
Initially recognised as an actor in the cultural sector, this movement is at the 
forefront of the campaign for responsible citizenship and for the promotion of good 
governance through information dissemination and sensitization activities. For 
H[DPSOHWKHpZHoYHKDGHQRXJKqPRYHPHQWZKLFKLVXQGHUWDNLQJDVHQVLWL]DWLRQ
FDPSDLJQIRUWKH\RXWKWRKDYHDFFHVVWRWKHQDWLRQDOLGHQWLîFDWLRQFDUGDQGWKH
YRWHU LGHQWLîFDWLRQ FDUG WR HQDEOH WKHP WDNH SDUW LQ WKH HOHFWLRQV 7KH nGDUDMLo
PRYHPHQWZKLFKKDVUHOHDVHGDQDOEXPWRVHQVLWL]HRQWKHULVNVRIWKHnJROGFXUVHo
in Senegal and has called for responsibility and transparency in the mining of the 
resource.
,QWHUYHQWLRQVRI6HQHJDOoVFLYLOVRFLHW\FDQEHFDWHJRULVHGLQîYHNH\DUHDV
r The work environment: 7UDGH XQLRQV ,WV DIîOLDWHGPHPEHUVKLS DUH FDWHJRULVHG
into three groups: employers unions, salaried workers union and union of workers 
in the informal sector.
r Human rights, democratic and economic governance: This relates to human rights 
organisations and organisations which focus on public affairs management.
r The socio –economic environment: This relates to associations, groups, NGOs, 
Foundations. Their objective is to create, facilitate, contribute to improve the 
livelihoods of people by working in areas such as education, health, income 
generation etc.
r The cultural and religious environment: The basis of activities and guide for 
members of this civil society is the protection and promotion of culture, religion 
etc. This civil society has the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people, with the 
backing of the heads of the movement who are religious heads and dahiras.
r Social Relationships: 7KHVH DUH RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZKLFK ZRUN LQ D VSHFLîF VHFWRU
comprising people who have power relationships to attain more equity such as the 
genre, communities negatively affected by the decisions.
INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SENEGALS’S 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
%DVHG RQ WKH UHYLHZ RI &62 LQWHUYHQWLRQV VL[ PDLQ DUHDV KDYH EHHQ LGHQWLîHG DV
WKRVH LQZKLFK&62VFRQWULEXWHVLJQLîFDQWO\WRFKDQJH7KHVHDUHPDLQO\HGXFDWLRQ
human rights protection, health and HIV/AIDS, economic and democratic governance/ 
DGDSWDWLRQWRFOLPDWHFKDQJHHGXFDWLRQRQSHDFHVHFXULW\DQGFRQïLFWSUHYHQWLRQWKH
îJKWDJDLQVWSRYHUW\DQGPLFURîQDQFH
The activities of NGOs in this sector such as ASAFIN or ACAPES seem to be very 
enlightening with the creation of a multipurpose professional training centre which 
SURYLGHVWKRXVDQGVRI\RXWKWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHFHLYHWUDLQLQJDQGWKXVTXDOLîFDWLRQ
Improvement in knowledge levels is undoubtedly one of the key changes attributed to 
civil society organisations.
We can cite as an achievement, the amendment of the 1999 law on the penal code 
which now imposes a 10 sentence with hard labour on rapists and people who engage 
in violence against women. This victory is attributed to civil society organisations and 
ZRPHQoVPRYHPHQWV LQSDUWLFXODU7KHSDVVLQJRI WKH ODZRQJHQGHUHTXDOLW\ LQ WKH
election process is a major progress made.
Within the context of implementing the integrated health development programme 
the Ministry of Health and some development partners have gone ahead to sign various 
FRQWUDFWVZLWKWKH1*2oVLQSODFHQRWDEO\WKRVHLQWKHIROORZLQJVHFWRUV5HSURGXFWLYH
Health (50%), AIDS (20%), Capacity Strengthening (10%), IEC (10%), and Community 
Health (10%). An institutional framework has been put in place to complement the 
involvement of NGO/OCB in the implementation of the health policy. A guide has been 
developed to regulate the partnership between the Ministry and NGOs/associations. 
CSO participation in the development and follow up of public policies has become a 
key requirement for democracy and citizenship due to globalisation. Governance issues 
which have become the subject for heightened controversy between government and 
CSOs in view of their sensitivity and political scale constitute an area in which civil 
society has made recent investments. 
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The involvement of CSOs in providing support to the underprivileged by facilitating 
DFFHVVWREDVLFVRFLDOVHUYLFHVDQGPLFURFUHGLWKDVFRQWULEXWHGVLJQLîFDQWO\WRLPSURYLQJ
the livelihoods of the poor.





consolidation of peace. Civil society actors play an increasingly important role in the 
discussions, initiatives and programmes aimed at promoting governance, peace and 
the security of the country. In all, CSOs have had variety in their range of intervention, 
categorised in six key areas as outlined above. It must be noted that these areas of 
LQWHUYHQWLRQDUHLQOLQHZLWKQDWLRQDOSULRULW\DUHDVRXWOLQHGLQ6HQHJDOoVHFRQRPLFDQG
social policy document 2010 -2015 (3rdJHQHUDWLRQ'653DQGWRWDOO\UHïHFWWKHFRQFHUQV
of the people. The general objective of CSOs is to provide support to people in order to 
LPSURYHWKHLUOLYHOLKRRGVîJKWDJDLQVWSRYHUW\DQGSURPRWHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW
THE KEY CHALLENGES OF CIVIL SOCIETY
r Democratic and economic governance constitutes a big challenge for CSOs. The 
absence of a regular General Assembly within their ranks, which should culminate 
in the democratic renewal of tenure of CSO leaders is a sign of dysfunction.
r The challenge of sourcing for funding to ensure effective participatory processes 
which are inclusive and sustainable.
r Other huge challenges relate to technical and institutional capacity strengthening 
as well as giving CSOs a professional outlook.
r The challenge of resource mobilization: Majority of civil society organisations are 
dependent on donor organisations and government funds.
r The challenge of independence of CSOs in relation to political parties.
RECOMMENDATIONS
r Put in place a tripartite framework to research and implement initiatives for the 
promotion and administration of social issues in Senegal. This framework will bring 
together all stakeholders in the social/solidarity-based economy.
r Put in place a programme to promote citizenship participation and use as leverage: 
sensitization and communication with a view to involving foreign and national 
SDUWQHUVDVZHOODV WKHSULYDWHVHFWRU WRPRWLYDWH WKHPWRSURYLGHîQDQFLDODQG
material support towards the achievement of social action programmes.
r Strengthen institutional and technical capacities of local and national CSOs;
r Improve on the governance of NGOs. Developing networks and alliances: Joining a 
network gives CSOs more weight and is an important tool for sharing experiences.
CONCLUSION
The weak nature of the modern State as well as its proven inability to meet social 
needs and the democratic aspirations of the people are the basis for the support of 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVZKRVHPDLQDLPLVWRUHGHîQHWKHVRFLDOFRQWUDFWEHWZHHQJRYHUQPHQW
and the various components of society.
While progress made due to international networks have made CSOs credible partners 
LQWKHH[HFXWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQWoVGHYHORSPHQWSURJUDPPHVWKHLUZHDNSURIHVVLRQDOLVP
DQGODFNRIîQDQFLDOLQGHSHQGHQFHLVUHJUHWWDEOH7KH\KRZHYHUKDYHDORWRILQïXHQFH
in the management of national and international issues.
With the emergence of new actors comprising on one hand emigrants capable 
RIîQDQFLQJSURMHFWV LQ WKH FRPPXQLWLHV WKH\EHORQJ WRDQGRQ WKHRWKHUKDQG WKH
SKHQRPHQRQRIWKHKLSKRSPRYHPHQWDQGWKHnZHoYHKDGHQRXJKoPRYHPHQWDQHZ
type of civil society is materializing.
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Civil Society and the Democratic 
Transformation of Sierra Leone
Aisha Fofana Ibrahim & Nemata Majeks-Walker
SIERRA LEONE
Introduction
The need for a vibrant civil society cannot be underestimated in a society such as Sierra 
Leone which has experienced not only a brutal 11 year civil war (1991-2002), but also a 
number of repressive regimes that violated all thinkable rights of its citizenry since her 
independence in 1961. Even though it can be argued that civil society existed prior to 
independence in Sierra Leone, the proliferation of organizations with the potential to 
LQïXHQFHWKHVWDWHRQEHKDOIRILWVSHRSOHLVDSURGXFWRIWKHFLYLOZDU+RZHYHUWKHUH
LV QHLWKHU D JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHGGHîQLWLRQ RI WKH WHUP pFLYLO VRFLHW\q QRU DQ DFFHSWHG
FODVVLîFDWLRQRIZKLFKJURXSVVKRXOGEH UHJDUGHGDVFLYLO VRFLHW\DFWRUV LQ WKH6LHUUD
Leonean context.  
7KHWHUPLVJHQHULFDOO\XVHGWRUHIHUWRRUJDQLVHGJURXSVVXFKDVZRPHQoVSURIHVVLRQDOV
faith-based, advocacy, youth and workers groups, that mediate between the state and 
ordinary citizens or between duty bearers and claim holders in an effort to check the 
potential excesses of the state. These groups have in one way or the other been able 
to “challenge state authoritarianism, expand democratic spaces, and defend issues of 
public interest” (Jusu-Sheriff, 2004:267). By 2007, there were over 300 international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil 
society organisations (CSOs), and community-based organisations (CBOs), registered 
with the then Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP) with many 
equal numbers unregistered. All these bodies constitute what is today regarded as civil 
society in Sierra Leone.
This paper looks at the transformation of civil society over the decades from a time when 
they operated within a restricted space to a time when, because of proliferation, the 
activities and existence of some organisations has become suspect.  It also examines 
WKHSRVLWLYHUROHFLYLOVRFLHW\SOD\HGGXULQJWKHFLYLOFRQïLFWDQGWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQVWR
building a democratic Sierra Leone. 
The changing faces of Civil Society
The notion of what constitutes civil society is a contested one not only in Sierra Leone but 
elsewhere in the developing world. This contestation ranges from which organisations 
qualify to be labeled as non-governmental to the functions they should perform in 
VRFLHW\7KHPRVWUHFHQWZRUNLQJGHîQLWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQ6LHUUD/HRQHKROGVWKDWLW
is “The space outside the household, government and the market where people organize 
or associate to advocate with and on behalf of the people, geared towards the interest of 
the community”.109




space between the state and society — are the traditional secret societies such as the 
Poro and Sande110WKDWFRQWLQXHWRZLHOGVRPHIRUPRILQïXHQFHLQPRGHUQGD\6LHUUD
Leone. Concerned with the rite de passage from girl/boyhood to woman/manhood, 
these groups have “constituted alternative poles of power and some carved out their 
RZQ DXWRQRPRXV pFLYLFq VSDFH WR SURPRWH RU GHIHQG WKHLU VSHFLîF LQWHUHVWVq -XVX
Sheriff, 2004: 267). Closely following these traditional institutions are the professional 
associations that emerged in nineteenth and early twentieth century in Freetown 
to defend the individual and collective rights of their members. Other established 
voluntary groups coalesced around issues of gender, ethnicity and religion.
Workers and youth groups engaged in social activism during the struggle for 
independence. This suffered a setback after independence was achieved. Early post-
independence civil society comprised mainly of community based development 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV \RXWK JURXSV IDUPHUVo DVVRFLDWLRQV DQG ZRPHQ DQG IDLWKEDVHG
organizations. These associations were concerned with self-development and growth 
of their members than in challenging state excesses. The few exceptions were the 
labour Congress, the Bar Association and the National Union of Students. 
By the time Siaka Stevens, 1968-1986, centralised power around his personality and 
declared a one-party dictatorship in 1978, all dissenting voices went underground. This 
was the beginning of state fragmentation that was to lead to civil war.
7KHDGYHQWRIZDULQtDQRXWFRPHRIRYHUWZHQW\îYH\HDUVRIDXWKRULWDULDQUXOH
— witnessed a revival and subsequent proliferation of civil society organizations. Civil 
society thus re-emerged to play its historic role in the context of a brutal civil war with 
a clear understanding of the strategic role that non-state actors have to play in the day-
to-day activities of a functional State.  Spurred in part by global human rights discourses 
anchored around issues of participation, accountability and transparency, these agents 
have made their mark as quintessential oversight bodies monitoring the activities of 
the state, advocating for democratic principles and freedom, and enlightening the 
citizenry about their rights. 
Civil society groups also perform a host of public, private, generalized, as well as, 
VSHFLDOL]HGIXQFWLRQVDQGDUHVHHQDVDSROLWLFDOQRWIRUSURîWVRFLDOJURXSV0RVWDUH
active in the development sector, providing services in education, health and agriculture 
while others are engaged in the peace-building and governance sector, with a focus on 
democracy, anti-corruption, human rights, and gender equality. 
However, a critique of CSOs is that:
“...civil society values are poor in Sierra Leone. CSOs do not practice Good Governance 
and Gender Equity. CSOs are characterized by the culture of secrecy and corruption. 
110 The Poro is an all male secret society, while the Sande is an all female secret society in Sierra Leone.  Membership into 
theses societies cut across every ethnic group in the country except for the Krios.
Widespread corruption has been reported within CSOs. Most CSOs lack internal 
democracy, accountability and transparency and leadership for most is in the hands of 
their respective founders or even set up as a family organizations aimed at attracting 
donor funding.”111 
Generally however, CSOs are rated above average in terms of professionalism and 
accountability, while others are viewed as one-person entities not above malfeasance 
and impropriety. There exists an unhealthy competition for donor funds, power and 
LQïXHQFHWKDWGRHVQRWDXJXUZHOOIRUWKHLPDJHRIQDWLRQDO&62V0RUHRYHUWKHLURYHU
reliance on donor funding creates an uneven power relations, whereby power lies with 
the funding partner and CSOs become mere implementing bodies for INGOs.  In many 
instances, projects become unsustainable because many INGOs spontaneously change 
funding focus, which creates a situation whereby many CSOs end up chasing where the 
money is rather than focusing on their core principles.112
Locking horns with khaki boys and warlords
7KHUROHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\HVSHFLDOO\WKHZRPHQoVPRYHPHQWLQFKDOOHQJLQJWKHPLOLWDU\
junta and ending the civil war is well documented and a veritable success story of their 
collective intervention in nation building. Recognizing the huge cost and consequences 
RIDUPHGFRQïLFWDQGVWDWHIDLOXUHFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVFKDOOHQJHGWKHPLOLWDU\
junta and launched a nation-wide campaign to educate, inform and galvanise the 
people of Sierra Leone to defend their individual and collective rights as citizens. This 
was achieved through massive awareness raising workshops with stakeholders and 
aggressive media intensive campaigns on emerging national discourse on democratic 
values, peace building, good governance and human rights.
)RU H[DPSOH WKH 1DWLRQDO 3URYLVLRQDO 5XOLQJ &RXQFLOoV 135& DWWHPSW WR VWDOO WKH
democratic transition process was met with resistance by CSOs during the National 
Consultative Conferences of Bintumani I and II, at which they insisted on elections 
before peace. At these Conferences, the junta line was that there needed to be peace 
before elections could be held. Understanding the implications of such a position, civil 
VRFLHW\VWRRGîUPRQWKHKROGLQJRIJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQVWREULQJEDFNFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP
in Sierra Leone by arguing that peace could be better negotiated by a democratically 
elected government. 
The actions of civil society were again pivotal in the restoration of the government 
of president Kabbah in 1998 after it was ousted from power by the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) coalition in 1997. 
CSOs mobilized people within Sierra Leone and in neighbouring Guinea, where the 
111 CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone (2006)  p 9
112  For more on this see Fanthorpe and Maconachie (2010) and Jusu-Sheriff (2004). Both analyze the unsustainable 
nature of these groups that are totally dependent on funding from INGO and how they can be easily compromised.
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Kabbah government was located, to organize marches, take part in radio phone in 
programs to demand for a return to democracy. Radio Democracy 98.1 became the 
mouthpiece for the pro-democracy movement. 
Civil society was also vigilant in ensuring that the RUF adhered to the Lome Peace 
Accord. When the RUF violated the accord and abducted 500 UN peacekeeping troops, 
:RPHQoV *URXSV RQ0D\   GHPRQVWUDWHG RXWVLGH WKH UHVLGHQFH RI WKH 58)
Leader demanding their release.  These and other demonstrations, in which the RUF 
shot and killed demonstrators,  led to the end of the RUF in government and the arrest 
and trial of Foday Sankoh the leader of the RUF.
The post-war era and the entrenching of democracy and the 
rule of law 
 CSOs have been effectively engaged in development and nation building through 
holding the government accountable for its stewardship, providing a plethora of services 
and building the capacity of a wide spectrum of the population to critically analyze 
some of the social and economic trajectories of the government. The Sierra Leonean 
experience suggests that civil society has been a partner in development on several 
occasions, which complements rather than opposes the efforts of the government. 
Thus civil society has played a pivotal role in shaping democratic principles and 
SUDFWLFHVSRVLWLYHO\LQïXHQFLQJJHQGHUQRUPVDQGDERYHDOOFUHDWLQJDVSDFHIRUZRPHQ
and other minorities to participate in public life. The fact that many Sierra Leoneans are 
becoming aware of their rights as citizens, and, to participate in democratic processes 
through free and fair elections as well as to exercise their franchise through non-violent 
means can all be attributed to the work of civil society groups in the country.  In the 
last three elections held in the country, civil society embarked on massive awareness-
raising, mobilization and sensitization campaigns in which people were encouraged to 
exercise their voting rights, and particularly to vote for female candidates and ensure a 
violence free election. 
In effect, the 1996 elections saw over 750,000 (60.33%) of the 1244,601 registered voters 
casting their votes, while in 2002, 2.3 million  (85%) of the 2.7 eligible voters registered 
to vote and a total of 1.9 million, 83% of those who registered, voted in the elections. 
The 2007 elections also witnessed a high number of voter turnout with 1,984,016 of 
the 2,617,554 registered voters casting their votes. All of these elections were relatively 
non-violent.
CSOs provide educational and other social services to communities that might otherwise 
QHYHU EHQHîW IURP VXFK VHUYLFHV7KH\SURPRWH FRPPXQLW\ SDUWLFLSDWLRQRI FLWL]HQV
and have consistently provided the ideal civil space for Sierra Leoneans to contribute 
to their own development. This has empowered many Sierra Leoneans to be able to 
contribute in the search for solutions to their problems.  By creating the much needed 
awareness and knowledge on human and legal rights, CSOs have relentlessly fought for 
the introduction of important legislations as well as the repeal of unpopular acts. 
%HWZHHQDQG:RPHQoV*URXSVOHGWKHFDPSDLJQIRUWKHHQDFWPHQWRIWKH
three gender justice acts, namely the Domestic Violence (DV), Registration of Customary 
Marriage and Divorce and Intestate and Devolution of Property Acts in 2007. These three 
DFWVSURWHFWDQGSURPRWHZRPHQoVKXPDQULJKWVERWKDWWKHGRPHVWLFDQGOHJDOSXEOLF
spheres. The DV Act criminalizes domestic violence, while the Devolution of Property 
Act addresses all the discriminatory provisions of law and practices against women in 
relation to inheritance, making men and women equal in the distribution of estate. 
$VSDUWRIWKHJHQHUDOFLYLOVRFLHW\HQJDJHPHQWZRPHQoVRUJDQL]DWLRQVKDYHEHHQDW
the core of changing the status of women in Sierra Leone in the 21st century.  This era 
has witnessed the emergence of the non-partisan 50/50 Group of Sierra Leone whose 
mission is to campaign for more women in politics and public life through training and 
DGYRFDF\ 7KLVJURXSKDV IRFXVHGRQ FKDQJLQJ WKHSXEOLFoVSHUFHSWLRQRIZRPHQ LQ
politics and public life through recruiting, training and supporting over 6,000 female 
leaders, political aspirants and candidates over the years. 
The 50/50 Group has organized vigorous training and capacity building programmes, as 
well as advocated and lobbied political parties to encourage women to take leadership 
positions.  It led campaigns to encourage the alternating of women and men on party 
lists (zipper system). All these efforts have contributed to an increased number of 
female contestants, from 65 in 1996 to 156 in the 2002 presidential and parliamentary 
elections, and elected parliamentarians from 5 to 18 (two women Paramount Chiefs) or 
14.5 per cent of members of parliament.  
With the restoration of local governance in 2004, 54 of the 107 female candidates 
who contested for the elections were elected, constituting 13.7 per cent of elected 
FRXQFLORUV,QFROODERUDWLRQZLWKRWKHUZRPHQoVJURXSVDQG2;)$0WKH*URXS
provided funding and support to 29 female politicians to stand as independent 
candidates during the 2008 local government elections. The 50/50 Group furthermore 
led the establishment of the Council of Women Councilors and the Sierra Leone 
)HPDOH3DUOLDPHQWDU\&DXFXVZKRVHDLPVLQFOXGHLQFUHDVLQJZRPHQoVSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ
decision-making positions as well as lobbying for the revision of discriminatory laws 
against women. 
The Ebola Crisis
,Q0D\  WKHîUVW FDVH RI (ERODZDV UHSRUWHG LQ 6LHUUD /HRQH DQG OLNH LQ DOO WKH
calamities that has befallen Sierra Leone, civil society was fully engaged in working 
towards a solution to the crisis. The role and impact of Civil society has been immense 
LQWKHîJKWDJDLQVW(ERODDQGUDQJHIURPHQVXULQJWKDWWKHLPPHGLDWHQHHGVRISHRSOH
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are met to holding the state responsible for service provisions and the management 
of Ebola funds.  The last case of Ebola was discharged on September 25, 2015. As of 
6HSWHPEHUWKHFXPXODWLYHFRQîUPHGFDVHVRI(ERODLQ6LHUUD/HRQHVWDQGDW
8,704; deaths at 3,589 and survivors at 4,051.113
Since the outbreak in 2014, civil society groups have worked collectively and individually 
and have been at the forefront of mobilizing and sensitizing communities on how to 
curb the spread of the virus.  Some organizations have focused on monitoring health 
facilities and the treatment of the sick, while others have focused on restoring livelihoods, 
building the capacity of survivors, providing water, sanitation and educational facilities. 
Civil society was quick to draw attention to weak accountability systems and delays 
in the international response to the Ebola epidemic.  A vast majority of organizations 
expended resources on providing material goods for the sick and survivors, taking care 
of children orphaned by Ebola and educational materials and services for children. 




and MAWOPNET, was formed in July 2014 to address the gendered nature of EVD. This 
campaign provided a platform for women in Sierra Leone and those in the diaspora 
WR FRQWULEXWH ERWK WKHLU PDWHULDO DQG KXPDQ UHVRXUFHV WR WKH îJKW DJDLQVW (EROD
Recognizing that women are proportionately affected by Ebola, this campaign set out to 
ensure that not only was the gendered material needs of women met but that gender 
becomes a critical category of analysis for all Ebola related interventions.  WRESL has 
consistently articulated that women are especially vulnerable to EVD because of their 
primary role as care givers as well as prevailing gender roles and traditional practices. 
This makes women susceptible and disproportionately affected by EVD and therefore 
WKHQHHGWRHQJDJHZRPHQLQWKHîJKWDJDLQVW(9'7RGDWH7KH:5(6/FDPSDLJQKDV
focused on the following:
r Documenting and supporting orphans and dependents of Ebola;
r Advocating for the welfare of health workers, especially in the provision of adequate 
SURWHFWLYHJHDUSD\PHQWRIEHQHîWVDQGJHQHUDOZHOOEHLQJ
r  Providing facilities and training on hand washing, initially in all markets in the 
Western area and in at least two in each district in order to imbibe a culture of 
hand washing in Sierra Leone.
r  Making Ebola messages realistic and consistent.
r Supporting women in quarantined homes through the provision of care packages
r Supporting women survivors of EVD. through the provision of care packages
113  National Ebola Response Centre (NERC). Nerc.sl. retrieved September 29, 2015
r Conducting a study on the impact of Ebola on women and girls.
%HIRUH WKH îUVW FRXQWGRZQ WR WKH HQG RI (ERODZKLFK VWDUWHG RQ $XJXVW  
&62oV KDG IRUPHG D FRQVRUWLXPZLWK D SURMHFW WLWOHG &LYLO 6RFLHW\ (EROD 5HVSRQVH
and Recovery Platform» with the goal of enhancing collaboration in rolling out post 
Ebola recovery programmes as well as engendering public trust.114 This consortium, it is 
EHOLHYHGZLOOLQïXHQFHWKHZD\SRVWHERODUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURJUDPVDUHGHVLJQHGZLOO
enhance the monitoring of how money is spent by the state and other stakeholders and 
will ensure that ordinary people have a say in the design and implementation projects.
Conclusion 
&62VHVSHFLDOO\ZRPHQoVJURXSVKDYHFRPHWRUHFRJQLVHWKDWWKH\DUHPRUHIRUPLGDEOH
when they work collaboratively. As such, recent advocacy campaigns, such as the 30% 
minimum quota campaign, have been mainly organised under an umbrella body — The 
:RPHQoV6ROLGDULW\6XSSRUW*URXS :66* >DFRDOLWLRQRIZRPHQoVJURXSV LQFOXGLQJ
Grassroots Empowerment for Self Reliance (GEMS)], The 50/50 Group, Campaign for 
*RRG*RYHUQDQFH&**WKH6HDUFKIRU&RPPRQ*URXQGDQGYDULRXVRWKHUZRPHQoV
organisations. 
The primary objective of the WSSG is to advocate and campaign for the protection of 
the rights of women through the judiciary and legislature in the wider community. This 
has been done through a combination of advocacy campaigns, rallies, demonstrations, 
WHVWFDVHOLWLJDWLRQVDQGWKURXJKFUHDWLQJUHïHFWLRQSODWIRUPVLQWKHIRUPRIGLDORJXH
sessions where women are able to debate and consult on issues that affect them. To 
GDWH WKLV FROODERUDWLRQ RIZRPHQoV JURXS IRU DPLQLPXP  TXRWD IRUZRPHQ LQ
parliament and all elective and selective decision making positions has been successful 
and has led to the drafting of the Gender Equality Bill, which will be tabled in Parliament 
before the end of 2015.
0RVW UHFHQWO\ LV WKH :5(6/ FDPSDLJQ D FRDOLWLRQ RI ZRPHQoV RUJDQL]DWLRQV WKDW
continues to advocate for the recognition of the gendered nature of Ebola and the need 
IRUZRPHQoVHQJDJHPHQWDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDOOSURFHVVHV
Such coalitions seem to be the way forward for CSOs in Sierra Leone. The larger and 
stronger the membership, the more seriously they will be taken by the state and the 
OHVV EXUGHQSODFHGRQ VLQJOH RUJDQL]DWLRQV WRîJKW WKHîJKW &RDOLWLRQV DOVRKHOS WR
avoid duplication of efforts and deter suspicion and allegations of partisanship. With 
the amount of professionalism and dedication displayed by the majority of CSOs in the 
country, the realization of a country in which accountability and transparency prevail 
becomes an immediate reality.   
114  Statement by Head of Action Aid Sierra Leone, Mohamed Sillah  at a CSO consortium meeting with the Chief of Staff 
on  Tuesday 18thAugust, 2015 at State House, Freetown. http://allafrica.com/stories/201508191573.html
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Recommendations
Civil society can only be vibrant and effective if it is accountable to the people it is 
responsible to, refrains from partisan politics and sustains itself independently. In 
general, CSOs have been able to maintain their neutrality although sustainability 
remains a major challenge, especially since donor funds are drying up and development 
partners such as DFID and the European Union (EU) are under increased pressure 
to do more with limited resources. Moreover, most donors must now achieve and 
demonstrate results with shrinking budgets to skeptical citizens and governments. 
1. Civil society organisations must remain vocal and continue to hold the state 
accountable to its citizenry through advocacy, monitoring and capacity building.
2. There must be a joint commitment by development partners to support civil society 
in their efforts to build a culture of transparency and accountability in Sierra Leone.
3. Provision should be made in the national budget for an annual subvention to CSOs 
to reduce their overall dependence on external donor funding which in some cases 
GLUHFWO\LQïXHQFHVWKHDJHQGDRIWKHVHRUJDQLVDWLRQV
4. Parliamentary Committees should be encouraged/ mandated to dialogue with civil 
society as a matter of principle on crucial matters involving the general populace.
5. 7RHIIHFWLYHO\IXOîOOWKHLUUROHV&62VQHHGWREXLOGWKHFDSDFLW\RIWKHLUVWDII
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The contribution of civil society to 
the upsurge of democracy in Togo : 





A contemporary concept which has been bandied around a lot or is at least 
PLVXQGHUVWRRGn&LYLO6RFLHW\oLVSRVLWLRQLQJLWVHOIDVDPHOWLQJSRWIRUQRQVWDWHDFWRUV
working towards the well being of the people.
In Togo, civil society has experienced a fairly unusual growth in view of the fact that since 
WKHoV LWKDVSOD\HGDQDFWLYHUROH LQWKHGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQQDWLRQDOUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ
and development of the country.
7KHREMHFWLYHRIWKLVDUWLFOHLVQRWWRJLYHDQH[KDXVWLYHH[SRVÃRQ7RJRoVFLYLOVRFLHW\
EXWWRJLYHDV\QRSVLVRQKRZLWLVUHJDUGHGE\LWVDFWRUVDQGEHQHîFLDULHVLGHQWLI\LWV
strengths and weaknesses to be able to assess its contribution to the socio economic 
and political development of the country.
The Context
,Q &,9,&86  nFLYLO VRFLHW\o LV GHîQHG DV pa dynamic environment outside of the 




to the progress of the citizen and also extends to the area of politics. Civil society 
organisations, which are essentially apolitical have not left political entrepreneurship 
WRSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV7RJRoVFLYLOVRFLHW\LVYLVLEOHWKURXJKLWVFRQWULEXWLRQWRGHYHORSPHQW
and the consolidation of democracy.
Civil society is doing well among the people because based on a study undertaken by the 
Population Research Unit of the University of Lome (URD, 2002), in 2002, CSOs comprised 
RIWKHSRSXODWLRQ0RUHWKDQWHQ\HDUVODWHUWKHîJXUHKDVJRQHXSVLJQLîFDQWO\
Parent Teacher Associations, local development committees, organisations with a focus 
on environmental conservation, poverty, impunity, corruption, human rights violations 
HWFPDLQO\PDNHXSWKLVSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ7KHVLJQLîFDQWLQFUHDVHLQWKLV
percentage can be attributed to the need to form groups in order to undertake activities 
which have an extremely positive impact on members. The following groups can be 
LGHQWLîHG
r $VVRFLDWLRQVRIQDWLYHVRIDQHWKQLFFRPPXQLW\ZLWKLQDVSHFLîFJHRJUDSKLFDODUHD
r Men and/or women belonging to various socio professional sectors whose objective 
is to entrench certain rights and show that they are well represented;
r Victims of political excesses;
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r Groups established to ensure the promotion and well-being of some marginalised 
sections of the population
r Groups established to strengthen the capacity of the youth etc.
These are the various areas which account for and sustain the interest of Togolese in 
associations.
The beginning of the contemporary civil society movement in Togo dates back to 1933, 
to the days of the uprising of market women in Lome. They demanded the release 
of the “Duawo” (the elite) and the removal of harsh taxes imposed by the colonial 
authorities in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1929. Civil society already had 




LQ7RJRoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ H[SHULHQFHGDSHULRGRI OHWKDUJ\RZLQJ WR WKHRQHSDUW\
political system in the country. However, the thirst for the freedom of the people of 
Africa, which was made manifest through uprisings in many African countries during 
WKHoVDQG WKH n(DVW:LQGo UHVXOWHG LQRSHQLQJXS LQGHHG UHVWRULQJ WKHSROLWLFDO
environment with the establishment of democracy and multi party rule. Togo was not 
VSDUHGIURPWKHnZLQGRIFKDQJHo$VDUHVXOWRIWKLVQHZHUDPDQ\&62VZLWKDIRFXV
on safeguarding political gains, good governance and human rights were established.
,PPHGLDWHO\ DIWHU WKLV SHULRG7RJRoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ZHQW WKURXJK D SHULRG RI GLVJUDFH
in 1992 due mainly to a break in international cooperation owing to poor democratic 
practices. CSO funds, mainly provided by foreign partners, diminished and activities 
came to a standstill.
In 2000, activities of civil society picked up; majority of its activities during this period 
ZHUH XQGHUWDNHQ LQ WKH DUHDV RI KXPDQ ULJKWV SURWHFWLRQ HGXFDWLRQ OLWHUDF\ îJKW
against impunity etc. This can be attributed to the political openness promoted by 
state authorities, the requirement for good governance by international institutions, 
the development of new technology in the area of information and communication 
(establishment of half  a dozen FM radio stations in the capital and more in the rural 
DUHDVWKHERRPLQSULYDWHPHGLDPXOWLSDUW\V\VWHPVHOHFWLRQVDQGîQDOO\DGYRFDF\
activities of local CSOs and the Togolese diaspora.
7KH SHFXOLDU DVSHFW RI 7RJRoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ LV WKH IDFW WKDW VRPH RUJDQLVDWLRQV KDYH
voluntarily excluded themselves from it while others have been excluded involuntarily. 
This applies to workers unions who, for the most part, consider themselves as another 
social force and are reluctant to be counted among the CSOs because their direct 
counterparts are the employers association and the State.
7KHSULYDWHVHFWRUWKRXJKQRWSDUWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\VXSSRUWV&62VE\îQDQFLQJVSHFLîF
activities particularly through fund raising for humanitarian activities and the execution 
of some projects as part of supposed corporate social responsibility.
Some people consider that CSOs working in the areas of good governance, politics or 
democracy are a spring board for politicians who have failed in their political parties or 
for political novices who nurture an ambition greater than civil society. The latter take 
temporary refuge among CSOs in order to make a name for themselves. For others, it is 
an opportunity to enrich themselves on grants from funding partners.
Although this may not be entirely true, it makes us aware of the fact that people are 
closely observing the activities of civil society as well as the management of their 
heritage.
Private Sector
Until recently, CSO relationship with the State was tense, marked with frequent 
FRQïLFWV6RPHRIWKHHYHQWVWKDWKDYHFUHDWHGVRPHOHYHORIGLVFRUGEHWZHHQWKHWZR
entities include prohibition and suppression of public protests against a State measure, 
ZLWFKKXQWRILQïXHQWLDODFWRUVLQFLYLOVRFLHW\ZLWKLWVFRQVHTXHQWLPSXQLW\VORZQHVV
in regularizing the registration documents of associations, making actors in civil society 
look like political actors etc. The political environment in Togo did not allow for open 
dialogue.
Relations with the State however, improved with the political openness promoted 
by the various actors in the socio political life of the country and with national 
reconciliation which led to the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
2009, relations with the State have improved. It is necessary to indicate that the work 
of this Commission ended in April 2012 and its report was made public. On 24th 
December, 2014, Government established the High Commission on Reconciliation and 
Strengthening of National Unity, to complete the work of the Commission. It was given 
the task of implementing a victim reparation programme, such as was proposed by 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The expectations of various socio-political 
actors in the country and particularly of the people of Togo, who have high hopes for 
this institution, is that the work of the High Commission will contribute effectively to 
reconcile the sons and daughters of this country. It is however, necessary to point out 
that the challenges this institutions must face are enormous.
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7KH6WDWHLQFUHDVLQJO\LQYROYHV&62VLQWKHUHVROXWLRQRIVRFLRSROLWLFDOFRQïLFWV7KLVLV
the case of GF2D115 and REFAMP-T116 who were stakeholders in the 2004 Global Policy 
Agreement in their capacity as women associations working for the total emancipation 
of the Togolese woman and her involvement in the management of public affairs.
The media, on the other hand is a key partner to CSOs not only because they are 
voluntarily part of civil society but more because they are a channel for disseminating 
information to the people. To this end, work sessions and training seminars are often 
held to group their actors into various thematic areas.
There is a weak relationship between private sector and civil society which essentially 
focuses on providing various forms of support for the implementation of activities. 
There is however, no clear or established partnership framework between them.
Civil society’s capacity to become an essential component in 
the development of the country
7RJRoVFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVWKHDGYDQWDJHRIEHLQJFORVHWRWKHSHRSOHXQOLNHWKHFDVHRI
political and State actors. Thus it condemns social injustice, works towards poverty 
UHGXFWLRQDQGîJKWVDJDLQVWKXPDQULJKWVYLRODWLRQV:LWKUHVSHFWWRSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQ
VRPH&62V VXFK DV )$00(DQG$/$),$KDYH SXW LQ SODFHPLFURîQDQFH VFKHPHVE\
VSRQVRULQJ$*5VIRUWKHEHQHîWRIWKHSHRSOH7KHVHRUJDQLVDWLRQVJHQHUDOO\JLYHVPDOO
loans at progressive rates to women and Togolese nationals or to groups/cooperatives 








GF2D established legal advisory, aid and support centres countrywide to provide legal 
support to people, especially women.
7KHoV LQ7RJR VDZ WKHHPHUJHQFHRI D YHU\ FRPPLWWHG FLYLO VRFLHW\GHYRWHG WR
îJKWIRUDQGVDIHJXDUGJDLQVPDGHLQWKHDUHDRIGHPRFUDF\%\LWVLQYROYHPHQWLQWKH
115  Working Group on Women, Democracy and Development
116  Network of African Women Ministers and Parliamentarians – Togo
political life of the country, which was evident through sensitization campaigns, going 
to the grassroots to condemn abuses and violations, civil society positioned itself as 
an indispensable partner. Election periods were times when it played a very important 
role. It actively participated during these periods to ensure free and fair elections. To 
this end, the CSOs network was put in place particularly from the year 2007, to observe 
the organisation of the various elections. The LTDE117, OSCADAE118 based in Lome are 
also examples of the commitment of civil society in that they actively participated in 
entrenching democracy and the rule of law in Togo. They were always ready to condemn 
the abuses and violations to which people fell victim as well as election related fraud.
Given that the history of Togo is marked by violence during periods of elections, 
particularly presidential elections, civil society made a lot of effort to promote peace 
during this period in the life of the country. Many CSOs organised various kinds of 
activities, from meetings with political leaders to sensitization of people in various 
regions on non violence. In 2010, organisations such as Justice and Peace, CACIT, GRAD, 
GF2D etc. established a CSO platform known as ‘Civil Society Mechanism for Peaceful 
Elections’. This initiative as well as various other efforts from civil society helped to 
ensure a peaceful presidential election in 2010.
In 2015, the GF2D collaborated with ten CSOs to implement a project called «Mobilisation 
of women based organisations for a violence free election in Togo ». The project was a 
nationwide one and had the objective of promoting peace during the electoral process 
which led to the presidential election of 25th April,2015. In addition, with support from 
WANEP-Togo, a «Situation Room» was created on election day. The Joint Action of Civil 
6RFLHW\ &16&ZDV DEOH WRPRELOLVH VLJQLîFDQW îQDQFLQJ IURP WKH (XURSHDQ8QLRQ
which enabled it to deploy more than 3,000 national observers.
CACIT provided support to victims of political violence. To date, 72 complaints were 
îOHGDWWKHWULEXQDOVDJDLQVWWKHDOOHJHGSHUSHWUDWRUVRIWKHVHDFWV8QIRUWXQDWHO\QRQH
of these complaints were investigated. To this end, the Court of Justice of ECOWAS 
instructed Togo, in a decision taken on 3rd July 2013, to investigate them.
&LYLOVRFLHW\FDQDOVREHVHHQLQWKHDUHDRIJRRGJRYHUQDQFHîJKWDJDLQVW LPSXQLW\
peace building etc. Activities undertaken by COPED, CACIT, WANEP-Togo and many 
other organisations demonstrate its contribution to the promotion of democracy and 
the rule of law in Togo. 
117  Refer to list of acronyms and abbreviations
118  Ditto 3
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Assessment of Togo’s civil society
Difficulties and challenges
Registering an association in Togo is a big challenge. According to the World Bank (2004), 
RI&62VLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHUHJLVWUDWLRQSURFHVVLVYHU\GLIîFXOWDQGLQGLFDWH
that administrative bottlenecks are impediments to the creation of associations.
$OO FLYLO VRFLHW\ RUJDQLVDWLRQV HVWDEOLVKHG LQ WKH FRXQWU\ PXVW îUVW RI DOO REWDLQ
FHUWLîFDWLRQ WR EH UHFRJQLVHG DV DQ DVVRFLDWLRQ 7KH SURYLVLRQV ZKLFK UHJXODWH WKLV
contract of association can be found in law number 40-484 of 1st July 1901 (JORT 1946, 
SDJH  (YHU\ DVVRFLDWLRQ LV îUVW RI DOO UHFRJQLVHG E\ WKH0LQLVWU\ RI ,QWHULRU DQG
6HFXULW\VXEVHTXHQWO\WKH0LQLVWU\RIGHYHORSPHQWDQGUHJLRQDOSODQQLQJFHUWLîHV LW
DVDQ1*2,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWFHUWLîFDWLRQDVDQ1*2KDVLWVRZQDGYDQWDJHV
such as non payment of certain taxes.
Aside the fact that some political representatives put psychological pressure on NGO 
DFWLYLVWVZRUNLQJ LQ WKHSROLWLFDOîHOG WKHUH LVDFOHDU OLQHWKDWVHSDUDWHVFLYLO VRFLHW\
from politics. Many would say that this separation between the government and civil 
society must be consolidated. To prove them right, some CSOs are created by political 
leaders or their supporters to promote their political ideas. Since the 2010 presidential 
elections, the country has witnessed the creation of associations commonly called 
nVXSSRUW DVVRFLDWLRQVo 7KHVH DVVRFLDWLRQV HQMR\ PRUH YLVLELOLW\ DQG KDYH VLJQLîFDQW
îQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVDWWKHLUGLVSRVDOEHFDXVHWKH\GHYRWHGO\FRPPXQLFDWHWKHSROLWLFDO
ideologies of their leaders. Unfortunately, this kind of association is categorised as a 
CSO. This situation is frustrating for civil society which is powerless in the face of these 
nH[FHVVHVo
7RJRoV FLYLO VRFLHW\ LV QRW îQDQFLDOO\ LQGHSHQGHQW EHFDXVH LW UHFHLYHV IXQGLQJ IRU LWV
activities from external sources; it is one of the reasons why the break in international 
cooperation had such a negative impact on its development. The contributions of its 
PHPEHUVDUHLQVLJQLîFDQWFRQVLGHULQJWKHLVVXHV&62VGHDOZLWK7KH\DUHREOLJHGWR
FRXUWWKHVXSSRUWRIîQDQFLDODQGGHYHORSPHQW LQVWLWXWLRQVVXFKDVWKH:RUOG%DQN
United Nations Agencies, chancelleries and embassies of western countries. 






on Sustainable Human Development prepared by the UNDP in 2004, more than 50% 
of CSOs are based in the capital Lome. The situation has not changed much more than 
ten years after this report was released. This lessens the impact of the activities they 
undertake. The poor cooperation among NGOs is equally noteworthy; only 46% of NGOs 
in Togo are members of federations or networks119. A study by the World Bank in 2004 
noted a weak cooperation between local NGOs on one hand and international NGOs on 
the other. The coalitions and alliances crumble with the test of time and other interests.
$VLGH LQWHUQDWLRQDO 1*2V ZKLFK KDYH WKH UHTXLUHG UHVRXUFHV WR UHFUXLW TXDOLîHG





spite of laudable-efforts it has made these recent years in relation to socio-economic and 
political development in Togo. In fact since 1933 to date, catalysts have enabled CSOs to 
SRVLWLRQWKHPVHOYHVEHWWHU&DWDO\VWVVXFKDVWKHn(DVW:LQGoLQWKHoVWKHHPHUJHQFH
of multi party states, the openness advocated by the government, the impetus created 
by external donors etc. It has become an indispensable actor in contributing to address 
the challenges confronting the country.
“A reliable and sincere  partnership with the State, more professionalism and training for 
the sector, more visibility and creativity in its approach; these are the elements civil society 
requires in order to achieve the objective it has given itself: Becoming progressively close 
to the people” The resolution of these key challenges that CSOs make daily efforts to 
DGGUHVVZLOOVDIHJXDUGWKHIXWXUHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGWKHVLJQLîFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWKDWLW




WKH n(DVW:LQGoDQGPRUHUHFHQWO\ LQWKHoV$OO WKHDFWRUVDJUHHWRSURPRWHWKLV
growth even if it means that the private sector must remain inactive.
9DULRXVUHIRUPVPXVWEHXQGHUWDNHQWRHQVXUHWKDWFLYLOVRFLHW\oVDFWLYLWLHVPDNHEHWWHU
119  UNDP - Togo, NGO Report on Sustainable Human Development in Togo 2004
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impact. Some of these include:
1. It is critical that civil society becomes professional in its work. It requires relevant 
competencies to enable it maintain the key position it occupies vis a vis the 
government. 
2. The regulations that these organisations have freely adopted must be adhered to 
by their own actors. 
3. The capacities of the latter must be strengthened in various sectors to ensure the 
effectiveness of their activities. 
4. &LYLO VRFLHW\ PXVW KDYH UHOLDEOH îQDQFLDO SDUWQHUV RYHU ORQJ SHULRGV RI WLPH WR
ensure continuity in its activities; it must particularly develop strategies to source 
IRULQWHUQDOIXQGLQJLQRUGHUQRWWRVXIIHUWKHHIIHFWVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOîQDQFLDOFULVLV
5. The partnership among CSOs must be consolidated. The activities of CSOs will 
be more visible if strategic partnerships along thematic lines are encouraged. 
Information sharing among local and regional CSOs must also be sustained. This 
partnership is also important with respect to actors in government. Civil society 
must not always be wary of them
6. The State in its capacity as guarantor of individual and institutional freedom must 
DFFHOHUDWHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSURFHGXUHVDVVRFLDWLRQVPXVWJRWKURXJKWREHFHUWLîHG
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In West Africa, CSOs have evolved and gained important recognition in public policy 
debates and contribution to democratic development. Civil society has contributed in 
YDULHGZD\VWRJRRGJRYHUQDQFHDQGVRFLRHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW6SHFLîFDOO\&62VKDYH
LQWHUYHQHGLQHOHFWLRQVDQGJRYHUQDQFHSURFHVVHVFRQïLFWSUHYHQWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQW
humanitarian crisis, health and sanitation challenges (Ebola outbreak in the region). 
(YHQ WKRXJK &62V DUH FRQWULEXWLQJ VLJQLîFDQWO\ WR GHYHORSPHQW YHU\ OLWWOH KDV EHHQ
highlighted and documented to demonstrate their achievements and contributions to the 
regions development. 





to shape public policy making in the region. The main priority is to present evidence 
WKDWVWURQJO\ UHïHFWV LVVXHVRQ WKHJURXQGWKDWZRXOGFKDOOHQJHSUHFRQFHSWLRQVZKLOH
still maintaining a relevance to public policy and practice. What the authors have done 
is to individually capture the historical evolution of civil society, its contributions to 
development and propose concepts that will frame the development discourse in West 
Africa.
The overall aim of this research report is to move forward the documentation of the 
contributions of civil society to development across the region. It also seeks to open up 
the space for continuous discussions by showing the intrinsic value of civil society, using 
HYLGHQFH GUDZQ IURP HDFK RI WKH îIWHHQ FRXQWULHV IRFXVLQJ RQ FRQWULEXWLRQV WR JRRG
governance, democracy, and sustainable development. 
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